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What explains the evolution and dynamics of land squatting in Montevideo, Uruguay? Over the 
last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in this city that lacked a 
―frontier‖ of poor illegal settlements until the 1980s, with the exception of a handful of very 
precarious neighborhoods dubbed cantegriles that started appearing around the 1950s. Today, 
about 11 % of the city‘s population lives on illegally occupied land (INE 2006). The more than 
400 current squatter settlements have expanded the city limits, leaving a very concrete trace of 
urban and social change. Squatter settlements mushroomed without natural disasters setting 
people in motion and without population growth due to rural to urban migration processes, 
frequent causes of land squatting elsewhere. Thus, both knowing how and why land squatting 
has developed constitute interesting puzzles. No one has yet written about the history of land 
squatting in Montevideo. This dissertation recovers this history from oblivion and puts it in 
dialog with the literature on popular politics. From a social movement/contentious politics 
perspective, in this dissertation I challenge the assumption that socioeconomic factors such as 
poverty were the only causes triggering land squatting.  I test whether political factors also 
shaped the cycle of land invasions and examine the mechanisms through which those factors – 
known as political opportunities in the literature - translated into different types of mobilization. 
Through statistical analysis, in-depth interviews, document analysis, and multi-sited 
ethnographic fieldwork, this project will describe and explain the origins and trajectories of 
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 v 
squatting as an elusive form of collective action during the last half of the 20th century (1947-
2004). The project seeks to a) describe and explain the cycle of squatting and its timing; b) 
compare trajectories of different kinds of mobilization involved in land seizures and the 
mechanisms that activated them, and c) understand squatters‘ politics through a thick description 
of squatters‘ experiences and memories of their relationships with state agencies and politicians 
and through the experiences and memories of politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats as well.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
What explains the evolution and dynamics of land squatting in Montevideo, Uruguay? Over the 
last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in this city that lacked a 
―frontier‖ of poor illegal settlements until the 1980s, with the exception of a handful of very 
precarious neighborhoods dubbed cantegriles that started appearing around the 1950s. Today, 
about 11 % of the city‘s population lives on illegally occupied land (INE 2006). The more than 
400 current squatter settlements have expanded the city limits, leaving a very concrete trace of 
urban and social change. Aerial pictures of Montevideo today look very different from those in 
the 1960. Green areas of the past are grey areas today.  Squatter settlements mushroomed 
without natural disasters setting people in motion and without population growth due to rural to 
urban migration processes, frequent causes of land squatting elsewhere. Thus, both knowing how 
and why land squatting has developed constitute interesting puzzles.  
No one has yet written about the history of land squatting in Montevideo. This 
dissertation recovers this history from oblivion and puts it in dialog with the literature on popular 
politics. From a social movement/contentious politics perspective, in this dissertation I challenge 
the assumption that socioeconomic factors such as poverty were the only causes triggering land 
squatting.  I test whether political factors also shaped the cycle of land invasions and examine the 
mechanisms through which those factors – known as political opportunities in the literature - 
translated into different types of mobilization. Through statistical analysis, in-depth interviews, 
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document analysis, and multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, this project will describe and explain 
the origins and trajectories of squatting as an elusive form of collective action during the last half 
of the 20th century (1947-2004). The project seeks to a) describe and explain the cycle of 
squatting and its timing; b) compare trajectories of different kinds of mobilization involved in 
land seizures and the mechanisms that activated them, and c) understand squatters‘ politics 
through a thick description of squatters‘ experiences and memories of their relationships with 
state agencies and politicians and through the experiences and memories of politicians, 
technocrats and bureaucrats as well.   
Through the study of squatter settlements we learn something about urban popular 
politics in Uruguay. But, perhaps more interestingly, we learn something about less visibly 
structured forms of collective action more generally, forms that I dub here elusive. Most of the 
literature on collective action has been based on empirical research conducted in wealthy western 
democracies about more or less clearly structured movements such as labor movements. As we 
will see in the body of this dissertation, the study of squatters in part challenges and in part 
confirms the generalizability of those theories of collective action. Finally, those not even 
slightly interested in this particular case of contentious politics may still find something 
appealing here. Through the study of squatter settlements we also learn something about how to 
know, how to study subjects about which we do not have all the information we would like. In 
this sense, this dissertation is a sort of ode to the methodological imagination. It challenges us – 
or at least it challenged me - to count things that seemed un-measurable before, and to combine 
the parsimony of quantitative explanations with the depth of ethnographic research.  
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1.1 ON SQUATTING 
Squatter settlements are residential communities mostly or completely inhabited by poor 
residents who build their own houses on illegally occupied land. Residents might be owners or 
renters of their houses, but the plots where those houses are built belong to someone else, 
sometimes to the state, sometimes to private owners. They have become a landmark of most 
underdeveloped cities, especially capital cities, as a consequence of the rapid urbanization 
process in the last half of the twentieth century. Many migrants who came to the cities to work 
and did not find affordable housing either through the market or through the state started to 
occupy land they did not own and to build informal neighborhoods. With time, squatting also 
became common among other urban poor that were not migrants but had been living in the 
formal city. They also found in squatter neighborhoods a solution to their housing problems.  
  Squatter settlements all over the world share their illegality and their most important 
demand: land titles. Yet they vary from city to city, within cities, and within each settlement as 
well. They vary in the social composition of their dwellers (from the poorest of the poor to the 
working class), construction materials (depending on climate conditions, available materials, 
dwellers‘ assets, eviction expectations, and so on), landscape (e.g., from crowded shantytowns or 
slums to neighborhoods with streets and blocks that look just like a regular neighborhood in the 
formal part of the city), location in the city (while some of Rio‘s favelas are in the middle of the 
city, side by side other neighborhoods, in most cities squatters locate on the periphery), degree 
and type of organization and many other characteristics.  
It is very difficult to estimate how many squatters or squatter settlements there are in the 
world, precisely because of their informal character. There are, however, a few plausible 
estimates. In Lima almost half of its almost 7 million inhabitants live in one of about 300 
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settlements (Dietz 1998). In Montevideo, according to the most authoritative estimate, about 11 
percent of the population lives in a squatter settlement (INE 2006).  
The prevalence of squatters greatly depends on population pressures, the housing market, 
and the labor market. But it also depends on the relationship between the popular classes and the 
state. This relationship includes housing policy as well as more specific actions towards those 
who squat. State agencies may encourage, tolerate, ignore, harass or crush squatter settlements. 
More often, however, their acts belong to a grey zone that includes some tolerance, some 
repression, some cooptation, and some assistance. In addition, and to add one more layer of 
complexity, the state is not monolithic. Different state agencies may pursue different policies or 
specific actions and those policies may change.  State actions tend to depend, in turn, on how 
organized squatters are and on how interested elites are in squatters as political support.  In other 
words, the argument that guides this dissertation is an interactive one. Harsh economic 
conditions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence or prevalence of squatter 
settlements in a city or at a point in time in the same city. Economic conditions interact with 
political factors to make squatting happen, and to shape how it happens.  
In a related vein, but from a more micro perspective, I see squatter settlements as sites of 
both suffering and agency. More often than not, the media, politicians, policy makers and the 
general public portray squatters as suffering individuals, as citizens that lack what others have. 
This is indeed objectively true. Moreover, many squatters perceive themselves as suffering 
individuals, who lack what they need or what they are entitled to. And this is what you see when 
you enter into deprived households, when you talk to people who do not have jobs, health 
insurance or hope, when you walk along the streets of neighborhoods that look like lost non-
places in the middle of nowhere, and see barefoot children playing with rundown toys close to a 
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polluted and smelly river. Still, there are many poor people, with similar needs and rights who do 
not squat. I do not know if ―it takes a certain personality‖ to be a squatter as a social worker told 
me referring to the toughness you need to survive the ordeal of  being cold, hungry, or having no 
running water, especially at the beginning of a land invasion. What I do know is that squatting 
takes a lot of individual and family work, and a lot of collective work as well. In more academic 
terms, it takes a lot of agency. As Gay (1994) puts it ―victims they undoubtedly are; innocent 
however, they are not. Indeed, there's increasing evidence from a variety of contexts that the 
urban poor have been active, organized, and aggressive participants in the political process and 
that the popular organizations, in particular, have had a significant impact on the relationship 
between the urban poor and political elites." 
1.2 THE STUDY OF LATIN AMERICAN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS  
Squatter settlements in Latin American cities became very sexy objects of study in the 1960s.
1
 
The region‘s massive and rapid urbanization in the mid twentieth century, accompanying what 
would turn out to be an incomplete industrialization process,  has fascinated scholars from the 
                                                 
1
 More recently there has been a revival in interest in squatter settlements, but from a policy-oriented perspective, by 
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other international agencies who have been supporting 
slum upgrading programs such as Favela-Bairro in Brazil or the Programa de Integración de Asentamientos 
Irregulares in Uruguay. The general philosophy underlying these programs dates back to Mangin (1967) and Turner 
(1976) and has been preached all over the world by Hernando de Soto (1986). Rather than trying to avoid them, 
governments should help squatters build their neighborhoods. Using Mangin‘s words, squatting should be 
considered a solution rather than a problem. Although at first sight reasonable, the theoretical and political 
implications of these programs are questionable. First, they do not tend to attack the causes that lead people to squat. 
Second, their malleable use of social capital and democracy theories is something deeply troubling. As just one 
example, they often overstate the integration  capacities of all types of social capital, sometimes forgetting that 
without ties outside of these communities, or weak ties to use Granovetter‘s (1981)term, the long term wellbeing of 
squatters will probably not improve, no matter how much they participate in the building of their immediate 
environment. This is a very interesting line of inquiry but a different one from this dissertation‘s. (For more on these 
programs see Clichevsky (2003)).     
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region and abroad. In the 1960s and 1970s social scientists, especially anthropologists, found the 
massive migration from rural areas to urban centers very interesting. Migrants‘ demographics, 
values, behaviors, political attitudes and neighborhoods were under continuous scrutiny. The 
uncertainty of the time triggered academics‘ imagination to think about the new reality.  
Two major theories developed, with contending explanations of the migration and the 
fate of these migrants, especially those left out of the industrialization process, those that could 
not get incorporated into the built city and had to find alternative jobs and alternative housing 
and built the shantytowns or squatter settlements that are so characteristic of Latin American 
cities until this day. On the one hand, modernization theory – with Gino Germani (1968) as its 
main representative - considered migrants‘ shantytowns as transitory, as one stage in a longer 
process of change and development. Once these migrants learned  urban values, and once the 
modernization process was more complete, squatters would get incorporated into the culture of 
modernity, and therefore into its institutions, such as the labor market and the formal housing 
market. On the other hand, José Nun (1969; 2001) and his more structuralist colleagues 
developed a very different theory. Much more pessimistically, they predicted that shantytowns 
were there to stay, because the peripheral form of Latin American capitalism would never 
incorporate them. Squatter settlements constituted the housing of a marginal mass, whose 
existence was, according to Nun, functional to the whole system. It contributed to low salaries 
and therefore to the very unequal form of capitalism of the region.  
These theories structured the discussion of empirical results, and have been challenged 
and molded by them, giving birth to a rich tradition of studies and theoretical reflections about 
urban poverty.
2
  Janice Perlman‘s (1976; 2004) work on the favelas of Rio showed in the 1960s 
                                                 
2
 For a summary of this tradition by some of its main exponents, see González de la Rocha et al.(2004).  
 7 
that squatters were not that different from formal urban dwellers, and that their marginality was 
just a myth. She claimed that favelados were very much integrated into the formal economy and 
the values of the modern city. In the same vein, studying the case of Santiago de Chile, 
Alejandro Portes (1972) examined  ―rationality in the slum.‖ He empirically challenged the idea 
that slum dwellers were irrational. He demonstrated that they were not apathetic either, and that 
their political views and strategies could be radical or consensual depending on the 
circumstances, just like citizens living in the formal parts of the city. Susan Stokes‘ work in Lima 
(1991) and Robert Gay‘s (1994) more recent work in the Rio favelas have continued to flesh out 
that idea by showing variation in the political views and strategies of squatters.  
The relationship between squatter settlements and the state and politics in Latin America 
has received much more attention that in other parts of the world, in part because this 
relationship has been much stronger than anywhere else.  David Collier‘s (1976) work in Lima 
persuasively unveils how intertwined squatters and oligarchs are, how extensively though often 
silently the Peruvian elite has been involved in the formation of the dozens of settlements that 
make Lima one of the most informal cities of the region. Also for the case of Lima, perhaps the 
most studied city when it comes to urban informality, Dietz (1998) studies political participation 
both formal (vote) and informal (community participation), in six poor Lima neighborhoods over 
a 20 year time span. Other examples of this line of inquiry include Cornelius (1974; 1977),  
Roberts (1973), Handelman (1975), Eckstein (1988), Hipsher (1997; 1998), Schneider (1995), 
Burgwal (1995) and more recently Auyero (2000), Özler  (2003a), and  Dosh ( forthcoming, 
2009.) 
Specialists on a different region of the world suggest Latin American squatters‘ 
distinctiveness. In their attempt to bring together different traditions of study of urban 
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informality, Alsayyad (1993) and Alsayyad and Roy (1993; 2003) argue that, contrary to what 
happened in Latin America, in the Middle East it is the relative depolitization and invisibility of 
squatters that has enabled their survival.  
1.3 SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS AS MOVEMENTS 
Nobody would deny that squatters of abandoned buildings throughout affluent western 
cities, especially European cities such as Amsterdam, London or Barcelona, fall into the category 
of social movements.  They see themselves as such. Often also a youth and anarchist movement, 
the occupation of empty buildings in these contexts is perceived by the actors and by the 
authorities as an act of defiance of the state or the mainstream society they want to protest 
against. Of course, the degree of defiance varies by context, depending especially on property 
laws and the degree to which these laws are enforced. While in the US squatting has been very 
rarely tolerated, in cities such as Amsterdam or London institutionalization of the movement, 
through tolerance and even amnesty and legalization of squatters, has been more common (Pruijt 
2003).
3
 Yet squatters in the cities of the underdeveloped world are not usually seen as 
participants in social movements. We see them as deprived, impoverished or victims. Many seem 
them as dangerous as well. It is rare that we think of all the agency and collective effort it takes 
to build a neighborhood. 
Squatter settlements might or might not be considered social movements depending on 
the perspective we assume, and on their specific forms of organization at particular times and 
                                                 
3
 For an interesting study of the dynamics of movements‘ decline, and especially narratives of decline among 
Amsterdam‘s squatters, see Lynn Owens‘s book (Owens 2009). 
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places. Take for example Tarrow‘s (1998) definition of social movements as ―collective 
challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, 
opponents and authorities.‖ These challenges are different from the ones political parties and 
interest groups make, though sometimes the limits are blurry. Based on this definition, we can 
debate about how challenging, how collective, how interactive, and how sustained squatters‘ 
actions are. We can debate if all squatters of one city can be considered a social movement or if 
each neighborhood is what bounds collective action and therefore we have as many movements 
as neighborhoods. Some may also say that none is a social movement.  
Still, I argue that even if we do not consider squatter settlements as social movements, the 
theories and methods developed in the last decades for the study of collective action and 
contentious politics illuminate dynamics of squatting that might otherwise remain unnoticed or 
under-analyzed. This notion is very much inspired by Dynamics of Contention, a book in which 
three of the top scholars of social movements encourage researchers to expand their scope of 
analyzed phenomena and see if the mechanisms that were discovered to be useful to understand 
classic social movements such as the labor movement, are also useful to understand other 
phenomena (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).  
Trying to avoid entering in the never ending debate of social movements‘ definitions, I 
prefer the broader concept of contentious politics to illuminate the struggles over urban land 
shantytowns represent. ―Contentious‖ refers to claims that if realized would conflict with 
someone else‘s interests; ―politics‖ refers to some involvement of the government in these 
actions. Squatters‘ demands on the state, for titling, public services, schools, food and so forth, 
certainly imply a redistribution of finite resources and in that sense are conflicting with the 
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interests of the rest of the tax payers and other citizens. Since these demands are made to the 
local, city or national government, they are political demands.  
Not everything that squatters do is contentious or political. To survive, squatters use a 
broad range of strategies. Some are individual or household strategies (e.g., voting, working, 
distributing care work within the household, marrying, moving, contacting a politician 
individually, asking relatives for help, performing illegal activities, and others). Some imply 
collective action (e.g., seizing land at night, building streets, resisting the police, petitioning the 
state, and so on). The degree to which collective action takes place depends a great deal on 
contextual features. The same is true of the ways in which collective action takes place. While 
some contexts stimulate autonomous or self-sufficient collective action at the margins of the 
state (which seems to be the case in Middle Eastern cities and in repressive regimes), other 
contexts stimulate intense interaction with politicians and the state (e.g., Montevideo in 
democratic times and in other Latin American cities). This dissertation is primarily concerned 
with this latter form of collective action, and this is form can be illuminated by the literature on 
contentious politics.  
Squatter settlements are the most vital manifestation of political action by the urban poor 
of Latin America (Portes and Walton 1976). Organization often happens only within the squatter 
neighborhood, not among all squatter neighborhoods of one city. There have been cases of 
umbrella organizations among different squatter neighborhoods but the most common type of 
collective action takes places among neighbors of the same squatter settlement. Organization 
may take different forms depending on squatters and on the context in which they act. Squatters 
may invisibly self organize without demanding anything from the state; they may vote for a 
candidate they perceive as more willing to satisfy their demands; they may enter into patronage 
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relationships; they may protest in different ways such as blockading streets or marching; or, as it 
is usually the case, they may combine these and other modalities of organization. Governments, 
in turn, may repress, tolerate, help or ignore settlements.  
Organizing in a context of great deprivation is not easy. Collectively planning invasions, 
resisting the police, building houses and helping others build their own, getting together to 
demand or to steal electricity and phone lines, providing running water, building community 
services such as soup kitchens, forming associations, planning and building streets, opening 
clinics, blockading streets to get a new school in the area, taking care of the children, ensuring 
that new neighbors are ―good‖ neighbors or ―people of work‖ that ―want to progress‖–rather than 
―thieves‖ or ―scavengers‖–  policing, and many other ordinary practices take place in squatter 
settlements and require residents‘ participation, energy and cooperation (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 
[2000]). Even settlements formed by gradual accretion, without initial collective planning, 
require trust and collective organization to solve everyday problems. Almost all demands 
squatters make and all actions they take require solving collective action problems. Squatters 
often recognize that making demands collectively on the state gives them more likelihood of 
being heard. Yet the problem of collective action is always there and often appears to researchers 
in the fieldwork in the form of complaints about lack of interest and participations among 
neighbors.  
Taking a very similar stance, Eckstein (2001) describes squatters as an ―expression of 
consumer defiance, a form of protest against the high cost and low supply of shelter in the formal 
housing market‖ (p. 331). Although Özler (2003a) does not see squatting as a social movement 
he does see squatters as ―an important political force making distinctive demands on the 
government‖ (p. 2), and as ―strategic voters or protestors with clear demands, who use the means 
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available to them to influence political leaders to advance their interests‖ (p. 3). He sees squatters 
as sharing with the rest of the urban poor problems of poverty and employment, but having at the 
same time a very specific set of unified demands about to their housing conditions and especially 
about land tenure. In order to solve these specific demands, Özler says, squatters tend to enter 
into a relationship with the government because land tenure and titling depends on government 
regulation, even when on private land.  
To the general public, however, squatter settlements do not constitute movements. 
Newspapers have not treated land invasions like ―noisier‖ forms of protest such as strikes or 
demonstrations. Yet because of the relationship between squatters and politics in Latin America, 
talked about earlier, several scholars have indeed used social movement frameworks to study 
organization among land squatters. We can find studies of squatters from almost all the sub-
fields or traditions of social movement research. The first studies, those that saw irrationality, 
marginality and disorganization in squatters, basing themselves on the same theories of social 
disorganization that saw social movements in the developed world as the action of irrational 
masses. The following statement from a 1964 essay by Barbara Ward, a British economist and 
writer interested in development, illustrates this perspective:  
All over the world, often long in advance of effective industrialization, the unskilled poor are 
streaming away from subsistence agriculture to exchange the squalor of rural poverty for the even 
deeper miseries of the shantytowns, ‗favelas‘ and ‗bidonvilles‘ that, year by year, grow inexorably on 
the fringes of the developing cities. They (…) are the core of local despair and disaffection (…). 
Unchecked, disregarded, left to grow and fester, there is here enough explosive material to produce in 
the world at large the pattern of a bitter class conflict (…), threatening ultimately the security even of 
the comfortable West (Quoted in Portes (1972)).  
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Much later, influenced by the European thinking of the 1980s on social movements, some 
scholars saw in squatter settlements the ―new social movements‖ that Alain Touraine, Alberto 
Melucci and others were talking about at the time. The phrase ―new social movements‖ was used 
to describe post-industrialist movements emerging in Europe after the 1960s whose concerns 
were different from the more traditional economic focus of the labor movement. These 
movements were supposed to be less interested in making demands only on the state, in 
promoting cultural changes in the way we do and think about the world and our lives, and not 
only in the economic sphere. If there ever were new social movements or if what changed was 
just the ways scholars look at them is still a matter of discussion (Calhoun 1993). In the end E.P. 
Thompson would deny any economic reductionism in explaining the English labor movement in 
the early 19
th
 century. Yet what remains true is that social movement scholars started to pay 
much more attention to identity, culture and ideology.  
The New Social Movements framework became famous among Latin American scholars, 
and some foreign Latin Americanists, as a way to analyze emerging movements during the 
democratization process in the region in the 1980s.  The theory‘s emphasis on the transformative 
power of civil society, its proposed dichotomy between identity and strategy, and its admiration 
of autonomous mobilization deeply tinted studies of social movements in the region (Davis 
1999; Roberts 1997).  
Studies of squatters under or in dialog with this tradition focus on the identities generated 
by living together in the same neighborhood and having to solve problems through community 
organization. Researchers saw in the participation in soup kitchens and other types of 
neighborhood organizations, the politicization of everyday life, that European scholars had seen 
in the women, gay, ethnic, human rights and environmentalist movements. Holston (1991), for 
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example, studies autoconstruction as an arena of spatial, political and symbolic mobilization in 
Brazil. Although he recognizes that squatters reproduce long term relations of domination as 
well, he focuses on how in auto-constructing their own homes and neighborhoods, they  are 
―transforming themselves as citizens but they are also changing the images of disrespect that 
blind them to a denigrated sense of their own persons"(p. 462). Holston even sees squatter 
settlements as one instance of his concept of spaces of insurgent citizenship, which are urban 
spaces in formation or in transition, in his own words ―new metropolitan forms of the social not 
yet liquidated by or absorbed into the old [which] (…) embody possible alternative futures" 
(Holston 1999). 
Oxhorn‘s  (1995) work on the resurrection of civil society, especially among pobladores or 
squatters, in the last years of authoritarian Chile and during democratization, is another example 
of a study very much colored by the questions of the New Social Movements approach. He finds 
the idea of lo popular as a defining identity among poor Chilean urban dwellers at the time, and 
he finds the autonomy of civil society from the state and political parties in this period to be its 
most salient feature. In his own words:  
 
In a fundamental way, the issues involved in the resurrection of civil society and its potential for 
democratization reflect the emergence of "new" actors (a myriad of territorially based popular 
organizations) and their juxtaposition with a variety of "old" actors (the traditional political elite and 
the parties they represent). The legacy of the authoritarian regime will affect both differently; as a 
result they may develop identities that are at odds with each other. The above discussion suggests that 
an important part of the identity of the new popular organizations may reflect a greater commitment to 
ideals associated with participatory democracy and great distance from political parties (p. 35).  
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Another example of this focus on identity creation is Caldeira‘s (1990) work on women‘s 
participation in São Paulo‘s popular neighborhoods. Besides raising our awareness about how 
much popular neighborhood organizations are actually women‘s organizations normally masked 
by words such as ―the popular classes,‖ or ―the poor,‖ she also examines the possible formation 
of a new women‘s identity through neighborhood participation. She recognizes how participating 
in neighborhood organizations may be just an expansion of domestic work for some women (i.e. 
caring for the neighborhood) but she also sees in that participation the possibility of politicizing 
everyday life for many  women who had never thought politics before, and of a change in gender 
relationships within the household as well. Finally, embedded in an edited volume on the 
linkages between culture and politics in Latin American Social movements, Díaz Barriga‘s 
(1998) work on Mexican colonias is also sensitive to the fine blurry line between the domestic 
and the political in squatter settlements‘ mobilization.  
The political opportunities framework has more recently resonated among scholars of 
Latin America, and among scholars of squatting in particular. This framework is based on the 
idea that social movements or contentious politics more generally are not outside but in dialog 
with more institutionalized politics (Della Porta 1997; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; 
Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Thus, movements tend to emerge, activate or decay depending on 
what happens outside them, more precisely in the political realm. Elections, democratization 
processes, the incumbency of a party that sympathizes with a movement, international pressures 
for an authoritarian government to open up, variation in patterns of policing can all be political 
opportunities for movements.  
The case of Santiago de Chile, for instance has attracted the attention of some scholars 
studying the relationship between land squatters and politics from a political opportunities 
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framework. Schneider (Schneider 1995) studies how the Pinochet military regime reduced 
political opportunities for Santiago‘s squatters – who previously had been highly mobilized - and 
acted repressively towards them. Hipsher (1998), in turn, looks at how democratization revived 
great (though not long lasting) mobilization in Chilean squatments.  
Comparing the case of Santiago, Chile with the cases of Mexico City and Istanbul and 
Ankara in Turkey, Özler (2003b) also focuses on the political opportunities shaping squatters‘ 
mobilization. Theoretically, he does not explicitly work under the political opportunities 
framework as known in the social movements‘ literature, but under Political Science‘s 
―institutionalism‖. Yet there are a lot of similarities between these two frameworks and Özler‘s 
interests and findings can be read completely through the political opportunities lens. He studies 
the effect of different political characteristics on the strategies that the urban poor choose to 
make demands to the government. According to him, four characteristics of the political system 
are crucial in determining squatters‘ strategies: legalism versus ad hoc enforcement of the laws, 
degree of government stability, the government‘s tendency to respond to policy demands with 
programmatic as opposed to opportunistic solutions, and government ideology.  
Dosh (forthcoming, 2009) uses the political opportunities framework to compare the 
different patterns in the cities of Lima and Quito. While in Lima invasions have become routine 
and institutionalized, in Quito they are considered aberrations, which the author argues, has to do 
with differential political opportunities in both cities. While Peru has pro-settler legislation, an 
entrepreneurial city hall in Quito has watched over and protected public land from being seized. 
However, the author‘s further work trying to explain the differences within each of these two 
cities leans much more to a resource mobilization type of argument.  Resource mobilization 
theory finds the most important causes of collective action in movement‘s internal assets 
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(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Resources can range from money to type of internal 
organization to the strength of networks. In Dosh‘s work, the main resource that explains 
variation within each of his two cities in the level of success in getting demands met by the states 
is the type of organizational strategy. In the end his explanation is twofold, since for him 
neighborhood service acquisition outcomes result from a combination of factors both external 
and internal to invasion organizations. As Dosh puts it, ―External factors beyond the control of 
organizations do invite and curtail mobilization in a variety of ways, but this study shows that 
whatever the array of external variables, certain types of organizations, characterized by specific 
strategies, assets, and leadership structures, are better able than others to exploit those external 
factors.  In short, organizations do in fact exert control over key aspects of their own process of 
acquiring resources‖ (p. 11-12).   
1.4 SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN THIS STUDY 
The writings on squatters as movements from a political opportunities framework have 
shown similar dynamics between more or less amorphous forms of collective action such as 
invading land and organizing to get services and the more classical forms of protesting like 
striking, rioting or marching. Yet I see two main flaws prevailing most of the literature. These 
problems are not restricted to the study of squatters or of social movements in Latin America by 
any means. They are broader flaws, prevailing in the literature of social movements in general. 
The first one refers to a very loose concept of political opportunities that is impossible to prove 
wrong. And the other one refers to some dissociation between macro and micro perspectives in 
the study of social movements.  
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 The first problem thus refers to the excessive looseness of the concept of political 
opportunity and this leads to its often ad hoc use as an explanation (Gamson and Meyer 1996; 
Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Think of a contentious event, look back, and you will always find 
something politically relevant that could have caused it. Call it political opportunity. Of course, 
this is a grotesque caricature, but it illustrates by exaggerating one of the main problems in this 
prolific field of social movements‘ studies. As further explained in chapter 5, the idea of this 
project has been to specify political opportunities from the beginning, to later test if they were 
relevant or not. As political opportunities I had defined elections in general and a specific 
historical landmark in the history of the city of Montevideo: the left winning elections for the 
first time in 1990. I hypothesized a) that squatter invasions are more likely to happen close to 
election campaigns, and b) that the left in the city government also raised the likelihood of land 
invasions either because of more permissiveness on the officials‘ side or because of more 
expectations on the squatters‘ side. During fieldwork and analysis I learned that post-electoral 
years were also moments in which squatting peaked.  
 Trying to address the second and broader of these two problems, this project is at the 
crossroads of two approaches to social movements. Many studies try to understand why or under 
what conditions movements emerge. In general, these studies point to macro-level factors, 
although there are theoretical and empirical disagreements about what those factors are: political 
and ideological opportunities, activist cultures, absolute or relative grievances, or movement 
resources (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).  Advocates of a 
second perspective on movement emergence focus on micro-level factors, arguing that 
identifying macro-level causes offers an interesting, but incomplete, picture that veils actors‘ 
decision making (Blee and Currier 2005). Disappointed with the macro perspective, some of its 
 19 
initial proponents have recommended that scholars should focus more on the dynamic 
mechanisms that make collective action happen (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In this 
project, I pursue this latter recommendation by bringing together macro and micro perspectives 
on social movements. While the macro perspective explains the conditions under which squatters 
are more likely to emerge, the micro one accounts for how squatters interact with these 
conditions to produce squatter settlements.  
This dissertation is organized in seven different chapters. Following this introduction, 
chapter two introduces us to land squatting in Uruguay. It shows the changing demographics and 
other characteristics of squatters at the same time that it briefly describes some important 
characteristics of the Uruguayan state and political system. Chapter three, in turn, fleshes out the 
methodological approach of this work based on the use of several data gathering methods and 
two main ways of organizing those data: mini-ethnographies and an event catalog of land 
invasions. Chapters four, five and six are the empirical core of this study, based on the data 
collected. Chapter four describes the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo from its beginnings 
in the late 1940s until the end of the study period in 2004. It also uncovers the different types of 
land invasions by telling stories of invasions and showing quantitative data on the prevalence of 
each type at different historical moments and their characteristics. Chapter five aims at testing 
the power of rival theories – grievances and political opportunities - in shaping the probability of 
land invasions in a certain year. It ends up with a more interesting interactive statistical model 
and substantive argument. Chapter six, in turn, is deeply ethnographic in the sense that it tries to 
take the reader to the study setting, by choosing a story and scrutinizing the relationship between 
squatters and the state through political brokerage. It scrutinizes leaders, non leaders and 
politicians‘ experiences with squatting and mobilizing for land and services. It develops the 
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concept of market clientelism to refer to a very successful strategy practiced by squatters‘ leaders 
to get squatters‘ demands fulfilled. Finally, chapter seven concludes this study by attempting to 
very concisely pull together everything I have learned from this research.  
 
. 
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2.0   THE CASE 
2.1 SQUATTING AND THE REPERTOIRE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION OF THE 
URBAN POOR OF MONTEVIDEO 
The explosion of squatting in Montevideo took place later than in other metropolises of the 
region.
4 
 Although some land invasions, dubbed cantegriles, existed in Montevideo before 
squatting peaked in the 1990s, the Uruguayan capital developed differently than other Latin 
American cities. Despite already starting to show signs of urban socio-economic inequality in the 
1980s (Portes 1989), Montevideo was more egalitarian than other cities of the continent. Even 
after the military regime (1973-1984) carried out a harsh policy of evictions and demolitions in 
the city center, where many poor people lived, there was no massive move to squatter 
settlements on the outskirts of the city. Instead of organizing land invasions, the urban poor of 
Montevideo gravitated to an already familiar strategy for coping with housing problems: 
crowding at relatives‘ homes (Benton 1986).  
                                                 
4
 For a general perspective on housing problems and land squatting in Latin America, see Gilbert (1994) and Portes 
and Walton (1976). There are several studies of particular cities: Santiago de Chile (Castells 1983; Handelman 
1975; Hipsher 1998; Oxhorn 1995; Özler 2003b; Paley 2001; Portes 1972; Sabatini 1995; Salman 1997; Schneider 
1995); Mexico City (Cornelius 1974; Cornelius 1977; Diaz Barriga 1996; Diaz Barriga 1998; Eckstein 1977; Özler 
2003b);Buenos Aires (Auyero 2000; Cravino 2006; Merklen 1991; Merklen 2003; Merklen 2005; Özler 2003b), San 
José de Costa Rica (Lungo, Pérez, and Piedra 1992); Rio de Janeiro (Gay 1994; Perlman 1976; Perlman 2004; 
Portes 1972; Valladares 2005); Quito (Burgwal 1995; Dosh forthcoming, 2009.); and Lima (Collier 1976; Dietz 
1998; Dosh forthcoming, 2009.; Stokes 1991; Stokes 1996). 
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In this section I provide contextual features on the relationship of state and society in 
Uruguay that I believe help explain this puzzle. I do so by drawing on scholarly work on 
Uruguayan political history as well as on some comparative works. This enables me to identify 
some long term trends in the way the poorest citizens have related to the state in this country as 
well as some important changes that shifted that relationship. I later describe the broad changes 
in land squatting in Montevideo both in identity and in demographics. For this, I unearthed the 
few sources I was lucky to find that could tell me something about the first land invasions, such 
as two forgotten early studies of squatter settlements from the 1960s and early 1970s. A 
documentary film was vital for seeing life inside one of the poorest land invasions of the city in 
1958. I have tried to track the change in the popular name of land invasions from cantegriles to 
asentamientos. I finally attempt to follow demographic changes of squatters by comparing earlier 
studies with the 2006 household survey.  
2.1.1 A stubborn statist tradition in a worn down/elastic state 
According to Benton (1986) squatting did not happen by the time the military evicted city 
buildings in the 1970s because economic activities, as well as neighborhood identity, connected 
the poor with the city core. However, she also pays special attention to the traditional 
paternalistic role of Uruguayan welfare policy:  
Of crucial importance was the peculiar historical-political relationship between workers and the state 
in Montevideo. The long tradition of state assistance to the urban poor before 1973 clearly 
conditioned the responses of residents in bringing pressure to bear on the state. Behavior that seemed 
to represent attitudes of resignation –the lack of organized protest over the destruction of conventillos 
 23 
in Palermo and Sur 5 or the wait-and-see strategy of residents housed in the city stables –quietly 
shifted responsibility to the state for resolving the housing ―crisis‖ it had helped to engineer (Benton 
1986: 49).  
 
The Uruguayan state in general and its welfare branch in particular has been noted for its 
singularity in the region (Filgueira 2000; Mesa Lago 2000). When Centeno (2002) classifies 
Latin American states in a continuum of institutional capacity, he locates Uruguay, together with 
Chile and Argentina, as ―obvious‖ successful end points of the spectrum.  Yet as Centeno also 
notes, the Uruguayan state was the latest of the three to consolidate, due to continuous civil wars 
during the nineteenth century. The early governments of the twentieth century in Uruguay had to 
face two different tasks that other countries faced at separate moments in time.  The first was 
political institutionalization and the second was the demands for political participation of the 
new emerging social sectors such as the urban working class (Panizza 1990).  
Until 1904, the Uruguayan state did not have a centralized army that could control the 
country‘s territory. The territory was actually divided between the two traditional political forces, 
the Colorados and the Blancos, born back in the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
Colorados controlled Montevideo, then the fifth biggest city in Latin America. More than a 
quarter of the population lived in the capital whereas other cities of the region housed an average 
of 3% to 5% of the population (Panizza 1990). The Blancos, in turn, under the leadership of the 
caudillo Aparicio Saravia, controlled the countryside.  
                                                 
5
 Palermo and Sur are two traditional neighborhoods of the city core. Together with Ciudad Vieja, they were the 
areas most affected by the urban policies adopted by the military government. Before 1973, they housed a lot of 
urban poor in substandard buildings characterized by crowding and poor living conditions, popularly known as 
conventillos. Subletting and squatting in those buildings was the norm. Not only were these people affected by the 
deregulation of rents but also by the direct eviction from some of those buildings. In 1978 a decree law authorized 
the municipality to institute evictions of residents of any property found to be in ―imminent danger of collapse.‖ The 
number of evictions rose immediately. As a consequence, some individuals resettled somewhere else in the city, 
while others were relocated either in ―temporary‖ shelters or public housing (Benton 1986).     
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Welfare policies were one of the tools that the colorado president José Batlle y Ordoñez 
(1903-1907 and 1911-1914) used to consolidate the power of his party over the country.  While 
he spent his initial presidency first fighting the revolts of Aparicio Saravia and the blancos and 
later consolidating the military control of the country, he spent his second presidency building up 
his state project. Batlle y Ordoñez believed in strong economic interventionism and in pro-
worker legislation. He was a believer in state enterprises as well so during his government he 
nationalized several banks such as the Banco de la República. Among his progressive pro-
worker legislation, he fought for the eight-hour workday, unemployment compensation, workers‘ 
rights to strike, regulation of child labor, maternity leave, and the establishment of retirement and 
handicap pensions.  Some of these projects were approved during his presidency and some others 
right after he left office. Thus, the construction of the Uruguayan state is completely linked to the 
construction of its welfare state.  
Despite interruptions such as the Terra dictatorship (1930-1938), the state kept growing 
and generously provided progressive labor rights, universal or almost universal coverage in basic 
social protection services, good quality public services such as education and health, and 
employment in a wide range of public sector administrative and productive activities. With 
shades such as the world wide 1930s economic crisis, for more almost half a century, the 
Uruguayan economy enjoyed times of economic prosperity.  The convulsive international 
situation of the two world wars and later the Korean were was beneficial for Uruguay because of 
the great demand for products such as meat and wool. After the demand for Uruguayan goods 
decreased, there was a crisis of inflation, unemployment, and falling living standards. Even then, 
the state kept growing as a sort of counter-cyclical buffer. Even in 1970, when the Uruguayan 
model of import substitution and state-led development was already falling apart, 95.4% of the 
 25 
Uruguayan economically active population had social security coverage (Filgueira 2000) and 
almost 30% of the labor force was employed by the state (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 
2005). In her study of social policy-making in Chile and Uruguay, Castiglioni (2005) poses an 
interesting puzzle related to this.  Both countries suffered democratic breakdowns in 1973 and 
both had big welfare states at the moment. Still, while the Chilean military carried an aggressive 
pro market program of state retrenchment, the Uruguayan counterpart left social policies almost 
untouched. Castiglioni finds that, together with other institutional factors, the ideology of 
Uruguayan policy makers during dictatorship was still permeated with the legacy of batllismo. 
 But a slow reform process did take place. Following the regional trend of neoliberal 
reforms, Uruguay shifted towards a less regulated and more export oriented economy. Yet 
citizens have consistently and stubbornly rejected state retrenchment reforms, especially 
privatization of state enterprises. The most recent sign of resistance took place in 2004 when 
Uruguayans not only for the first time voted the leftist coalition into office with a pro-state 
platform, but also approved a constitutional reform that defines water as a human right and a 
public good and states that the provision of piped water and sanitation can only be done by state 
enterprises. Only months before, through a referendum, Uruguayan citizens had opposed a law 
that attempted to end the monopoly of the state-owned oil company and opened it up to outside 
investors. Uruguay has also blocked strong privatization attempts of its social security system, 
has engaged in an educational reform at odds with retrenchment trends, and has been unable to 
reform its health system until 2008 – a health reform aimed at increasing coverage rather than 
privatizing services as in other countries. All this contrasts with the region‘s two other welfare 
pioneers who have privatized most of their state businesses. While Argentina and, even more so 
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Chile, have experienced a market revolution, Uruguay has obstinately chosen a different path. As 
Filgueira (2000) puts it,  
Uruguay has gone down the market oriented road to a limited extent, but clearly not to the degrees 
seen in other Latin American countries. The welfare state, and the [people‘s, unions‘, the left‘s and 
corporations‘] response to the decline in the quality of the public goods it distributed have been able 
to rescue the public dimension of those goods (p. 219).  
According to Filgueira, the strong legacies of political and social citizenship help explain why in 
Uruguay those sectors with resources opted for voice rather than exit. This voice has, however, 
been more effective in defending the existing worn down welfare state than in making 
innovations.  
 The results of these middle road market reforms are mixed. Uruguay keeps doing better 
in some development measures in comparison to most third world countries. According the 
United Nations Human Development Index ranking, Uruguay has a high human development 
and is above the regional average. Uruguay is currently in the 46
th
 place in the IDH. In Latin 
America, only Argentina and Chile are above. Yet it has lost positions in the ranking over the 
years. In contrast to other countries of Latin America, it has been unable to improve its score 
(PNUD 2008). In terms of poverty, Uruguay has always outperformed most Latin American 
countries as one of the countries with the lowest poverty rates. Yet the comparison with its own 
past is less hopeful. Poverty rates have tended to rise even at times of economic growth since the 
mid 1990s (PNUD 2008).  
 The conclusion of a group of scholars who studied different welfare policies in Uruguay 
is quite disheartening (Filgueira, Rodríguez, Rafaniello, Lijtenstein, and Alegre 2005). They find 
an increasing disconnection between risk groups and protected groups. According to the authors, 
the welfare state has not adapted itself to deep changes in the labor market such as the increase in 
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structural unemployment and informality or to the also deep demographic changes such as less 
stable families and the increasing poverty among children. They identify a very vulnerable group 
of 40% of the population that despite being very vulnerable does not have enough state attention. 
They are mainly children, young women with low incomes, informal workers and land squatters.    
The legacy of batllismo, the legacy of a big state, is deeply entrenched among 
Uruguayans. As Panizza cleverly states it, rights for Uruguayan citizens did not evolve as in 
Europe from political to economic to social. Economic and social rights came first and this 
impacted people‘s subjectivity since they would come to conceive citizenship in a broader way 
than just voting (Panizza 1990).
6
 This legacy impacted also the 2004 election, in which a 
coalition of leftist factions, the Frente Amplio, won national elections breaking two centuries of 
bipartidism in the country. According to Luna (Luna 2007) parties competed for this election 
around a state versus market opposition, with Frente Amplio on the state side, appropriating and 
reinventing the batllismo ideology, and the traditional parties on the market side.  
 
All these contextual features help us understand Benton‘s opening statement about the 
reliance of the urban poor to the state. With this in mind, it is completely logical that the urban 
poor were waiting for the state to do something for them. Yet contrary to what she implies by 
saying that faced with housing problems they did not squat en masse but instead hoped the state 
would respond to their problem, as will see  throughout this dissertation, squatters in Montevideo 
still depend very much on the state. In that sense, squatting in Montevideo implies more 
continuity than rupture in terms of relying on the state. In other words, even when they settled on 
vacant urban land people in need requested state help.    
                                                 
6
 The Constitution of 1918 declared suffrage universal and compulsory for men older than 18. Women‘s suffrage did 
not come until 1932, and it was implemented in 1938 for the first time.  
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The growth of squatter settlements and their characteristics are a visible trace, almost like 
a metaphor of this eroding but still stretchable and paternalistic state.  The more than 400 
squatter settlements in Montevideo, housing 11% of the city‘s population are one of the most 
noticeable signs of the problems of Uruguay‘s economy and state. They spatially remind us that 
the times of the ―happy country‖, the ―fat cows‖, or the ―Switzerland of Latin America‖ 7 – as 
people used to call Uruguay - are gone.  Extreme poverty and unmet basic needs are not the 
patrimony only of squatter settlements. Urban poverty exists in the city center and in other 
formal neighborhoods as well. Yet with the exception of homelessness, poverty in the formal city 
is camouflaged behind the European-style facades of the city center or the working class 
detached housing that characterizes the once industrial neighborhoods. Squatter settlements in 
contrast, sometimes because of poor housing, often because some are located close to polluted 
rivers and piles of garbage, and always because of their lack of paved streets and other public 
services, make poverty and suffering visible to the most oblivious passerby. 
In this sense, squatter settlements are the most noticeable evidence of the process suffered 
by the Uruguayan urban poor in the last decades. Using Kaztman‘s (2001) evocative phrase, the 
urban poor in Montevideo have been ―seduced and abandoned‖ by a labor market that promised 
formal and stable jobs, a state that promised good services and benefits, an open education 
system that offered opportunities of upper mobility and a city that promised not only shelter but 
also interaction with other social classes. All these promises are unmet for many urban poor. It is 
only in this context that we can understand why many of my interviewees, both squatter leaders 
                                                 
7
 The myth of the ―Switzerland of Latin America‖ appeared somewhere in the first part of the twentieth century, 
perhaps from the admiration that president José Batlle y Ordoñez (1903-1907 and 1911-1915), designer of the 
Uruguayan state,  felt for Swiss political and welfare institutions. Costa Ricans also see themselves as the 
Switzerland of (Central) America.  
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and non leaders framed their actions in terms of rights: ―It is our right to squat. Housing is a right 
in the Constitution.‖  
The ―structure of opportunities‖ available to the urban poor has shrunk in all its spheres: 
the market, the state and the community (Kaztman 1999). Regarding the labor market, taking 
1970 as a starting point and comparing it with 2000, jobs became scarcer and those that do exist 
are less stable. This is in part because women doubled their participation in the labor force in the 
period – from 27.5% in 1970 to 52.5 in 1999 -  (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005), but 
it also because many industries closed, the state has reduced its employees by half , and there is 
not enough employment generation. Moreover, positions that do open up tend to be unstable and 
low paid, especially if targeted to less skilled workers. Salary differentials by education are 
increasing (Bucheli and Furtado 2004). Unemployment has increased and is especially high for 
the youth and the poorly educated. Although traditionally under 10% in Uruguay, since 1970 
unemployment has reached double digits several times and rose to 16% during the 2002/2003 
economic crisis (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 2005). The informal labor market has 
increased substantially as well. According to the 2006 household survey, 36.5% of the working 
population in 2006 did not have social security (INE 2006).  
These changes in the labor market are a product of the change in the mode of 
accumulation from the decaying import substitution model to an increasingly open economy 
since the 1970s. The opening of the economy started with the military government in 1973. This 
new model has been characterized by overall growth and overall inequality. According to 
economic historians, this trend of growth with a non egalitarian distribution dates as back as the 
1960s, when the trends of GDP per capita (which measure overall growth) and real wages (which 
measure the wellbeing of average workers), convergent since the 1920s, started to diverge 
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(Camou and Maubrigades 2005).  Not surprisingly, the Gini coefficient, one of the most popular 
inequality measures, follows an overall growing trend since 1960 (Bértola 2005).   
Regarding the state, the second dimension of the structure of opportunities analyzed by 
Kaztman, I have already mentioned its diminishing role as an employer. But its impact among 
the urban poor comes also through other avenues such as the educational system, which is unable 
to retain many students past the first year of secondary school. This becomes particularly 
worrisome when we know that a person needs on average 9 years of education to get an income 
above Uruguay‘s poverty line. Finally, regarding the community, socioeconomic residential 
segregation has increased in Montevideo in the last decades (Kaztman, Filgueira, and Errandonea 
2005). Neighborhoods are increasingly homogeneous in terms of income, occupational status 
and education. This is especially problematic for the urban poor who today have fewer resources 
in their neighborhoods, from information to role models, which might have helped in finding a 
job or making any attempt at upper mobility.  
Squatter settlements are therefore visible evidence of these changes. Their inhabitants are 
among those suffering and facing this shrinking structure of opportunities, as we will see below. 
Yet squatter settlements are also evidence of the run down but still generous and stretchable state 
described above. Although with great variation, the state was present in all of the 24 squatter 
settlements I visited in my fieldwork. While in some it was only there providing, imperfectly, 
basic services such as piped water and perhaps appearing once in a while to make a census of the 
population, in others it was there more fully, through its regularization program, investing 
government and Inter-American Development Bank money paving streets, providing urban 
services, giving land titles and promoting participation. In most settlements there was or had 
been some community organization. In all there was or had been at least a local leader or boss. 
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One of the main goals of these neighborhood associations or local leaders is to mediate with the 
state for services. Depending on how well organized they are, how connected they are, and of 
course also depending on the moment in which they make demands, some squatter settlements 
are able to stretch the limits of the state a little bit further. This stretching becomes literal, 
spatially speaking, since providing services to squatter settlements, mostly located in the 
periphery of the city, often implies extending services beyond the originally planned city limits.  
Separation of public and private spheres, state and civil society, state and government, 
parties and state are not clear in Uruguay.
8
 More than sharp divisions, it is more faithful to reality 
to speak of gray shades or permeable tissues (Panizza and Piera 1988) to refer to the 
relationships between these categories. Practical implications of this are multiple. Among them is 
the fact that to access some goods or services, it has often been more effective to talk to a 
politician or a local broker than to stand on line in a public building. Many squatters, particularly 
those that are organized in neighborhood associations or have a local boss available have 
experienced this first hand. When I first started doing research in squatter settlements, back in 
my undergraduate years, I was naively struck by people calling politicians or high rank state 
officials by their first names or having their telephone numbers in their home directories. They 
knew from experience that some people can successfully mediate between them and the goods 
they want to obtain. They knew how to combine the use of these mediators with direct 
petitioning to the state. They did either or both of them to get what they desperately needed be it 
light, water or any other service. And they also knew and had experienced the inclusiveness of 
the Uruguayan state.  
                                                 
8
 A common neologism among Uruguayans scholars is to say that Uruguay is a case of partidocracia or political 
parties-rule  to represent the historic centrality that parties have had both in the state and civil society  (Caetano, 
Rilla, and Pérez 1987). 
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Squatters move in the interstices of these gray shades, the gray shades of welfare 
institutions that are neither completely inclusive nor completely exclusive and the gray shades of 
politics. Merklen (2003), a scholar of grassroots collective action who has studied land invasions 
mainly in Buenos Aires but also in Montevideo, captures this with a great metaphor. He says that 
squatters, rather than having the culture of the farmer, who can foresee the future and plan for it, 
have the culture of the hunter who seizes whatever opportunity he can find. This hunter culture, 
Merklen says, is part of the popular culture of individual and collective actors.  
In sum, squatter settlements in Montevideo are embedded in a broader statist tradition 
that has characterized the relationship between the civil society and the state since the state‘s 
creation (Filgueira 2000). This strong statist tradition is what has made the state the main target 
and reference of almost all collective actors (Castagnola 1989).  This tradition continues, despite 
the fact that the state today is only a run-down shadow of what it used to be. There is less to give 
away and more people that need it.  
2.1.2 Statism and Clientelism: continuities and changes 
In addition to the entrenched statist tradition, Uruguay squatters are also embedded in 
another feature of the linkage between civil society and the state: the centrality of political 
parties and their factions as brokers or intermediaries.  Yet there have been some changes in the 
last decades, basically due to changes in the state and in the political system. In this section I will 
briefly refer to these changes because I believe they might have had an impact on the number 
and manners in which people seize lands and squat them.  
In their comparative study of Latin America Collier and Collier (1991) argue that the way 
in which the different countries incorporated the working class in political life constituted a 
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critical juncture that left short and long term legacies. In Uruguay and Colombia the main agent 
of that incorporation was a political party, rather than the state as in the other countries. In fact, 
as mentioned before, it was the Colorado party that was in charge of the task in Uruguay. 
Because of a tradition of pacts and co-participation in government between colorados and 
blancos, ―progressively both parties ‗colonized‘ the state apparatus and become crucial brokers 
between society and the political system‖ (Luna 2006).  
The State was never a legal-rational abstraction ruled by an unbiased bureaucracy but an 
entity connected to political parties and their factions. This last item is very important to 
understand the Uruguayan political system: its high factionalization (Buquet 2001; González 
1991; Piñeiro 2004). Each party has many factions each with their own leaders and strong 
identities. Voter‘s are often more loyal to the factions than to the parties. All these factions 
compete for votes, have representation in some parts of the state and play the clientelistic game.  
There were never neutral spaces, as Panizza (1990) notes. Neutrality in the Uruguayan 
state has meant participation of all parties and their factions. As Filgueira (2000: 95) puts it, 
―because the consolidation of the state‘s social programs coincided with the firm establishment 
of the state‘s authority, of the parties, and of the political system, there was an early 
appropriation of the state by the party apparatus. (…) Although the norms regulating the state‘ 
social programs were general in content, their application became part of the clientelistic games 
played by parties, their factions and their leaders.‖   
Pensions and jobs were the most traditional commodities in the clientelistic exchange 
(Panizza 1990). Political clubs were the neighborhood or zonal units through which most of 
those goods were delivered. In his study of political clubs Rama (1971) finds that although their 
explicit function is to socialize citizens into party politics – something they did in the past - their 
 34 
real function at the moment was to exchange votes for favors. Their clientele was formed by 
those without resources such as economic power, union representation, or instrumental personal 
relationships; that is, by those whose only goods to exchange were their promise of vote and 
political support. He finds that the period of economic recession after 1955 had several 
consequences for political clubs. The first reaction was an unprecedented multiplication in their 
number. While before there was one club per relevant political faction per electoral zone, in 1966 
there were about 8,000 clubs for an electorate of 523,000 people in Montevideo (p. 13). The 
second consequence, closer in time to the dictatorship in 1973, was the disappearance of political 
clubs as part of the overall destruction of the political system.  
At the moment Rama conducts fieldwork, 1969, he observed the proliferation phase. He 
noted a complete loss of the ideological basis of the traditional parties and their transformation 
into ―political managers.‖ The last link in the chain of political managers was the political clubs‘ 
runner or broker. These brokers spoke with nostalgia of the clubs of the past. They complained a 
great deal. Demands greatly overwhelmed what they could get for their constituency. They told 
stories of frustration and sacrifice.  
The proliferation of clubs detected by Rama mirrors a rise in public spending at the time. 
Although public spending in Uruguay has always followed political cycles systematically 
growing on the eve of the electoral year (Moraes, Chasquetti, and Bergara 2005), 1962 stands out 
for its great rise in spending. The Blancos, who presided over the Colegiado government
9
 at the 
time, wanted to keep office (Luna 2006).  In fact, ―both major political parties reacted to the 
                                                 
9
 From 1952 until 1967, Uruguay had a colegiado government that is an executive of 9 members elected by the 
people (6 for the majority party and 3 for the one that follows in votes). This was an idea discussed and discarded by 
the political elite many times. In 1913, when José Batlle y Ordóñez came back from a trip to Switzerland enchanted 
by their collective executive, he started advocating for it. Yet, the idea of a colegiado did not prosper until an 
opportunistic time in which the Blancos, who have not been in the presidency since 1865 saw it as their chance to be 
on the executive and made a pact with the colorado president at the time, Andrés Martínez Trueba, who was also 
interested in the colegiado. See  (Gros Espiell 1964) 
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crisis by reinforcing their reliance on clientelism and patronage as a way to contain discontent 
and maintain their electoral share. (…) In spite of that, the electorate started to seek alternatives, 
shifting their electoral support between and within parties‖ (Luna 2006: 151).   
All the clubs Rama described belong to some faction of the Colorado or Blanco parties. 
Although there were various leftist parties or progressive factions within the traditional parties, 
they did not have clubs.
10
 As the author notes, ―they have not able to penetrate into those social 
sectors that were more marginalized by production, consumption, politics and culture. Even 
today for the Frente Amplio which has a different situation [he writes in 1971, year of foundation 
of this newer coalition], they still have a communication problem with the sectors of the electoral 
forces that nurture political clubs‖ (Rama 1971: 35).     
It took the Frente Amplio many years to win that electorate, but it eventually did. Only 
five years after the end of dictatorship, in 1989, it won the Montevideo city government and has 
been in power in the city since then. In 2004 it won the national elections, bringing Tabaré 
Vazquez – the former city mayor - to the presidency.11 Many reasons underlie the success of 
Frente Amplio in breaking with a long history of bipartidism in Uruguay. One of them is their 
success in winning the increasing electoral competition for the urban poor, traditionally alienated 
from an organized working class and intellectuals‘ left. In Montevideo, where half of the 
electorate lives, this implied winning geographical territories that were strongholds of the 
traditional parties, especially of the most populist factions of the Colorado party (Luna 2007; 
Mieres 1994). While the Frente Amplio was already strong in the West of the city by 1989, in 
general traditionally working class areas, it still had to win the most deprived eastern periphery. 
                                                 
10
 The Socialist Party of Uruguay, for example, founded in 1910, was quite old by the time Rama conducted 
fieldwork in the late sixties. In 1962 several leftist groups and some people and fractions that had broken up with the 
traditional parties formed the first leftist coalition, FIDEL (Frente Izquierda de Liberación).  
11
 See Lanzaro (2004) for a collection of studies describing and explaining the growth of Frente Amplio.  
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In chapter six, through the story of one particular land invasion I unveil how this worked in 
practice both for politicians and for local leaders.  
Thus, the 1990s witnessed an increase in electoral competition for the urban poor. This 
changed conditions for squatters. In the previous section I have pointed out other contextual 
features that changed the rules of the game for the urban poor, mainly state retrenchment and 
increasing vulnerability to employment problems especially for the less educated. There is still 
another important contextual feature to be mentioned because of its impact on how the state 
relates to citizens and how clientelism gets played: decentralization.   
Like many states following the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, the 
Uruguayan state started a decentralization process, giving more power to municipal governments 
(Laurnaga 2001). Besides the general decentralization reform that Uruguay carried out, 
Montevideo‘s municipal government implemented its own decentralization (Goldfrank 2002; 
Veneziano Esperón 2005). Starting in 1990, once in the city government, the Frente Amplio 
administration implemented a city decentralization process. According to the electoral platform 
that took the party into the city administration, decentralization was aimed at bringing the 
government closer to the citizens, especially the poorest citizens and making it more accountable 
and efficient. It consisted of dividing the city into 18 zones, each with its local government 
(dubbed Centros Comunales Zonales or Zonal Community Centers). The original project was 
resisted by the opposition and in the end the decentralization ended up being more administrative 
than political or financial. Still every Zonal Community Center has an executive board and a 
local council that make suggestions to the Mayor about big issues such as spending priorities in 
the area and some administrative decisions such as small resource allocations within the zone.   
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The impact of Montevideo‘s decentralization on squatters has not yet been studied. 
Although not the main preoccupation of this dissertation, city decentralization was an important 
contextual feature of my research. Since my study period extends back to well before it was 
implemented (1947-2004), I was able to perceive some changes and I here hypothesize about 
them.  I believe decentralization‘s impact to be multiple.  One consequence was that 
decentralization brought information closer to the citizens, including information about land 
ownership and available plots to squat (e.g., either public land or private land whose owners had 
not being paying taxes for a while). This, in turn, appears to have had different effects for 
squatters over time according to my oral histories and observations. At the beginning of the 
decentralization process, the diffusion of this information actually resulted in new invasions. As 
an example, one of the leaders I interviewed learned about an interesting vacant plot from one of 
the members of the local council, whom he knew through their common political faction. Yet 
with time local authorities started to protect that information and all neighbors became more 
responsible in caring for empty plots that could be use for some public building or space. The 
experience of government made local authorities learn that allowing or promoting a land 
invasion had lots of costs for the administration in bringing services to the area. During 
fieldwork I found an interesting case of a land invasion that was deterred immediately by 
neighbors and local authorities acting together with the central municipality to evict squatters 
because the plot they were invading was to be used for the community to build a square.  
In addition, decentralization brought municipal services closer to the people. For many of 
my interviewees, the local community center was their main reference; it is where they go when 
they have a problem either personal or of their neighborhood. The zonal community centers were 
increasingly mentioned by newer land invasions as the institution that helped them the most.   
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Social workers in those community centers complained to me about the overwhelming demands 
they receive from the population, in particular from squatters.  
Decentralization also brought politics closer to the people. For many, participation in the 
local council (a legislative branch of the local government, with no executive power but with 
voice in what needs to be done in the area) was their first time in politics. Many squatter 
settlements have representatives in the local council, especially if they are settled in municipal 
(or other publicly owned) land. This has on the one hand revived a structure of pre-existing local 
bosses and on the other hand it has created new ones. This process and its impact have only 
recently started to be studied (Luna 2006). Decentralization has revived old forms of 
neighborhood political participation that were dying with the crisis of political clubs and the 
decay of neighborhood associations once popular in Montevideo (Gonzalez 1989).  
In relation to this, zonal community centers encourage collective rather than individual 
demands by generally dealing with people as representatives rather than individuals and 
prioritizing those demands that come from a group. Social workers and other professionals 
working there extensively promote community participation. This has encouraged organization 
among squatters, generally at the settlement level but in some cases there has been coordination 
among various squatter settlements of the area.
12
  
As Filgueira, Garcé, Ramos and Yaffé (2003) suggest and Luna (2006) empirically 
documents, state retrenchment and decentralization have had an impact on clientelism in at least 
three ways: a) diminishing its role (recession of clientelism due to both a push toward political 
accountability and to state reform and fiscal crisis); b) moving it from the national to the 
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 For example: Comisión de Tierras in the CCZ 17, Coordinadora de Asentamientos in the CCZ 9, Coordinadora 
de Asentamientos CCZ 12. I interviewed members of these three umbrella organizations of squatters. None of them 
was actively meeting at the moment of my fieldwork. All interviewees explained how hard it is to coordinate 
actions. In general coordinating efforts have been organized from above, from the municipal government.  
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municipal level; and c) changing strategies and the nature of goods exchanged (e.g., while more 
durable goods such as pensions or employment were exchanged through clientelistic networks in 
the past, today more fleeting goods such as social services or information are exchanged).  
Despite this recession of clientelism, squatters‘ leaders are among these who still use it, 
because of their great dependence on state resources. They use it as one of the strategies 
available to get services and other goods for their neighborhoods. In chapter six I develop one 
particularly successful way to use clientelistic networks among squatters‘ leaders: market 
clientelism.  It consists of either strategically switching from one party or faction to the other or 
pretending to be apolitical to get as many things as they can from different patrons. But squatters 
also use other strategies, such as making demands directly on the state through written petitions 
or exercising pressure by going en masse and camping outside the office of some authority until 
they get a concrete commitment to install water or light. Very rarely do they blockade streets to 
get what they need, but some squatters have done so.   
2.1.3 Changing the repertoire 
Going back to Benton‘s (1986) surprise about the Uruguayan poor not mass squatting as in other 
Latin American cities, I believe land squatting was just not part of the world of the possible for 
the working poor. By the time Benton writes, squatting was still associated with the poorest of 
the poor, with slums, with scavenging, with marginality. The framing of land squatting as a right 
and as a feasible option for the working class who could not afford the formal city appeared 
somewhere in the late 1980s or 1990s.  
Land invasions were an innovation in the repertoire of urban poor dwellers. They became 
part of the set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate 
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process of choice (Tilly 1993). They entered the repertoire without a significant rupture with the 
historical paternalistic relation between the state and civil society in Uruguay. Innovation is 
frequent in contentious repertoires, but usually within the established forms. In general, there are 
no complete breaks with the old ways (Markoff 1996; Tilly 1993).  In this sense, even though 
through squatting part of the urban poor became very active in the production of their housing, 
neighborhoods and living conditions, doing things that had previously been done by either the 
state or the market, they still relied a great deal on the state. In fact, it is this very interaction 
between squatters and the state that constitutes the peculiar form of land squatting that we see in 
Montevideo (especially more recently) and in other cities of Latin America. In other regions of 
the world, such as the Middle Eastern cities, squatters tend to solve their collective and 
individual problems outside the state, resourcing to social and religious networks, in what Bayat 
(1997) calls the ―quiet encroachment of the ordinary‖ (See also AlSayaad 1993). 
2.1.4 The politics of squatting 
Two recent studies throw light on the politics of squatting in Uruguay. While in previous work I 
(Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 [2000]; Álvarez-Rivadulla 2003) focus on the relationship of squatters 
with the elastic Uruguayan state institutions, a group of researchers at IPES in the Catholic 
University of Uruguay were pioneers in exploring the relationship of squatters with political 
parties and with other social movements (Kaztman, Ávila, Baráibar, and Errandonea 2003). 
These earlier studies illustrate how aspects of the political opportunity structure influence how 
squatters react to their situations. They are not precise in their definition of political 
opportunities. They conceive it as ―everything happening in the political system‖ which is 
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something that more recent studies of collective action have criticized, as developed in chapter 
five. Yet they do point at a political dimension in squatting that for many remains hidden.  
In my fieldwork in addition to squatters I also interviewed politicians and state workers. 
It was not uncommon to find among the latter people who got really upset with my insinuation or 
questioning about the role of politics in squatting. For some experts or politicians, especially 
from the left, squatting comes only because people need a place to live, and because they are 
poor. As one specialist in urbanism with a long tradition of leftist militancy that I interviewed 
and with whom I kept up a lively debate over email told me, ―I am not a fan of your hypothesis 
that land seizures are caused by more favorable political conditions. My own hypothesis is less 
of a novelty and much more economistic. I believe that invasions occurred basically because of 
need and that they coincide with moments of economic depression and little official response in 
terms of housing.‖  Every once and then he writes asking if I have already falsified my 
hypothesis.  
From his perspective, and from the perspective of many people, land squatting is just a 
matter of need. Given the poor conditions in which many squatters live, this makes sense. 
Besides, politically, it is wiser to see them as victims rather than as any sort of strategic beings. 
The general public and the state might be convinced to redirect resources toward the former but 
definitely not towards the latter. Yet this perspective also takes agency entirely away from 
squatters. The idea throughout this dissertation is NOT that economic conditions do not matter. 
But I do argue that they have interacted with political conditions to make land invasions more 
likely to happen at certain, favorable, moments and less likely at certain other moments, and to 
make land invasions happen in specific different ways at particular moments in time.  
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2.2 FROM MARGINALITY TO THE POOR WORKING CLASS: A CHANGE IN 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND IDENTITY 
2.2.1 The name 
The first land invasions appeared in Montevideo somewhere in the 1940s. The earliest one I 
could track was founded in 1947, and like most of the early invasions, located in a deprived area 
of the northeast of the city with vacant non urbanized land. There were some invasions in the 
more industrial working class northwest part of the city as well. These early invasions were 
dubbed cantegriles, as an irony. In Punta del Este, the wealthiest seaside resort of the Uruguayan 
Atlantic coast and a point of reference for the regional elite and jet set, there is a very exclusive 
club named Cantegril Country Club, built in 1947. It is unknown who started using that name, 
but some see it as a sign of popular resistance and imagination (Bon Espasandín 1963).   
Cantegriles were associated with rural-urban migration and with extreme poverty. They 
were formed by slow accretion, with one family or small groups arriving at a time. Without a 
sewage system, drinking water or any other service, houses were built by residents with scrap 
plywood, corrugated metal, sheets of plastic, cardboard, and other found materials. Their urban 
landscape looked very crowded, with no streets or public places. Often, you could see and smell 
piles of garbage and horses and horse-carts because some of the inhabitants worked by 
scavenging in the city and later classifying and selling cardboard and other recyclable materials.  
In 1958, a Uruguayan filmmaker, Alberto Miller, made a documentary titled Cantegriles.  
It is the earliest of all sources I found on the topic. This documentary, shot in the cantegriles of 
Aparicio Saravia in the Northeast of Montevideo, showed for the first time the reality of the 
people living there. Shot in black and white, it attempted to let reality speak for itself, as the 
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director said more than three decades later in an interview for TV Ciudad.
13
  It shows very 
precarious houses, lots of children playing with dogs or having a bath in what looks like a very 
dirty little lake, people working on sorting garbage, more children, some men chatting, people 
cooking with fire outside their house, and many other details of the everyday life of the 
cantegriles.  
Most of Miller‘s cantegriles are still in the city. And there are new ones similar to those 
as well, as I will develop in chapter four. Yet as a general pattern, the newer land invasions after 
the mid 1980s tend to be more urbanistically planned, with streets, blocks, sidewalks, and 
sometimes public spaces such as a community center or a square. Residents still self build their 
houses, but they use more solid materials such as bricks or some sort of cement. Some of these 
neighborhoods are, to an outsider, indistinguishable from a poor but formal neighborhood. The 
only difference is land ownership. What defines a squatter settlement is that residents may own 
the house but they do not own the plot on which their house is located.   
Slowly the world cantegril has become more and more specific. From a synonym of 
squatter settlement, currently it refers only to those that look like shantytowns. The new word is 
asentamiento irregular (literally irregular settlement). State authorities and the bureau of 
statistics use asentamiento irregular or just asentamiento to refer to groups of houses on an 
illegally occupied land. Most people do as well. But still the word cantegril is used informally to 
refer to the poorest asentamientos. The word is rarely used with a positive connotation. One of 
my interviewees, a leader from a very organized land invasion, proudly told me that ―some think 
this is a cante [short for cantegril] and this is not a cante. Here, nobody collects garbage. 
Everybody has his ranchito [little hut] but tries to have everything neat. You see the houses. 
                                                 
13
 Interview of Alberto Miller with TV Ciudad, 1991. Thanks to the staff of TV Ciudad’s archive for facilitating my 
access to this and other digital material.  
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They are all built with cement.‖ Like many, this squatter settlement resident identifies 
cantegriles with marginality, asentamientos with a downward mobile honest  and hardworking 
working class.  Curiously, when I asked María, a resident from a typical cantegril, about the 
difference between a cantegril and an asentamiento she told me ―none, they are the same‖ and 
she kept using the terms interchangeably during the interview and while touring me around her 
neighborhood.  
Asentamiento is somehow a more neutral word, although that seems to be changing. 
According to a recent study the group subject to most discrimination in Montevideo and its 
metropolitan area is that of people living in squatter settlements. For the general public living in 
an asentamiento is becoming increasingly associated with crime, danger and marginality. About 
37% of the population said they would not want someone who lives in a squatter settlement as a 
neighbor and 1 out of 4 respondents said they would not like to have an informal settler as a 
family member (IMM 2007). 
14
 
As with cantegril, it is difficult to trace the origin of the word asentamiento and the 
expression asentamiento irregular (irregular settlement). It probably came from international 
funding agencies, which use the term settlement a lot. But a former president of the city council, 
a man of the extreme left who, besides living in a squatter settlement himself, was very involved 
with many land invasions happening in 1990s, had a different story. He told me:  
[it‘s interesting] how the term asentamiento took off. I remember when I took my seat in the City 
Council in 1995, there was a land invasion that January. The mass media started an ideological 
battle… press terrorism was trying to prevent land invasions from happening (…). And then we [he 
                                                 
14
 Other categories of undesirable neighbors were former convicts (33%), politicians (18%), military officers (15%), 
gay people (14%) and people with AIDS (13%). The percentage of people who said they would not like squatters as 
neighbors increased with the socioeconomic level of the interviewee‘s neighborhood, reaching 49% among those 
who live in affluent urban areas.  
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refers to his political sector within the leftist coalition] met and we finally invented the term 
asentamientos irregulares. We started using it in the press and people started using it too. The term 
has a nuance that takes some pressure out of it. Before, people talked of invasions, land seizures. And 
we started to use asentamientos irregulares. 
 
Regardless of who coined the term, it is important to know that the expression 
asentamiento irregular or irregular settlement seems to be a politically less charged expression, 
than land invasions or land seizures. In this work, precisely because I am trying to recover the 
agency and the politics of squatting, I use these terms interchangeably. 
Finally, the change in name and identity implies also an increasing recognition by the 
state. Asentamientos are now part of the ―deserving poor,‖ that is, those that need to be helped by 
state policies such as titling regularization and neighborhood upgrading as developed by the 
Program for the Integration of Squatter Settlements (PIAI).  State policies towards squatters of 
the past, when there were any, had been mostly aimed at eradication by building substandard 
public housing for squatter dwellers. Other social actors have also recognized asentamientos in a 
way they had not recognized cantegriles. FUCVAM, the social movement for cooperative 
housing, a traditional working class movement associated with unionized workers and with the 
left, has started to pay attention to the reality of squatters. As one of the leaders of the movement 
reflected, ―The left never really understood the phenomenon of squatters. The orthodox used to 
say ‗these are lumpens, classless, blablabla‘.‖ Yet, more recently the movement has developed 
strategies to be able to work with squatter populations who do not necessarily have the fixed 
income to pay the small but regular fees, do not have the time to wait the usually long time it 
takes to get the plot, the loan, and the building process, and do not initially have the collective 
spirit to build by self help and organize community projects. An example of the effort to 
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overcome these obstacles is the movement‘s work with a group of eleven evicted families from a 
city center rooming house. They invaded the sidewalk until the municipality gave them a plot 
and they started to work with FUCVAM to build what is now a finished housing cooperative 
(Fossati and González 1996; Nahoum 1999). 
15
 
This increasing recognition by the state and other social movements as well as by 
political parties as mentioned in previous sections can be read as a process of ―certification.‖ 
According to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly  (2001) certification is one of the recurrent processes 
or mechanisms present in diverse forms of collective action. It occurs when collective actors get 
validation of their performances and their claims by external authorities.  
 
2.2.2 Demographics through historical and more recent studies of squatters 
The study of squatter settlements in Uruguay has proliferated in the last years, with the 
increasing attention of the government to this social problem. The National Institute of Statistics 
(INE) included in its 2006 national household survey for the first time a dichotomous variable 
that tells you if the surveyed household is located in a squatter settlement or not.  The PIAI, 
government program for titling regularization and upgrading, financed by the Uruguayan 
government and primarily with funds from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), has 
encouraged the proliferation of ―neighborhood diagnostics‖ (PIAI 2008).  Different groups of 
professionals, NGOs or associations of construction companies with NGOs compete for PIAI‘s 
funds to upgrade settlements. To win and later to work in the field architects, social workers, 
                                                 
15
 For more about FUCVAM see Midaglia (1992)  
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sociologists, engineers, educators and so on produce lots of information about particular 
neighborhoods. I have used some of them to compare with information from my interviews or 
for specific information I needed.
16
 The Montevideo Municipal Government, universities,
17
 and 
other bodies have also contributed more diagnostics, and some more general works.  
The most referenced historical work is a survey conducted in 1984 by two entities, 
INTEC, an NGO that has been working with regularization projects for a long time, and CIESU, 
a research center with an interest in urban studies (Cecilio 1997; Mazzei and Veiga 1985). 
INTEC later followed up alone on that study (Cecilio 1997).  But I found two very interesting 
much earlier works that are rarely cited. These two works mimic the broader Latin American 
discussion about squatter settlements, characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s that I referred to in 
the introduction. Bon Espasandín (1963) sees cantegriles primarily from the rural-urban 
migration angle. His work sides with the marginality theory perspective – he quotes some of its 
representatives such as Gino Germani - and he is very much worried by the problems residents 
have in getting used to urban values. In his own words:  
 The man that lives in cantegriles, besides being economically poor (…) is rootless. (…). This 
transplanted man, without roots in the urban environment, prefers working in independent 
occupations because he has learned to work on his own, depending not on a patron but on his own 
will or nature (p. 66). 
                                                 
16
 As an example, I have used the neighborhood diagnostics of IPRU, an NGO that has worked in regularization 
programs for years. In their very thorough case studies, they collect information on the history of the neighborhood, 
as well as demographics and other data.  
17
 Some undergraduate students of Urban Sociology from the School of Architecture of the Universidad de la 
República had conducted exploratory work in different squatter settlements of the city, visiting them and randomly 
interviewing one or two residents. I found some of their papers through professors I contacted and also through 
social workers at the Zonal Community Centers who had copies. Although they were generally very initial 
approaches, sometimes naïve, to these settlements they had some information I could use to compare with mine. 
Some were very interesting and all offered an interesting window on the way students of architecture, not usually 
exposed to the reality of poverty and popular housing in their courses, see the reality of land invasions.  
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Nonetheless Bon Espasandín sees the concentration of rural land as the main cause of migrants 
coming to the city, some of whom become squatters. In that sense, his perspective is structural. 
For him, the solution is trying to keep these migrants in their places of origin through various 
population policies. Baudrón (Baudrón 1979), in turn, takes a perspective more typical of 
Marxist of the time, more structuralist, more dependency-theory-oriented, and therefore sees 
squatter settlements as characteristic of a capitalist development model that does not create stable 
employment for all. Replicating Perlman‘s (1976) study in the favelas of Rio, Baudrón also 
rejects the view that squatters have different values or aspirations than mainstream society. 
Criticizing marginality theory, Baudrón argues that squatters‘ problems are not in their heads but 
in the structural conditions they have to face such as a rising cost of living, especially regarding 
housing.     
Table 1 summarizes and compares the findings of these two studies and more recent 
ones.  It also offers, in the last two shaded columns an update of the information I built based on 
the 2006 National Household Survey (INE 2006). In the right most column, I present, for 
comparison, data on formal neighborhoods. Given the inexistence of comparable micro-data on 
squatters from their emergence until today, this is the best approximation we can have to changes 
in their size and demographics.  
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Table 1: Studies on squatter settlements, Montevideo 1963-2006, and comparison of squatter 
settlements versus formal neighborhoods, Montevideo 2006.  
  
Bon 
Espasandín 
Baudrón 
Mazzei & 
Veiga/INTEC 
INTEC 
Update by Alvarez-
Rivadulla 
Date of the Study 
 
1963 1971 1984 1994  circa 2006 
Method 
Survey  
40 families 
Survey  
85 families 6 
neighborhoods 
   Survey 
524 households 
Replication of the 
1984 survey 
study  
(unknown N) 
Aerial pictures 
and city 
explorations for 
the catalog of 
settlements 
National household survey 
2006 (see notes for 
exceptions) 
Object  "cantegriles" 
"barrios 
marginales" 
(cantegriles as 
one subtype of 
them) 
"cantegriles"  
"asentamien-
tos precarios" 
and “extreme 
poverty” as a 
synonyms 
"cantegriles" and 
"asentamientos 
precarios" 
sometimes as 
synonyms and 
sometimes to 
distinguish two 
different types  
Squatter 
Settlements 
Formal 
Neighbor-
hoods 
Estimate of the 
Universe 
7000 people - 
2541 houses, 
15000 people 
7013 houses 
144707 people  
(11% of city 
population) 
39116 houses* 
1181261 
 People*  
Origin (household 
head born outside 
Montevideo) 
65% 65% 46%  16% **  
P
re
vi
o
u
s 
h
o
u
si
n
g
 Other squatter 
settlement 
  34% 34%   
Inner city slum    7% 7%   
House or 
apartment  
 52% 49% 57%   
Other   10% 2%   
Age: 
 Residents 10 years 
old or younger 
27.37% 
young 
population  
35% (16% the 
entire city) 
34% 28%  14%  
Sex: percentage 
women 
  48% 51% 51% 54 %  
M
o
ti
ve
s 
Couldn't afford 
rent/eviction 
 
 37% 47% 30% 25%  17% 
To improve    10% 45% *** 38% 
Other  63% 53% 60% 30% 45% 
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Bon 
Espasandín 
Baudrón 
Mazzei & 
Veiga/INTEC 
INTEC Update by Alvarez  
Poverty: % families 
with an income less 
than 1 minimum 
salary 
Squatter 
families have 
$9 a day on 
average **** 
33%  45%   17%  7% 
O
cu
p
a 
ti
o
n
 
Work on 
their own 
68%  70% 62% (hh) 28% (hh) 36% 25% 
Employees   35% (hh) 56% (hh) 63%  69 % 
F
o
rm
al
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
Without 
formal 
instruction 
38% 15% (pop>6)   2% (hh) 1%  (hh) 
Incomplete 
elementary 
education 
38% (pop>11)  51% (hh) 33% (hh) 24% (hh) 14% (hh) 
Finished 
elementary 
education 
14% (pop>11) 50% (pop >6) 40% (hh) 37 % (hh) 36% (hh) 23% (hh) 
Started 
secondary 
education 
0% 5% (pop >6) 11% (hh) 28% (hh) 36% (hh) 42% (hh) 
Started 
tertiary 
education 
0% 0% 0% 0% 2% (hh) 20% (hh) 
Household size 4.5 mean 5.4 mean  51% 5 or more 4.0 mean  2.9 mean 
Over-crowding  
3.3 people/ 
bedroom 
  
40% of houses have 
over crowding 
problems 
2.4  people/ 
bedroom 
1.6 
people/ 
bedroom 
Children per 
family 
average 
    1.4 0.5 
Houses' walls 
built with solid 
materialis 
(bricks or 
similar) 
7.5% (67% are 
shacks) 
 36% 63% 89%  98% 
% of households 
with piped water 
inside the house 
Almost none   38% 84%  97% 
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Bon 
Espasandín 
Baudrón 
Mazzei & 
Veiga/INTEC 
INTEC Update by Alvarez  
Sewage: 
households 
connected to the 
city sewage 
system 
   7% 21%  80% 
M
ai
n
 u
se
 o
f 
b
u
ild
in
g
s 
Housing    95% 96% 96% 
 
 
Commer
cial/other 
   
 
5% 
 
4% 
 
4% 
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 
Paying 
 
 
 
  39% 48% 94% 
Stealing 
 
   56% 52% 6% 
 
* Uruguay’s Institute of Statistics’ population count, 2004 (1st phase of the 2010 census) 
**Census of selected settlements by PIAI (government’s regularization program), 2001-2002 
*** To be able to compare, I have grouped the categories offered by the question mv11 of the the 2006 Househould Survey as 
follows: 1-"eviction" and 2-"economic reasons" as "couldn't afford rent/eviction" and 3-"house in bad shape", 4-"get my own 
house" and 6- "problems of space" as "to improve" 
****Minimum cost of a basic food basket for a poor family was 20 $/day at the time. 
 
 
The studies summarized in table 1 are not strictly comparable, yet they do show general 
patterns and trends. Forgetting for a moment the last column, we can see some big changes in the 
43 years from 1963 to 2006. The first one is the growth. From a numerically insignificant 
phenomenon, land squatting has grown today into the form of housing of 11% of the city 
population. In addition, the profile of squatters changed. Today, they tend to be more educated, 
work as employees rather than on their own, and they tend to come from other neighborhoods in 
Montevideo, rather than from the interior of the country.
18
 The appearance of the neighborhoods 
                                                 
18
 It is important to note here that squatters were never completely migrants in Montevideo, and they were very 
rarely the typical rural migrant arriving in the city and not finding a place there, or not having ―urban values.‖ Bon 
Espasandín (1963) already found the majority of the population of his cantegriles was from the city. When he only 
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also changed. Houses look more like poor working class houses than shacks. The main 
construction materials are not plastic, corrugated metal and other found materials but more solid 
ones. In addition, today more houses have basic services such as running water or electricity 
although still more often than not the electricity is stolen.  
Some of these general trends show improvement in the living conditions, on average, for 
squatters. For some poor urban dwellers, going to live in a squatter settlement may imply 
improving their living conditions. That is why when offered the option ―to improve‖ when asked 
why they moved to a squatter settlement, a considerable percentage of respondents chose it. Even 
without property rights or complete certainty that they will not be evicted, evictions have been 
very rare and non-existent after the settlement is consolidated. Thus, for a person that rents a tiny 
apartment or a very run down house at a high price, or a young couple living with relatives, to 
mention just some examples, going to live in a squatter settlement might be a good option.   
Yet we should not forget that there are many more squatters than there were in the past, 
and that if we compare squatter settlements with formal city neighborhoods, as we can do 
looking at the two last shaded columns of Table 1, we clearly see that squatters are an 
underprivileged group. They are poorer and less educated. They live in larger households, with 
fewer rooms per person and with more children. And they have fewer basic services. Although 
most households have potable water inside their houses and pay for that service, half of the 
households steal electricity from the street with very unsafe connections, and only a minority is 
connected to the city sewage system. 
                                                                                                                                                             
looked at head of households, he did find the pattern of migration. Nonetheless, those migrants were not mainly 
coming from rural areas but from cities or towns other than Montevideo (Baudrón 1979).     
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have tried to summarize the relevant features of the Uruguayan context in 
relation to urban poverty and land squatting in particular. I have emphasized the historical trends 
and facts that might have started path dependency trajectories, and at the same time I have tried 
to account for the changes. As exhaustive as I have tried to be, this case presentation is in many 
ways incomplete. Yet in building it and in including the relevant references for each of the 
multiple intertwined topics, I have aimed at giving the reader enough elements to understand the 
main questions of this dissertation as well as to be able to agree or disagree with, or at least be 
suspicious about, the answers I have found.  
 The history of land squatters in Montevideo is a window for observing larger 
transformations in Uruguayan politics, economy and society during the twentieth century. The 
rarity of squatters during the first part of the century responds to a society with a very early high 
level of urbanization and to a state and a market with great capacity to incorporate the lower 
classes as workers and citizens. The explosive growth of squatters in the last decades responds to 
the erosion of that capacity of integration of both the market and the state.  
Beyond the size variation, the changing demographics of squatters show that today in 
Montevideo it does not take scavenging or unemployment to squat. Quite the contrary, squatters 
are today more educated and with better jobs than in the past. They are in fact, part of the 
working class of the past who due to structural mobility got more education than previous 
generations. But unfortunately that does not guarantee them the satisfaction of their basic needs. 
They are, in comparison to the rest of the city, a very underprivileged group. They have been 
―seduced and abandoned‖ by a model of inclusion that does not seem to work anymore. In that 
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adjustment, ―squatting‖ changed its past connotation as synonym of ―marginal‖ and became 
increasingly appealing as a decent housing strategy for the lower classes. 
Finally, as I argue throughout this dissertation, mediating between the structural changes 
and the decision to invade a plot, there are people deciding, strategizing, and sometimes using 
political networks. These networks facilitate access to the state from which squatters need a lot 
and whom many squatters feel should do something for them, because they have rights. These 
perceptions about the state are not new but come from a tradition of state proximity, benevolence 
and, very important, permeability through personal political contacts.  
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3.0  HOW TO STUDY ELUSIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION? A CALL FOR MIXED 
METHODS 
Social movements and contentious politics more generally are difficult sociological objects. 
They have, despite this or because of it, provoked sociological imaginations to think creatively 
about how to grasp these amorphous, mobile, unstable, and difficult-to-limit- type of social 
phenomena. Studying social movements as processes rather than snapshots brings in an 
additional difficulty. Scholars have developed several ways of collecting and analyzing historical 
data, newspaper data being one of the most common. There are examples of collective action, 
however, that do not make it to the press or to any other record at least in a systematic way. 
These elusive forms of collective action require additional efforts from researchers who want to 
give accurate accounts of their development over time.  
When I embarked myself on the study of the cycle of land seizures in Montevideo, capital 
city of Uruguay, I knew I had a lot of work ahead. Studying the history of the informal city by 
definition posed two problems to the sociological imagination. First, it implied entering into the 
realm of historical research since I wanted to study things that had already happened. And 
second, I would probably not have readily available information, at least in official sources.  
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Broadly speaking I wanted to understand when and the conditions under which squatter 
settlements were more likely to emerge.
19
 For that, I needed to follow the development of land 
invasions throughout time and space. I needed a time series that did not exist and maps. But from 
a more micro perspective, I also wanted to understand how squatters had interacted with these 
conditions to produce (different types of) squatter settlements.
20
 For that, I needed to get at 
actors‘ perspectives. My suspicion was that, despite common sense beliefs that poverty had been 
the only driving force, politics had something to do with it. I therefore wanted to understand the 
relationship between politics and squatters.  Following a relational approach, I needed to get at 
the politicians‘ side and the squatters‘ side, although I later understood that more than two sides, 
there was often a grey zone (Auyero 2007). 
In this chapter I want to describe the methodological effort of studying the dynamics of 
an elusive form of contentious politics, using several methods and approaches.  
3.1 WHY A MIXED METHODS APPROACH?  
 
Although I had a priori theoretical and practical reasons for engaging in a project that required 
crossing methodological boundaries, I found one answer to the question of why I am using a 
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 Following Tarrow (1989) I believe that "What needs to be explained is not why people periodically petition, 
strike, demonstrate, riot, loot and burn, but rather why so many of them do so at particular times in their history, and 
if there is a logical sequence to their action. " 
20
 Following Katz (2001; 2002), I believe that ―when refined sufficiently, descriptions of how people act merge 
seamlessly into explanations of their behavior,‖ and that therefore ethnography should not abandon the search for 
causality, ―if not for other reason, (…) [because] it is a useful narrative device.‖  In a similar vein, in a sort of 
advocacy preface for the role of political ethnography, Tilly (2006) wrote: ―If you believe (as I do) that how things 
happen is why then happen, then ethnography has great advantages over most other conventional social scientific 
methods as a way of getting at cause-effect relations.‖     
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mixed methods approach, in the data. After reconstructing the cycle of events of land squatting 
as I will explain below, I compared the time series I ended up with, with one from the Ministry 
of Housing I suspected would have some biases. I found a discrepancy around 1994-1995. While 
the Ministry of Housing‘s series gives the idea that most settlements were already there by 1994, 
the one I ended up with shows a bunch of them occurring in 1995 and 1996. This turned out to 
be more than simply a mistake in the initial series. It was because I was using several 
methodological strategies that I was able to discover the ―missing link.‖  
After interviewing two early residents from the squatter settlement The Queen, I had two 
different dates of settlement. One informant had said squatting started in 1995 and another, in 
1996.  After neighborhood observations and interviews I always wrote up fieldnotes. I also 
looked up information about the neighborhood among my materials, considered what other 
informants had said about the neighborhood and browsed the internet too (usually a not very 
useful tool for this invisible form of mobilization but useful in this particular case). When I came 
back from these interviews, I wanted to resolve the contradiction.  Curiously, other sources were 
contradictory as well. A file I had found in the local government said 1995 and so did an article 
on the history of the neighborhood I found on the internet,  but a neighborhood report by students 
of Architecture from the Universidad de la República said 1996.  Moreover, two days before, I 
had interviewed early residents from a nearby squatter settlement. They had told me that The 
Queen had emerged in 1996, just a few months after theirs, with people that were not allowed to 
stay in their neighborhood by the local government.  
Rather than just applying the majority rule –  useless in this case because there was a tie -  
or the quality rule and decide in favor of 1996 given that the interviewee who said so had 
actually been more precise in the rest of the information she gave me about the initial days, I 
 58 
decided to pursue the contradiction a bit further. To solve the mystery I called the resident that 
had answered 1995 back and told him about the contradictory information. He then confessed 
that they actually had started in 1996, but that they always say they started in 1995 because only 
those settlements that started before 1996 can enter into the state regularization program. As the 
comparison of series in figure 2 will later show this might have been a strategy taken also by 
other settlements. Since the source of the initial series  were exactly those state agencies 
responsible for deciding which neighborhoods are to benefit from the policy, the series might be 
biased towards locating settlements that started around 1996, before their actual date. If one year 
changes the odds of receiving state aid, it is reasonable that that data series is inflated before the 
policy threshold.  
Thus using multiple sources added quantity and quality of data. This was crucial for my 
object, which I have dubbed an elusive form of collective action because it does not leave many 
traces in archives. Just like historians of the private life or those that study under-represented 
subjects in national archives such as children, women, the poor and so forth, using a multiplicity 
of sources was important to get more data (Markoff 2001). Sociologists tend to use triangulation 
as a technical word to refer to the use of multiple sources and types of data – and I use it here - 
but it is important to remember that historians have been doing this for the longest time. So 
rather than reinventing the wheel, we should look more at how they do it and learn from the 
ways in which they make inferences from these multiple sources.    
Using multiple sources, as the story shows, not only solved contradictions among data 
but also showed that those contradictions were sometimes informative. As Alessandro Portelli  
and other oral historians have taught us, the discrepancy between memory and facts often adds 
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value to oral sources rather than takes it away, as long as we combine them with other sources 
and analyze those discrepancies (Levine and Sebe Bom Meihy 2001; Portelli 1991).  
Finally, using a variety of sources and analyzing them using a variety of analytical 
strategies is, beyond practical needs, part of my broader conception of social sciences. The so 
institutionalized difference between quantitative and qualitative methods hides more than it 
shows. Many have advocated for this  multimethod perspective both in general (Brewer and 
Hunter 1989; Collier and Brady 2004; Tilly 2004) and within the social movements-contentious 
politics field in particular (Klandermans, Staggenborgh, and Tarrow 2002).  According to 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly  (2008) ―triangulating methods on a single research site or episode 
of contention can produce more robust results than even the most intense exploitation of any 
single method‖ (p. 324). For them, triangulation is also a good way to measure mechanisms 
triggering collective action, that is, small events or processes that link effects to causes.    
Yet real multi-method work continues being exceptional. The work of Doug McAdam in 
his now classic Freedom Summer (1988) is perhaps one of the best achieved exceptions of 
combining methodological strategies such as surveys, archival materials and in-depth interviews, 
within the contentious politics field. Curiously, McAdam‘s is also a retrospective study of 
mobilization. His success in understanding why young, white, privileged Americans participated 
in Freedom Summer – a campaign to register African American voters in Mississippi - and how 
that participation changed their lives, using a multiplicity of sources and methodological 
strategies, was inspirational.  Auyero‘s (2007) multimethod study of the 2001 Argentine wave of 
lootings was also illuminating. His combination of ethnographic data with an event catalog of the 
lootings helped in the understanding of why and how looters chose their targets and got to 
participate in the events.  
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3.2 WHAT DID I DO? 
Although I had conducted previous ethnographic work in three Montevideo squatter settlements 
in 1998 have been following these sites since then with several visits, I conducted the bulk of the 
fieldwork for my dissertation during a year that extended from mid 2006 to mid 2007.   
During those months, I conducted 80 interviews with squatters, politicians, government 
authorities, bureaucrats and other key informants. I visited 25 different neighborhoods filling 
observation templates, writing notes from informal conversations as well as impressions about 
those visits and questions for further exploration. I also collected all the documentary materials I 
found. I organized data collection based on two goals: I conducted mini-ethnographies of a 
variety of squatter settlements and I built an event catalog of squatting events. 
These two ways of organizing the research design are not very often used together. Each 
of them easily lends itself to the study of interactive accounts of struggle (Tilly 2008). Their 
combination enhances this capacity.  Event catalogs, when analyzed as time series in 
combination with contextual knowledge either in the form of qualitative historical information 
or, with more exactitude, in the form of explanatory and control variables, provide useful 
knowledge about the interaction of contention and other contextual processes. Ethnographic 
studies of contention, in turn, enable a closer look to the interplay among actors.   
3.2.1 Mini-ethnographies 
In order to understand how squatting has happened I selected a group of neighborhoods and tried 
to reconstruct their history. The basis for selection was the official list and map of squatter 
settlements that the agency in charge of squatter settlements in Uruguay and the Bureau of 
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Statistics had just finished building when I started fieldwork (INE-PIAI 2006). However, I also 
included two cases that were not in that list. One was not listed because it had already been 
regularized and therefore it was not legally a squatter settlement anymore but a formal 
neighborhood in which dwellers were owners of their land. The case was however interesting to 
me, because of the moment in which the land invasion occurred and the squatters‘ success in 
getting the state to pay attention to them by providing urban services and ultimately land titles. 
The other was not in the official list because it was a failed invasion, deterred by neighbors and 
local authorities the day it happened. It was interesting precisely for being a non-event.    
The criterion for selecting neighborhoods was guided by my original questions about the 
cycle of land invasions and the influence of politics. I wanted settlements that originated at 
different points in time in order to cover different political periods. I therefore sampled 
settlements formed before the dictatorship, during the dictatorship, during the transition to 
democracy, and during each electoral period thereafter. I ended up visiting 25 different squatter 
settlements, trying to also get variation by type of settlement to represent both the more and the 
less planned land seizures and variation in the geographical location in the city. 
Although I collected other types of information, the focus of my fieldwork was on the 
earliest days of settlements, how the early comers got to that piece of land, how they started 
building, how they solved everyday needs and got (or failed to get) public services such as water 
and light, how they solved collective action problems (if they did), who helped them, and if they 
faced any eviction attempt. To get at that information I conducted 41 oral histories from early 
residents. For that purpose I used a questionnaire template (see appendix A), which I used very 
flexibly but always making sure I got detailed information about initial times. While interested in 
the role of politics, I never asked directly about it and only pursued the issue after a name or 
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event appeared in the interviewee‘s narrative. Yet to avoid vagueness, after trying out the 
interview a few times, I included one question that turned out to be crucial. I asked: If you had to 
choose the three people or institutions that were most helpful to this neighborhood, who would 
you mention?  This question often gave me relevant tips and names that I could later pursue, and 
pushed some interviewees that had only said the common phrases ―we are apolitical here‖ or ―we 
did everything ourselves‖ to think and tell me about political and institutional helpers.  
Finally, I interviewed leaders and non leaders to crosscheck information.
 21
 Besides 
helping to fill gaps in the information, non leaders gave me less grandiose and less articulate 
stories than leaders. They also sometimes helped me understand the final link in the political 
network chain, as it becomes explicit in the analysis of a clientelistic network in chapter 6. 
Below, the shaded box includes a characterization of respondents. When leaders and non leaders 
from the same settlement or some other informant gave me information contradicting what 
another one had said, I often tried to explore those contradictions further. Sometimes, it was a 
matter of one remembering incorrectly. But in some other cases, there were just different 
perceptions of the same reality, based on the differential positions of the interviewee. In those 
cases there was nothing to solve or clarify but just two equally interesting though different 
perceptions of the same reality based on experiences. The most common example was the story 
of a leader who tells his story of sacrifice for his neighborhood without much recognition, and a 
non leader that sees him as a corrupt person that only participates to fulfill personal interests.   
One important bias in this study is the absence of those who arrived later to the 
settlement. Given that the goal was not to reconstruct the variation in memories within each 
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  The idea of interviewing both leaders and non leaders comes from Collier‘s (1976)  historical study of squatter 
mobilization in Peru. He interviewed initial leaders and non-leaders as a crosscheck and I did the same. 
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settlement according to respondents‘ position and especially according to arrival time, I did not 
include newcomers as informants. This could be something interesting to do in the future.  
The rationale for choosing oral histories as a technique was based on Blee and Taylor‘s 
(2002) recommendations: ―oral history interviews aim to elicit a robust or ‗thick‘ description of a 
historical period or situation from the perspective of those who lived through that time.‖ Oral 
histories are particularly valuable research tools for studying social movements that, like 
squatting, do not leave great documentary evidence. They are also valuable for unveiling aspects 
of movements that tend to be underestimated in written accounts, such as the role of women 
(Blee and Taylor 2002). In addition, they offer the possibility of studying the memory of protest, 
which I would like to do as a future project. However, retrospective oral accounts, just like all 
sources, can be misleading if not used with caution. For example, they tend to under-represent 
conflict, relations of domination, and differences between earlier and later beliefs, processes, and 
goals (Blee and Currier 2005). Considering these possible biases, I conducted oral histories with 
differently situated persons and, as already expressed, I combined them with other sources.  
As often in ethnographic fieldwork, whenever one of the residents mentioned an external 
actor in the interview I tried to find information about him or her and often also interview that 
person. Some people appeared in more than one interview and, as mentioned below, that was 
often an indicator of an important node. Thus, I talked to former and current local authorities and 
city councilors, lawyers, social workers and other professionals, the ex-major of Montevideo and 
current Minister of Housing and his advisors, and so on, totaling 44 formal interviews.  
From the three types of invasions I worked with, accretion, planned and land subdivisions 
and sales, the last one was the most difficult to track. I did include three invasions that started in 
this way, but I could not always talk to all the actors like I tried in the other ones. In one case, for 
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example, the settlement started as a fraudulent sale and settlers could never really know where 
their money went. I could not find those fake sellers either. Yet the story of Manuel in chapter 6 
compensates for this a little bit, since it illustrates in depth how subdivision and sales start and 
develop. Accretion invasions, in comparison to planned invasions, were also more difficult to 
study because due to the lack of collective planning at the beginning, there was no collective 
history to tell.  Interviews where much shorter, no matter how much I probed my interviewees.  
Every time I visited a new neighborhood I used an observation template to systematically 
observe spatial features such as the existence of streets, public services and collective buildings 
or spaces such as soup kitchens. I also collected documents such as neighborhood reports 
conducted by professionals or NGOs and a few press articles. In some neighborhoods, leaders 
had neighborhood documents such as pictures, minutes from meetings, local press articles and I 
collected those too.  
For the analysis I have tried to reconstruct neighborhood histories by putting together all 
the sources and exploring contradictory information. I have analyzed how the histories vary 
across time and space. Yet, I did not use these several neighborhood histories to just compare 
them using the traditional comparative method based on Mill‘s most similar or most different 
cases. I did pay attention to similarities and differences in order to be able to identify relevant 
types of invasions. But I also analyzed connections among stories. References to other 
settlements, leaders, or to the same politicians appearing in more than one neighborhood, were 
often indicators of something worth pursuing further. This is perhaps best illustrated in the 
analysis on chapter 6.
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 While the comparative method keeps being the basis of one important field in Political Science, Comparative 
Politics, anthropologists have contributed interesting criticisms to it, proposing multi-sited ethnography as a 
methodological approach. See:  Marcus (1995).  
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During the analysis and the writing, which often went together, I used the stories to 
understand and illustrate the cycle of land invasions (and to build it as I will explain below).  I 
have paid particular attention to squatters‘ strategies for invading plots and building 
neighborhoods. These often included connecting with the state either directly or through a 
political contact. I also paid attention to the perceptions squatters and politicians have of each 
other.  
The reconstruction of these neighborhood histories helped me better understand what it 
took and what it meant to seize land at different moments in time and with different degrees of 
organization. Political networks and particularly the action of local political and/or economic 
brokers appeared to be crucial in the organization of settlements. Those that did not have brokers 
tend to be poorer.  As I will develop on chapter 4, time and space mattered and the settlements 
that emerged in the 1990s and that were located in the western part of Montevideo were often 
more organized. 
 
 
About my interviews with squatters:   
I interviewed 41 squatters (16 women, 25 men), all early residents of the settlements I visited, some 
leaders and some ordinary residents.  
Age: On average, middle aged (mid 40s ranging from 33 to late 70s). Even though I explicitly looked for 
the earlier residents, I ended up talking to a middle aged group, in general. This is not surprising given that 
squatting has been mainly a housing strategy of recently formed families.  While the average age of household 
heads and their partners in the formal city was 53 in 2006 (ENHA 2006), their counterparts living in squatter 
settlements are 11 years younger on average. Yet squatters tended to look older. Harsh lives, poor health care and 
poverty showed in the lack of teeth, early wrinkles and tired looks. During fieldwork, I was mostly impressed by the 
early aging or quick lives of women.  I met Jenny about 10 years before my dissertation fieldwork trip when I 
started visiting Freedom Village. A life of scarcity and fighting to make ends meet with several children and now 
early grandchildren, who also live with her,  made her look much older than the mid 40s she was.  
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Jobs: My informants tended to survive on low paid informal jobs just like the population of squatter 
settlements in general. According to the ENHA (2006), 60% of workers from squatter settlements had informal jobs 
(i.e., without contract or benefits) whereas that percentage is 31% for the formal city. Some were scavengers – in 
general as a cushion job held in certain periods when they do not find anything else; - some had small businesses 
in their houses; some were temporary workers in construction; two women were maids. A small group was 
receiving state benefits:  two were receiving the governments’ basic income; two were living on their pensions and 
one was receiving unemployment benefits. Only two of my interviewees resembled the ideal of the working class 
(i.e., relatively skilled, manual, protected jobs): a soap factory worker and a carpenter working for a building 
company.  
 Four others, however, also belonged to the manual working class, but their jobs were much more 
temporary, dependant on short term contracts with the state. Two of them were scavengers that were at the 
moment part of a NGO state funded project that worked with scavengers from the poorest area of the city. Two 
others were building bus stops as part of a short term contract with the state as well. Their jobs reflect a new trend 
in some Latin American states that after the huge retrenchment policies of the 1990s had started new welfare 
programs to attenuate the social consequences of liberalization. Some of these programs include short term 
employment and training projects for those that otherwise would be unable to leave unemployment.  
Also among my interviewees I found a few non manual working class or even bourgeois employees: a 
lawyer, the secretary of a congressional representative, and a public employee.  They were among the most 
educated of their neighborhoods.  In addition, I found two retired low rank military men and the wife of one that 
was at the moment in the Congo, as part of a UN mission.  Finally, 5 of the women work in their houses as 
housewives.  
Urban trajectory: Before becoming squatters, the great majority of my interviewees lived in a formal 
neighborhood, either renting or with family, in nearby neighborhoods or at least in the same general area of the 
city as their squatter settlement. Only four came directly from outside Montevideo, and even in those cases, they 
were not rural migrants but came from other urban areas. They all had urban experience.   
How they found out: Most respondents learned that a new invasion was being planned or that one had 
just occurred through word of mouth rumors and personal networks. Only one woman, who bought her plot of 
land in what turned out to be a fraudulent sale, learned through a newspaper.  
Politics: Most respondents identified with Frente Amplio, the leftist coalition that was in office when I was 
conducting fieldwork, just like the majority of Uruguay population at the time. I made sure to interview people 
from different political leanings, and I did get at least six Blanco Party voters and five Colorado Party voters.  
Leaders versus non leaders:  People leading land invasions did not belong to different social universes 
than the rest of the population, but at least among my interviewees, leaders tended to have two features that 
made them stand out from the rest: they had some political or organizational capital and they knew how to talk. 
Leaders tended to have some organizational experience before the invasion –unions, cooperative housing 
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movements, neighborhood associations or political parties. In fact, they somehow translated that experience and 
the capital that came with it to the organization of the squatter settlement.  They knew how to do things, whom to 
talk to, how to organize neighborhood associations and assemblies, how to petition and so on.  In addition, they 
were very articulate speakers. 
I found non leaders that trusted leaders and were willing to help them and others that were distrustful 
because they considered them to be pursuing personal gains or not communicating all their information.    
Neighborhood leaders work hard. But squatter settlements have mobile populations and leaders are not 
an exception. Those that after the invasion stayed in the neighborhood are likely to stay in charge forever. They 
become a reference for others who, whenever there is a problem, can easily find them in their houses. For many, 
the neighborhood is their big oeuvre in life and that is part of the motivation behind hours, money and effort spent 
in what they perceive as helping others. Leaders perform different types of tasks such as finding out about a plot 
to invade, facing the police or the owner, organizing squatters, measuring, dividing and distributing plots, selecting 
new settlers, writing letters, petitioning, wait for hours at a public office to get the water connection for 
everybody, getting birth certificates for kids whose parents do not know how to do it or do not have the money to 
pay a bus ticket to the city, calling an ambulance when somebody is seek, evicting people that try to build in what 
were considered public places, talking to politicians when they come to visit the neighborhood and many other 
things.  
Many define their work as "social work in politics" or “the social” which they at least explicitly consider to 
be different from regular politics, less strategic and more for the people, more because you care about the poor.  
Leaders complain of the hard work and because others do not participate. And they also complain because they do 
not get enough recognition for that hard work, neither by the neighbors nor by the politicians or state officials they 
work with.  An anecdote from my fieldwork illustrates this latter point very well:  
When I arrived at the office of a city councilor from the Frente Amplio to interview him that day, he let me 
in but he was talking to someone else, an angry woman. This happened the week before the internal elections of 
the party and both the lady and the local councilor belonged to the same party faction. The woman was 
complaining because, she said, the party had not given her enough support and, as she said, “those things hurt.” 
She had been in charge of the door to door political work convincing people to vote for their faction. According to 
her, they had not given her enough flyers to distribute in her neighborhood, which I later learned was a squatter 
settlement in which the city councilor had some constituents. Besides, they had only given her one banner that, she 
emphasized, was old and worn out. She felt that she could not convince others to vote for their faction if the party 
did not back her up. At one moment, the councilor had to go outside and she told me, “I cannot work like this. The 
other day I brought 50 people to the meeting. It cannot be that they don’t give me anything.”  
 Her story, the story of feeling not supported or in some cases underused by what they perceive as 
ungrateful others illustrates what some leaders feel. I interpret it as a frustrated search for recognition. Part of the 
rewards of being a leader is being able to show you are well connected.  
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The story of a leader and the relevance of language and political capital:  I was struck by a very charming 
and politicized woman, who expressed herself using elaborate language not only in our two long interviews but 
also when talking in public. She surprised me from the beginning. To break the ice I asked her if I should interview 
her as a local politician or neighborhood leader. She told me “first of all, I’m a woman, and I am Uruguayan” and 
she broke into a huge laugh. Her elaborate phrases did not fit with some orthographic mistakes I could see in the 
handwritten quotes she has as wall decorations throughout her welcoming but extremely poor house. They did not 
match her formal education either. She had suffered a life of deep economic and social exclusion. She told me she 
had to quit high school when her parents divorced and she was institutionalized with other homeless girls. She 
later became a prostitute, got married with a guy that eventually sold their house and left her and her children 
homeless again. Organizing with others to create what is now a consolidated neighborhood was a way out for her, 
the opportunity to have a place of her own for her family. There, she has participated from the beginning. She also 
participates outside her neighborhood, in the local council. Digging into her past, I realized this political capital 
came from before. Her family was from the Communist Party. She remembers going to meetings when she was a 
kid. She remembers her aunt taking her to strikes in the factory she used to work at. She remembers clandestinely 
working for the Communist Party during the military period. When the Communist Party took away her 
membership upon learning she was a prostitute, she showed her resiliency once again and she kept participating in 
a different Frente Amplio faction. She acknowledges how much that “political education” – her words - helped her 
in her participation in the neighborhood, and help the neighborhood through her get recognition and services.  
Once, she and some other neighbors went to the city council to ask for sponsorship and some material help for a 
local meeting to talk about the main problems of their area of the city. Her speech was long and provocative, as 
this quote illustrates:  
I always say I am very proud to belong to a squatter settlement and I add that nobody gave us anything. 
(…) I am telling you this so you get to know the reality, because I haven’t seen many of you walking through my 
neighborhood or through the area in which we live (…) I would like to explain to you what it means to live in a 
shack. It means that when it’s 6 or 7 pm *in the winter+ you have to go to bed dressed because the cold is atrocious. 
And you are lucky if the roof doesn’t leak and your floor is not just mud. Besides, if the school is more than two 
blocks away,  you often have to take your kids barefoot or with sneakers and then wash their feet in some puddle to 
be able to put their shoes on.
23
   
Knowing how to talk came up several times during my fieldwork as a necessary condition for becoming a 
leader, both among non leaders explaining why so and so was the leader or among leaders themselves telling me 
why others delegated things to them. Communication skills become very important when you are so dependent on 
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 Transcription from the Special Commission of Squatter Settlements of the Montevideo City Council, Minutes No 
7537, May 13, 2005.   
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others, as squatters are on state institutions to survive. They are crucial also for brokerage purposes, when you 
have to speak two or even three tongues: that of the state and of politicians and that of fellow squatters.  
Conducting retrospective fieldwork, it is difficult to know if leaders gained communication skills with the land 
occupation and neighborhood organization or they had them before. Judging from the oral histories, probably a 
mixture of both is closer to reality. Some, as already mentioned, had experience participating in organizations in 
which they also had to talk in public before invading a plot of land. But for some, participation in the neighborhood 
organization was a politicizing experience in which they learned many things, including how to communicate 
effectively, in order to reach out, to build ties, and bring resources to the neighborhood.  
 
3.2.2 Protest event analysis 
Most studies of contentious collective action are bounded within particular times and places. 
Social movements and other forms of contentious politics are often such complex objects of 
study that the close examination of cases makes sense. Yet there is also a very rich tradition 
within the study of contentious politics dedicated to the historical analysis of mobilization. Of 
course most good studies, even if they are focused just in one movement have some historical 
analysis, but I am referring here to a narrower set of scholarly work: protest event analysis. This 
line of inquiry is particularly valuable to those interested in the relationships between context and 
mobilization.   
Protest event analysis comprises descriptive accounts of contentious events (e.g., timing, 
location, size, and so on) and explanatory studies that incorporate protest events as a variable in 
multivariate models. Perhaps the most salient and common feature of protest events studies is 
their quantitative nature. They are very much interested in counting events and finding patterns 
with those counts. Their main methodological challenge is therefore defining what they consider 
events, which implies as often with social sciences constructing an object that is a proxy of a 
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broader phenomenon we want to study. The availability of sources usually shapes those 
definitions of events. Riots, strikes, episodes of political violence, lynching, and mass 
demonstrations are examples of ―countable‖ events.   
Thanks to the study of protest events we have learned interesting things about various 
types of contention, from postwar Italian strikes (Franzosi 1994) to today‘s young internauts 
making online petitions (Earl and Schussman 2008). We now know more about the shape, 
dynamics, changes and sequencing of cycles of contention (Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 1989; 
Tarrow 1998). We have learned a lot about the causes of contentious events. We know that 
ecological factors such as ethnic competition (Olzak 1992; Soule and Van Dyke 1999) or 
organizational density (Hannan and Freeman 1987; Minkoff 1995; 1997) have triggered specific 
types of conflict or collective action.  We have also learned that political factors such as divided 
government may spike protest events whereas contesting groups accessing routine politics 
through congressional representation may have the opposite result (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Angone 
2003). Protest event studies have been able to empirically test resource mobilization hypotheses 
(Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su 1999). Hardship and relative deprivation, in turn, have 
proved to be less relevant to protest than it was once thought (Snyder, Tilly, and 1972; Spilerman 
1976; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). Also through protest event studies, some scholars have taught 
us about the relationship of repression and mobilization (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). Yet 
others have been useful in pointing to a much pervasive though sometimes understudied cause: 
diffusion, both in time and space, through social networks or through other non-direct 
communication mechanisms such as mass media (Hedstrom 1994; Markoff 1996; Oliver and 
Mayers 2003; Soule 2004).  Finally, protest event analysis has helped us understand the policy 
outcomes or lack thereof of mobilization (Soule, McAdam, McCarthy, and Su 1999). 
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3.2.2.1 Building an event data set from various sources 
 
In order to describe squatter settlements in Montevideo as well as get at when and under 
what conditions different types of land squatting had been more likely, I built a catalog of land 
invasions with their location, type of invasion (i.e., accretion, planned or land subdivision and 
sale),
 24
 date of settlement and land property. Results from this catalog are exposed on chapter 
four.  In addition, I transformed this catalog into a time series of squatting events per year, 
including some predictors based on the theories I wanted to put into dialog: grievances and 
political opportunities. Chapter 4 and especially chapter 5 are based on this effort.  
The catalog and the time series were not easy to build because sources were not readily 
available.  Most studies of protest events are based on newspaper data.  Newspapers have 
revealed a great potential making comparative, quantitative and historical approaches to social 
movements relatively easy. They have enabled the systematic description and testing of theories 
and concepts such as solidarity versus breakdown theories, resource mobilization, political 
opportunities, cycles of contention, and diffusion processes. Newspaper data have also 
broadened the geographic scope of studies of social movements outside the affluent democracies, 
although there is still a lot to be done in this line. The study of different types of protest during  
the changing authoritarian context of  El Salvador 1960-1981, and research on the changing 
localization of worldwide labor mobilization during the 20
th
 century (Silver 2003) are just two 
recent inspiring examples of this. Moreover, we now know something about the possible biases 
newspaper data can introduce to our analysis of protest events and how to work them into our 
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analysis (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004; Franzosi 1987; McCarthy, McPhail, and 
Smith 1996). 
Still, there are many forms of collective action, some contentious, that do not make it to 
the press. They are less noisy, violent or organized than strikes, demonstrations or lootings. This 
is the case of land squatting, at least in the context of Montevideo. Are these forms of collective 
action inevitably fated to case studies or ―small n‖ comparisons? Or, alternatively, is there a way 
to build protest event data sets with sources other than newspapers? It is my contention that you 
can, and that the recent methodological reflections on how to build a data set with newspaper 
data throws light about the types of precautions we are to face. The intimidating task is 
assembling appropriate data. And the key, as with newspaper studies, is to recognize, understand 
and factor into the study the potential sources of bias. 
In fact the problem of current ―silent‖ or invisible forms of collective action is not 
different from what happens to sociologists interested in pre 19
th
 century movements. They do 
not necessarily have or can access to the complete universe of archival materials. As Markoff‘s 
(1996) study of French peasant movements before the Revolution demonstrates, building and 
exploring data sets that permit the study of conflict over time with sources other than newspapers  
may be time consuming but is not impossible. And it has the advantage of enabling us to test 
theories of contention in a broader set of movements than the very organized or recent ones.  
Land seizures leave a very visible trace in the urban space. Unless there is repression or 
government relocation, they tend to last. Governments often have some information about where 
they are and who is the owner of the land they occupy. Today, with GIS (geographical 
information systems), the obsession is to map them. However, there is little or no information 
about their history.  
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Although I could have answered my question about the determinants of land squatting 
through a different research design, like a multi-sited ethnography or other type of comparative 
design with some typical cases, I wanted to see variation over time.  In fact, I wanted to be able 
to stretch the realm of theories of mobilization to less structured collective action, and test them 
in some statistical way. I wanted to understand the temporal movement of squatting: why and 
when seizures go up or down. Building the data set of just the dates of land seizures and some of 
their characteristics was one of the hardest parts of my fieldwork.  
3.2.2.2 The event data and its biases 
As Scott (1998) says, when the state sees, maps or counts, it controls. It was not until 
squatter settlements became a problem to be addressed by politicians and by the state in general, 
that the first attempts to count and map them appeared. This did not happen until the late 90s, 
when the Ministry of Housing and the Municipal Government of Montevideo started separate 
efforts to get information about irregular settlements.
25
 
When I started this project, I got a list of settlements from the Ministry of Housing and 
another one from the Municipality of Montevideo. For some of them, they had the dates of 
settlement. When they listed the same settlements, they usually had very similar dates minus plus 
one to three years. I then assembled a time series of 136 settlements. Although I could have used 
that as my final data set, I was afraid that it was not representative of the whole universe of the 
more than 400 settlements I knew of in the city. My fear was not so much based on the sample 
size but on its biases. I feared that the settlements in those lists were among the more organized, 
given that they had had some sort of contact with the state and got registered in their files. I also 
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was held by the Blanco Party. This may explain why there were two separate efforts to identify settlements. 
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feared they were not representative of the different types of occupied land types. Specifically, I 
feared that occupations of private land would be underrepresented, since the state could not do 
much on them, and that those squatters on municipal or state land would tend to be 
overrepresented. This was why I got engaged in the difficult enterprise of building an event data 
set, without newspapers, without much archival information, and basically based on retrospective 
inquire.  
For about a year I have worked, among other things, on building this time series mixing 
the métier of sociologist with that of historian and ethnographer. By the time I started, the 
Bureau of Statistics had just released a list of 412 squatter settlements in the city, defined as 
groups of 10 or more houses whose inhabitants were owners of the house but illegal occupants of 
the land. Those had a geographical reference to which I wanted to link dates, types of land 
invasion and ownership of land, as well as any other information I could collect. It took many 
interviews, and different triangulation efforts to build this data set. As I said before government 
agencies are now interested in the informal city. They see it as a problem they need to locate, 
count and in which they need to act. But it is not their main task to systematize information about 
its history. 
26
     
I started my inquiry by taking a list of squatter settlements and a map to the local 
governments. Montevideo was divided into 18 local governments after the 1990s inner city 
decentralization program.  Those administrative and political units are the ones that better know 
the reality of their area. However, each area took much more than one interview. Information 
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 The exceptions are the reports of the settlements written by the technical teams that work in the regularization 
projects. They often include a historical chapter. There are several problems with this source: settlements in 
regularization are a minority, these reports are not all of the same quality or format, and they are not for public 
access. However, I was able to access some of them, through NGOs working in regularization programs as state-
partners. They were useful for triangulating information and in some cases getting at data I did not get from other 
sources.  
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was fragmented. Social workers, architects, local politicians, and local often had parts of the 
puzzle. Only in one local government did I find a folder with files for each of the more than 60 
settlements of the area with some characteristics, including settlement date. In the others, I had to 
rely on retrospective information from key informants. This often required previous interviews to 
find the right informants, those more knowledgeable and reliable. Luckily, people were willing 
to take the time to talk to me. I did not find no-responses from those I contacted. No matter how 
much I looked, those areas with stronger local participation, and stronger relationships between 
the local government and civil society had more precise information. This constitutes a source of 
bias I tried to solve by interviewing more people in some areas and by using other sources.  
I also used information from the neighborhood visits and the oral histories I have already 
talked about to crosscheck dates and find dates the local governments did not have. The first 
residents of each neighborhood I visited had the most reliable information about the date in 
which the settlement started since it was part of their experience. They often connected that date 
to some other personal event, such as the birth of a child. Often, those early residents also knew 
about the dates of settlement of nearby informal neighborhoods, because they had seen them start 
and grow.  
As a third source, I used archival materials that nobody had processed before and that I 
unexpectedly found. In 1998 and 2001, the Bureau of Statistics made a list of the country‘s 
squatter settlements and asked some questions of key informants. I got access to the hard copy of 
the forms which were resting on an office shelf, and I generated an electronic data set with some 
of the questions. The information is not very reliable, since for that survey they only asked one 
informant per geographic area, and they asked about number of houses or population numbers 
which are estimates this person made and not really aggregate measures of micro-data. However, 
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they asked about settlement age, and I used that information as the last source for those cases for 
which I did not have any other information, or had contradictory or imprecise information from 
the previous sources. The main problem of that data series, besides the lack of triangulation in its 
design, is that they did not ask for a date, year or period of settlement but about the age of 
settlement. Therefore, the series has what we can call the bias of retrospective rounding. People 
tended to approximate by answering 5, 10, 15, 20 years old and so on. Therefore, since the 
question was asked in 1998,
27
 there are peaks every five years, that is in 1993, 1988, 1983 and so 
on. We can see them in figure 1. The only peak bigger than 20 land seizures that is not a product 
of rounding up or down is the one in 1990, year that all series signal as the highest peak, 
reassuring the robustness of the finding.   
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 The series ends in 2000 and not in 1998. For most settlements there was one original form for 1998 with a second one in 
2001 to update some information. For a few, there was only one form for 2001 in which they asked about year of 
settlement for the first time. Those that were surveyed for the first time in 2001 could have appeared in the period between 
the two studies (1998-2001) or existed before without being detected for some unknown reason.  
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Figure 1: Number of Land Occupations per year with the “bias of retrospective rounding.” 
Montevideo, 1947-2000 (n=295). 
Source: Bureau of Statistics surveys of squatter settlements 1998 and 2001 
 
Besides helping me fill some missing data on dates, this new source provided me with 15 
―dead‖ events.  It had information about places that were squatter settlements in 1998 but that 
had been relocated or regularized by 2001. These data were interesting in different ways. First, 
they alerted me to a very interesting case I later conducted oral histories in. It was a case of a 
planned land seizure whose leaders used their political contacts in a very efficient way and 
reached services and regularization in a record time despite being located in protected rural area 
where the municipality forbids construction. Since they were regularized, they are not legally a 
squatter settlement any more.  In addition, the spatial look at the ―dead‖ events taught me 
something important about the politics of relocation. The three squatter settlements that were 
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once in the central neighborhoods of the city (old city and surroundings) had been relocated. 
That is why there is none today in those areas. The squatters that had managed to find an open 
space in expensive areas of the city had been relocated.  
Combining these three main sources I was able to assemble a data set with the exact or 
approximate date of origin of 382 out of 427 land occupations.
28
  Approximations, such as ―the 
90s‖ or ―between 1985 and 1986‖ are due two main sources. One has to do with the nature of the 
settlement, which in many cases is an accretion process. My criteria was always to ask about the 
year in which the first settlers occupied regardless of the fact that more came years after, but 
sometimes I could not find an exact year for that. This is precisely the other source of ambiguity: 
the lack of accurate records and the imprecision of remembering.  
Triangulation was useful to sharpen some dates (e.g., when one source said 1990-1995, 
and the other one helped with a more accurate 1994, I considered the more precise one to be 
more likely. For the general analysis I made use of every single piece of information on dates, 
the more or the less precise, trying to locate invasions at least in a period of time. Still, for the 
event history analysis on chapter 5, I only used those cases for which I had an exact year of 
settlement.  I therefore ended up with 257 events for 58 years (i.e., 1947-2004). 
The analysis of number and types of land invasions over time was very illuminating. Yet 
the study of dates is also problematic. The ethnographic analysis showed that even the best 
planned invasions kept receiving newcomers years after they started. Still, there is something to 
be said about using the date in which the ―early birds‖ or pioneers settled. Early residents are the 
ones who break the rules initially; they are the ones who violate property rights, the ones that 
show that it is possible to settle there, the ones that test the chance of repression and eventually 
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 The total is more than 412, the ones currently existing in the city, because I included also a few ―dead events‖, meaning 
settlements that changed into cooperative housing or that were relocated by the government to a different place.  
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face the police or the owner, and the ones that widen the repertoire of possibilities for other 
urban poor that may start to see that plot as a possible new home. The moment in which some 
people seize a plot of land is often the most contentious one in the history of the settlement. This 
is why studying squatting over time becomes so important.  
Figure 2 superposes the initial time series I got from state agencies with the complete one 
I ended up with, combining all the sources.  I gained 121 observations with the effort, a figure 
that ascends to 246 if we also include the more imprecise dates as I do when I consider period of 
settlement rather than the exact date (see chapter four).  
 
 
Figure 2: Number of land occupations 1947-2004. Comparison of different sources.  
Sources: For Initial Series: Ministry of Housing and Municipal Government of Montevideo. For Final Series: 
Ministry of Housing, Municipal Government of Montevideo, Interviews with initial residents, Interviews with key 
informants, Archival Material, Bureau of Statistics.  
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The comparison of the original and the improved series confirms a general trend: the 
wave of land occupations peaked in the 1990s.  Earlier, land occupations were rare events, and 
after that, despite what we would predict given the sharp economic crisis of 2002, new land 
seizures ceased. Some of the already existing occupations grew as newcomers arrived, but the 
crisis is not associated with new land occupations. The improved series confirms the 1990 peak, 
but also signals a couple of interesting facts. First, a smaller but interesting peak in 1985, that is 
the year after the first elections after 11 years of dictatorship (1973-1984). This peak was less 
visible in the initial series. The second is another peak in 1995. Two patterns seem to emerge. 
First that, contrary to what I thought at the beginning of my fieldwork, peaks are more likely 
after elections than in electoral years (elections were towards the end of 1984,1989, and 1994, 
and the three peaks are immediately after). Secondly, the extreme peak in 1990 supports the 
hypotheses that something related to the election of the leftist party to the government of 
Montevideo for the first time in history had something to do with the expansion of land squatting 
as a strategy or last resource of the urban poor. I explore these hypotheses in the next two 
chapters.  
In chapter 4, I describe the event catalog of invasions and make it dialog with all the 
other contextual information I gathered. In chapter 5, in turn, I use the event catalog to test the 
incidence of politics on the probability of land squatting events in one year, controlling for other 
variables more associated with hardship. The information provided by this event catalog 
illuminates each part of this whole work.  
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3.3 CONCLUSION: QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE?  
When conducting multimethod work, the temptation of writing some parts with the 
quantitative researcher hat and some parts with the qualitative one is huge. That simplifies our 
lives. Because of disciplinary traditions, methods determine not only a research choice but the 
way we report results, the journals in which we can publish, the rhetoric we apply, the authors 
we cite, the audiences we will appeal to and so on. Nevertheless, I have tried to avoid 
contributing to the seemingly essential division between quantity and quality. Many of the things 
we count and use as variables in regression analysis are often based on ―qualitative‖ judgements.  
In this work, no chapter is exclusively qualitative or just quantitative. As expressed here, 
the building of the event catalog of invasion events required ethnographic information.  The 
interpretation of the cycle and its explanation relied heavily on the contextual information I could 
find. At the same time, the initial statistical patterns I started to find helped me shape the lenses 
through which I was conducting the oral histories, reading documents and so on.  
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4.0  THE CYCLE OF LAND INVASIONS  
This dissertation is devoted to recovering the history of land squatting in Montevideo, understand 
it and explain it. Based on the idea that understanding when mobilization happens is as important 
as understanding why it happened and that it may actually tell us something about why it 
happened I have made an effort to reconstruct the cycle of invasions, the history of the informal 
city. This chapter opens up this time dimension by describing the cycle of invasions and 
exploring some hypothetical explanations for the main patterns over time.  
 The chapter is built on information I collected during one year of fieldwork in 
Montevideo (described in the methods section). It uses two main types of data. The first is a data 
set I constructed that includes dates of settlement, location, type of settlement and land property 
for the majority of the more than 400 land invasions in this city.
29
  The second is a large body of 
qualitative information I collected observing, reading archives and conducting interviews with 
squatters, politicians and experts. The two are intertwined throughout the chapter, as they are 
throughout the dissertation.   
 
                                                 
29
 I took the 2006 official cartography of squatter settlements (INE-PIAI 2006) as a starting universe. The 
cartography originally had 412 instances or cases of squatter settlements. To those I added 15 neighborhoods that 
started as squatter settlements but that have since been relocated or legalized (dead events in event history 
language). Thus, the final data set includes 427 cases. The final data set includes information on exact location for 
412 squatter settlements,  year of settlement for 256 settlement, period of settlement (before dictatorship, 
dictatorship, 1985-89, 90-94, 95-99, 00-04) for 334 settlements, land property at the moment of the invasion for 346, 
and type of settlement (accretion, planned or subdivision and sale) for 240 settlements.   
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 The chapter moves from simple to more complex patterns. After showing some general 
patterns of the cycle of land invasions only paying attention to the time dimension, the chapter 
adds several layers of complexity: the different types of land invasions and their patterns over 
time and space. Its overall goal is to take the reader to the site and show the general picture. Of 
course it does not refer to every aspect of the case for the theoretical orientation about politics 
and mobilization is always present. Yet instead of being specific as the next two chapters will be 
(one focused on the role of elections and the other one on the role of clientelistic networks), this 
one deliberately opens up possibilities for alternative explanations.  
4.1 TIME 
As Tarrow (1989: 13) clearly argues: ―what needs to be explained is not why people periodically 
petition, strike, demonstrate, riot, loot and burn, but rather why so many of them do so at 
particular times in their history, and if there is a logical sequence to their action.‖ As explained in 
the introduction, I believe ideas and methods developed for the study of social movements can be 
helpful to understand other more elusive forms of collective action or contentious politics, that 
are arguably beyond the scope of the concept of social movements, such as land squatting. Juan, 
one of my interviewees, leader of a land invasion, has a more mundane way to express what 
Tarrow theorizes: ―When the moment arrives, we‘ll ask for regularization. You need to wait until 
the moment arrives.‖ 
When looking at the evolution of land squatting in Montevideo over time, at least three 
striking features appear: late start in relation to the rural-urban migration process, steady growth 
during the military regime, a very notorious peak in 1990 followed by a decade of high numbers 
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of land invasions, and a decline since the end of the 1990s.  But before getting into the analysis 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 describe the cycle in different ways.  
Figure 3 illustrates the density of land squatting in Montevideo, that is to say the 
cumulative number of land invasions per year.  It is built on the 256 settlements of the city for 
which I found the year of settlement, for the period 1947-2004.  It shows that land squatting was 
a rare event until the 1970s. It also shows a low though steady rise in land invasions occurred 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Around 1989-1991 we see a change that corresponds to the highest 
peak of the cycle, followed by a decade of rapid and sustained growth in land invasions. More 
recently, the cycle seems to have reached a ceiling with a low number of land invasions per year 
since the late 1990s.  
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Number of Land Invasions per Year (density), Montevideo 1947-2004 
 
It is important to state, however, that although new land invasions became rare events 
again in Montevideo, many existing squatter settlements keep growing. This happens both 
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because of internal growth (e.g., births, grown up children going to live independently or 
forming a new family and building a small room in the backyard) or because of new population 
coming from the formal city in search of housing. Figure 4 illustrates these different processes 
and different cycles. While the number of land invasions had its peak between 1989 and 1990, 
and more recently invasions seem to be again the rarer events they used to be, the population 
living in squatter settlements has been growing pretty steadily. This dissertation is dedicated to 
the first of these two cycles.  
 
 
Figure 4. Comparing cycles of land invasions and population growth in squatter settlements, 
Montevideo 1947-2004 
Sources: Own data for the N of land invasions. Data from the National Household Survey (INE 2006) for the % of 
squatter families arriving in a given year. 
30 
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 The survey asks in which year the household head arrived to the current house. Therefore, we do not have data on 
those who moved out or passed away. Also, the survey did not capture anybody arriving before 1965 to a squatter 
settlement.   
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Finally, Figure 5 adds another dimension to the time analysis by grouping the number of 
land invasions by political period: before dictatorship, dictatorship, and the four elected 
governments after that. Given that the political periods do not have the same number of years, 
the bins represent the average number of land invasions per period to make them comparable (N 
of land invasions/N years in the period).  
 
Figure 5. Average yearly number of land seizures per political period 
 
Represented this way, the cycle takes a close to normal shape, with a mode in the 1990-
94 government in which there were an average of almost 20 new land invasions per year.  
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4.1.1 Late start in relation to the rural-urban migration process 
The first striking characteristic about the cycle of land invasions in Montevideo is its late start in 
comparison to other Latin American cities but, more importantly, its late start in relation to 
Montevideo‘s early urbanization. In most cities of the region and the world squatter settlements 
house rural migrants trying to find a place in the city. This definitely happened with earlier 
squatter settlements in the city of Montevideo. Yet it was not a generalized phenomenon. Most 
originally rural urban dwellers found a place in the formal city.  
The first land invasions appeared around 1950. The first one I have a date for dates back 
to 1947. Yet it is not only until the late 80s that land invasions start to multiply, at a time when 
the city had already stopped growing. Uruguayans from rural areas or urban areas from the 
interior of the country started migrating to Montevideo very early, and by 1960 the capital 
already had stabilized its population at about 45% of the country‘s total. Besides, Uruguay 
experienced its demographic transition very early as well, reaching fecundity rates in the 1950s 
that the rest of Latin America would reach only around 2000 (Kaztman, Filgueira, and 
Errandonea 2005). Thus, Montevideo is an odd case because it shows no correlation between 
population growth and the rise of land invasions.  
As already mentioned, other forces were in action. The economic downturn of the 
country since the 1950s and liberalizing policies, including liberalization of rent prices and state 
reduction, appear as the main suspects. Yet in this dissertation I explore other forces, political 
ones, which I will show interacted with economic circumstances in important ways.  
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4.1.2 Steady growth during the military regime 
The second salient feature is a steady growth during the military regime (see figures 3 and 4, 
from 1973 until 1984). This might have a lot to do with the liberalization of renting prices by a 
1974 law, consistent with the monetarist policies implemented by other Southern Cone military 
regimes. Many of the key informants I talked to, architects, social workers and so on, think so. 
And although I cannot say that interviewees who settled around that date mention rent more 
often than others, because many tend to mention rent as their personal reason for the move 
throughout the cycle, squatters during the military regime do mention not being able to maintain 
themselves in the formal city.  The impact of this law, especially for the poor was dramatic. 
(Benton 1986) states that with prices that had been kept artificially down for years, suddenly 
opening up to market forces, housing prices spiked and became the category of goods to rise 
most steeply in price.  
But these were not the only transformations to the urban environment of the poor that the 
military brought about.  Besides liberalizing rent, the authoritarian government also ―cleaned‖ 
the city center from poor people living in tenement houses. Central neighborhoods like Palermo 
and Sur housed many conventillos, the term for generally large old buildings with many rental 
rooms overlooking an internal patio. Besides offering a relatively cheap way of remaining in the 
city, conventillos were also related to the playing of candombe music, an afro-uruguayan rhythm 
originally associated with slaves and later with the popular classes. The government evicted and 
destroyed many of those buildings. Some people offered resistance but probably much less than 
they would have in a democratic regime. According to Benton (1986) who studied precisely this 
period,  
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The transformation of Montevideo's central city must be understood above all as part of a process of 
political change. The advent of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime simultaneously disrupted 
traditional forms of political integration of the urban poor and dismantled the legal and institutional 
apparatus that had permitted the survival of stable working-class neighborhoods in the city center. The 
new housing policies were not explicitly directed at removing the poor from desirable areas or 
otherwise facilitating the escalation of real estate investment and construction. They were inscribed 
instead in a general policy of deregulation of the housing market and were implemented through 
locally directed measures according to supposedly technical criteria. 
 
What puzzles Benton the most is that people‘s response was not to invade lands en masse, but 
resorting to other strategies such as going to live at relatives‘ or renting at a different place in 
groups. She attributes this to the residents‘ willingness to remain in the city and to their hopes 
that the state did something for them.  
Yet despite Benton‘s surprise about them not invading lands collectively, as pointed out 
before, there was indeed a steady growth of land invasions during the military regime. According 
to my estimates, about 5 new land invasions appeared every year from 1973 until 1984. Given 
that other military regimes, such as the Chilean, were very repressive with new land invasions 
and with the old ones that showed any kind of mobilization, I was struck to find steady growth in 
this period. The secret might be in the type of invasions characterizing this period. Except for 
one, invasions in this period began by accretion, with each family arriving separately. Apparently 
these slow forming and extremely poor neighborhoods did not represent a threat to the military 
government.
31
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 These land invasions where not the only non-threatening organizations for the military. During the authoritarian 
period many urban poor solved their increasing needs in a context of liberalization by organizing in what Rodé, 
Marsiglia and Piedracueva (1985) call ―spaces of freedom‖ such as soup kitchens, neighborhood health clinics and 
so on, which were also perceived as non threatening by the authorities.  
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 The only exception of land invasion with some degree of planning during the military 
regime was Calera Vieja, a housing cooperative organized by the Catholic Church and an NGO 
(CIDC) working with Catholic based communities, liberation theology, self help construction, 
and participatory methodologies based on the popular education paradigm from Paulo Freire. 
32
 
The imminence of an eviction of very underprivileged settlement located on private land in the 
La Teja Northwestern neighborhood of Montevideo detonated the experience. It was the local 
parish who asked a local NGO, CIDEC, for help. Together they started a re-location process with 
those families willing to engage in a self help transforming experience. As in Chile (Schneider 
1995) or Argentina (Prévôt Schapira 1999), the Catholic Church had an important role in popular 
organizations during the military regime in Uruguay (Filgueira 1985). With political parties 
suppressed, the Catholic Church was a refuge for organizing and solving everyday needs. Yet 
this is the only instance in which the story of the origin of a squatter settlement was associated 
with the church in my interviews.  
Another important example of church activity with squatters during the military 
government is the case of San Vicente, in the North East of the city, more precisely in Casavalle, 
the poorest neighborhood of the city. This nongovernmental organization was founded in 1977, 
by a Catholic priest, known to all neighbors as El Padre Cacho and is today, after the death of its 
founder, the most significant institution for many residents of the area. As an example, when I 
asked Luisa, a resident from Plácido Ellauri, a very poor squatter settlement in that area, about 
the three people or institutions that have helped her neighborhood the most, she simply said ―I 
would name just one, the San Vicente Organization.‖  This is hardly surprising, since Plácido 
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 Interviews with Susana Regent, Local Secretary of the 14
th
 Zonal Community Center, administrative municipal 
unit where this settlement belongs, and with Inés Giudice, social worker currently working at the Ministry of 
Housing and at the time working directly with this settlement, through the NGO CIDC.  
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Ellauri was in fact the first neighborhood in which Cacho worked
33
 and since Luisa, like many 
residents nearby work in one of the garbage-recycling projects of the organization, which 
constitutes her first relatively stable job. Like many people in her neighborhood, she had always 
worked as a scavenger. Her answer is nonetheless significant, since in many other interviews, 
elsewhere in the city, people tended to mention a politician, or the municipal government or 
some state institutions such as the water company.  
Although at opposite extremes of the periphery of Montevideo, La Calera Vieja in the 
West and San Vicente in the East, these two experiences were not disconnected. They started as 
two separate projects but towards the end of the military regime they both formed the MOVIDE 
(Movimiento Pro Vida Decorosa or Movement in Promotion of a Decent Life). During the 
military regime, Catholic parishes and NGOs ―were like islands‖34 in which people could 
participate while avoiding repression. MOVIDE emerged from a threat posed by a wave of 
evictions of settlements on private land, probably caused by speculation by owners and by the 
urban re-structuring caused by the construction of the new access routes to Montevideo from the 
North West. The movement was formed by two very different types of actors. On the one hand 
there were the poorest squatters of the city and some people evicted from buildings in the city 
center. And, on the other hand, there were some parishes and NGOs, with professionals and 
priests with radical views about making the voice of the poor heard and improving their living 
conditions.  
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 Based on the intervention of the historian and city councilor at the time, Mario Cayota, on September 5
th
, 2002, on 
the 10
th
 anniversary of the death of Padre Cacho.  Session 1037. Minutes available at http://www.juntamvd.gub.uy  
 
34
 Expression of Inés Giudice, one of the professionals founders of MOVIDE, who taught me about the history of 
the movement, as well as her current reflections about why it vanished with re-democratization. Unless explicitly 
cited otherwise, all the information about MOVIDE comes from this interview.  
 92 
MOVIDE was exceptional because it put the voice of the poorest of the poor on some 
newspapers and radio stations –the few that were not repressed and were sympathetic to the 
cause. It challenged the prejudices of the left about squatters. Leftist militants used to dub them 
the lumpen-proletariat and they did not feel they were members of the same class. And there they 
were, these people coming from the bottom of society giving hot discourses using spontaneous 
phrases such as ―we not only have a head for lice. We can also think,‖ mesmerizing every 
listener.  They claimed their character as workers as well as their right not only to decent housing 
but also to health, jobs and so on. A change in name –they were originally the Movement for 
Decent Housing and later changed to Decent Life –  showed a more profound change, from 
single issue demands after the threat of eviction to a more radical discourse, with a more ample 
platform, a critical analysis of their situation and the ability to make some external alliances 
(Filgueira 1985).  They held a clearly anti-politicians discourse, whom they blamed in part for 
their marginalized situation. In one of the documents of the movement, written to be presented at 
a seminar of popular organizations in October 1984 (a month before the first post-military 
elections), we can read phrases such as ―politicians used us and deceived us,‖ ―when politicians 
were governing living was very difficult‖, ―some politicians saw that the situation was difficult 
and they joined with the military,‖ ―with the coup our situation worsened, we became even 
poorer,‖ ―some politicians appeared in our neighborhoods making promises they never fulfill,‖ 
―the state doesn‘t give enough resources for everybody to have good health (…) It gives more 
resources to the military.‖35     
 MOVIDE became so important during the transition that it was one of the movements 
invited to participate at the 1984-85 multiparty consultations, known as National Conciliatory 
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 Cited by Rodé, Marsiglia and Piedracueva, (1985).  
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Program (Concertación Nacional Programática or CONAPRO). But that fame did not last 
much. With democratization MOVIDE started dismembering for many reasons specific to the 
movement
36
 and also for a general reason, one that affected many of the instances of the 
mobilization boom towards the end of the military regime:  the traditional political actors 
reappeared (Filgueira 1985). Political parties and unions recover the centrality they had before 
the military regime and with only some few exceptions the more heterogeneous forms of 
mobilization slowly vanished through cooptation, neutralization or some other mechanism.  
Like an urban mirror of the decline of the movement, today Calera Vieja, the emblematic 
experience of self help among the poorest of the poor, looks just like any other of the most 
deprived squatter settlements.  The population has grown and the infrastructure deteriorated. 
Finally, it is important to notice that MOVIDE did not encourage new land invasions. On the 
contrary, it was a movement that defended people from evictions. And despite its reactive origins 
it switched towards a more proactive platform, it was not a promoter of new land invasions.  
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 Among the specific reasons, Inés Giudice mentions frictions between delegates and their base in the 
neighborhoods especially when the movement starts having more visibility and delegates participate in the 
negotiations for democracy. This contrasted with the movement‘s principles of horizontal participation. She also 
mentioned some cooptation of leaders by the traditional political parties. Besides, there were also some tensions 
between professionals and the people from the neighborhoods. They were part of the same movement, but the 
former earned a salary and the others did not. There were also tensions between the major organizations in the 
movement. On one side, San Vicente, and on the other, the NGOs such as CIDC and Aportes, the ones responsible 
for the cooperative La Calera Vieja mentioned in the text. The two groups had different perspectives about the work 
they were doing. San Vicente was much less politicized whereas the professionals in the other NGOs were mostly 
leftist militants as well. With democratization the tension grew stronger. People at CIDC and Aportes put great 
emphasis on popular education, and they want to translate this methodology into the political parties. San Vicente 
did not have these broader goals beyond raising the quality of life and the consciousness of those in their area of 
action. And, finally, she referred to cooptation of the whole project by the first democratic municipal government 
(Colorado administration). The Plan Aquiles Lanza aimed, among other things, at transforming cantegriles into 
better neighborhoods using self help construction by the dwellers. According to Giudice (and this appears also in 
other interviews with key informants), they took the self help working strategy but they did not promote any other 
participation by residents or any coordination among the different neighborhoods. The plan acted in 7 
neighborhoods and it did not go very well. Many families quit, population grew, and plots were subsequently 
subdivided, taking over public spaces. Today these 7 neighborhoods look again like any other of the less planned 
squatter settlements of the city. According to Giudice, this plan took some ideas from MOVIDE but, contrary to it, 
the plan had a clear demobilizing goal.  
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4.1.3 The big peak 
Although there was a small peak of 10 land invasions the year after the democratic elections that 
ended the military period, land seizures did not rise significantly until the following elections 
(see figures 3, 4 and 5).  Theoretically, democratization processes are associated with a general 
opening of political opportunities and with a resurrection of civil societies. Empirically, in 
Santiago, Chile, a relatively close-by city, land invasions peaked right before the military regime, 
at times of huge electoral competition for the popular classes, and mobilization in those 
invasions was huge by the end of the military regime (Hipshir 1998).   
After eleven years of being one of South America‘s most repressive dictatorships (Blum 
1995), Uruguay and particularly Montevideo, its capital city, witnessed a wellspring of 
mobilization around 1984 (Filgueira 1985). Despite high poverty rates at the time squatting 
mobilization did not peak, however. Other movements headed this outburst of mobilization, 
especially the labor movement and the student movement. It was only when this wave of 
mobilization dissipated and the parties took once more their central role channeling and co-
opting civil society demands (Canel 1992), that many poor city dwellers adopted the strategy of 
land squatting.  
One could imagine several possible reasons behind the spike of land invasions in 1990. 
Structural conditions, such as de-industrialization, poverty, rising rent, low real wages and so 
forth, are conceivably behind it. Yet as I argue throughout this dissertation, political causes were 
the ones activating those economic causes. There are some general and some specific political 
factors about the year 1990 that could be associated with that year witnessing 41 land invasions 
in the Uruguayan capital. (This figure becomes even more surprising if we consider that the two 
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years with the next highest number of land invasions had only 17 each and that the annual 
average for the studied period was 4.4).  
Among the general political factors that could be associated with this spike, 1990 was a 
post-electoral year. As tested in the next chapter, post-electoral, and to a lesser degree electoral 
years, have been the ones more likely to experience land invasions. But 1990 was also a very 
particular year in Montevideo‘s political history.  It was not a regular post-electoral year. It was a 
historical juncture for the city since the Frente Amplio, the leftist coalition, assumed for the first 
time ever the city government. In fact, it was the first time that a party other than the traditional 
Blanco and Colorado parties won an executive position in Uruguay since 1830 (first elections). 
The entire history of bipartidism was put into question.
 37
 
But the growth of the Frente Amplio in Montevideo took the party a great effort (Luna 
2007). They needed a larger voting bloc than the traditional educated middle class. Squatters and 
potential squatters were among those constituents parties started to compete for, especially after 
the 1984 election. The following extract from an interview with a campaign advisor of the Frente 
Amplio, clearly illustrates the deliberate attempt of the party to reach out to squatters:  
 
–In the 1984 campaign, we couldn‘t really enter into a squatter settlement. You had to look at it from 
the outside.  
MJ –You didn‘t enter because you couldn‘t or because the Frente Amplio wasn‘t interested at the 
time?  
–Both. It wasn‘t a territory of the left, and there wasn‘t interest. You didn‘t enter. They didn‘t exist. 
Squatter settlements were not on the visual spectrum of the left, in the imaginary of the left. In 1989 
things were different. The key, was Tabaré [Vásquez], a charismatic figure. But it was a complete 
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 Number of land invasions in post-electoral years during the study period: 1 in 1947, 0 in 1951, 0 in 1955, 0 in 
1959, 2 in 1963, 0 in 1967, 1 in 1971, 10 in 1985, 41 in 1990, 17 in 1995, 5 in 2000.  
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novelty. The left entering a squatter settlement!!…wow!!!.It was very new, and then in 94, bang!!, 
everything exploded. You entered and it was like deification. I remember an image in the Tres 
Ombues settlement: Arana [current Housing Minister] and Astori [current Economy Minister] on a 
scavenger‘s cart, and people were taking them as if they were carnival queens…it was unbelievable. 
And they were followed by a huge parade. Unbelievable. That was definitely a turning point that 
continues until today.  
 
But the Frente Amplio was not just any political party breaking bipartidism and 
increasing the electoral competition for the poor. It was a party from the left. And this had some 
connotations both for politicians and the people that seemed to have impacted on land invasions. 
My fieldwork suggested that on the one hand, some politicians and militants from the Frente 
Amplio actively promoted land invasions and, on the other hand, some people assumed that a 
government from the left was going to be friendly with squatters, especially with organized 
squatters. Because of the relevance of this turning point in the history of land squatting in 
Montevideo, I propose zooming in these hypotheses before continuing with the description of the 
whole cycle.  
4.1.3.1 From the squatters’ side 
According to one of the social workers I interviewed, this was ―a time of hope‖ for many, 
especially for social movements. People with housing needs were not an exception and some 
also saw an opportunity in the Frente Amplio municipal government. I found some evidence that 
in 1990, and also throughout this first and later during the second period of the Frente Amplio 
administration,   there were expectations that a leftist government would be more permissive and 
generous with squatters and attend their demands for titling and services.  
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For the leader of a squatter settlement that started in 1990, a man of the left himself, their 
land invasion was directly associated with the Frente Amplio’s new administration. As he 
remembers it:  
The municipal government of Tabaré [he refers to the first leftist city major, Tabaré Vázquez, later 
elected president of Uruguay in 2004] was in its full peak. There was a very special enthusiasm. They 
supported the people who approached the city government with a good project, people that wanted to 
do things the right way.  
 
This perception that if they were ―doing things the right way‖ the municipal government was 
going to be on their side, is present in many of my interviews with early residents of invasions of 
that first period of leftist city government.  By that, they meant things such as being organized as 
a group, planning the invasion, and only including people that were going to live in the 
neighborhood (rather than speculators). Another leader of a land invasion from 1993 remembers:  
The fact that the left won the municipal government generated in one way or another conditions in the 
sense that people had a priori some guarantees of not being repressed, some framework for 
negotiation that maybe they wouldn‘t have with other governments. So, I think that‘s why in those 
years the process of land squatting accelerated, and I think that was something good.  
In fact, those expectations were more than fulfilled for him and other young friends from the 
Communist Party who organized this particular land invasion. After an initial month of 
uncertainty, in which the initial group started to clean the abandoned plot, discuss the rules, and 
select the newcomers among many that came hoping they could squat there, they asked and got a 
meeting with the mayor. Given that the plot was privately owned, their goal was to have the 
municipal government expropriate it so that then they could negotiate directly with the 
government. Sebastián remembers being a bit scared when he went to that meeting, but it turned 
out better than he could have ever thought.  
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It was a working meeting. Tabaré [Vazquez] received us with a map of the plot that we had squatted 
and he even told us the plot was bigger than what we had thought. We didn‘t have accurate 
information. We just had oral information; we didn‘t have any documents. (…) We asked him if we 
could accept more people from our waiting list. We agreed and went back with the news that we could 
increase the family. So, I think that the history of Youth 14 has been (…) relatively easy. It included a 
lot of sacrifice from the people, but that happened everywhere. But we had great advantages. We 
made a good presentation of ourselves, our situation and the families‘ profiles…we had a survey of 
the number of kids, I mean…I think in some way if there was political willingness, those things 
matter a lot.  
  
Thus far I have explained this peak as a result of electoral competition and the 
(sometimes accurate) expectations from squatters that their situation would be supported under a 
leftist government. But there were other mechanisms behind this peak as well as under the 
subsequent wave of land invasions during the 1990s: direct promotion by some political leaders 
and local brokers. No party or faction programmatically promoted land squatting. Yet there were 
some people and groups within factions that did act as active promoters.  
4.1.3.2 From the politicians’ side 
Politicians may help squatters for strategic reasons. I have found examples of this 
throughout the cycle of land invasions in Montevideo and from the whole political spectrum. Yet 
what happened during the first years of the Frente Amplio city government within this party was 
different. Some helped squatters also for ideological reasons. Once in the city government, there 
were different perspectives about how to administer the city, specifically about what to do with 
those in need. While some promoted centralized city planning, with great control of the 
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expansion of the city – the official position - some explicitly promoted land invasions. For the 
latter, invading was giving good use to vacant land. It was a sort of sui generis land reform. 
The clearest exponent of this vision has been Jorge Zabalza, once a member of the 
Tupamaros guerrilla movement,
38
 imprisoned during the Uruguayan dictatorship, then member 
of the MPP faction of the Frente Amplio (the most radical faction), now independent, former city 
councilor and president of the City Council (1995-2000), and who lives in a squatter settlement 
in the West of Montevideo. Unlike many elusive references to the role of politicians into 
squatting, Zabalza spoke to me upfront and proudly about his role:  
I was very much involved with squatter settlements because we [his political faction back then, the 
MPP] had defined it. We had the idea that it was good that people self managed their own problems. 
And the problem of housing was very important and massive around 1987-88 in Montevideo (..). And 
squatter settlements were the concrete form of that idea of people self managing themselves. There 
was something like a peak in which people organized themselves, occupied land, divided the 
individual plots…all in assemblies. You worked in assembly. You marked the streets, the places for 
common use like the soup kitchen, or the field for baby-soccer, according to the willingness of each 
settlement. And then you would start trying to get light, water and so on. (…) I can even today walk 
around some squatter settlements and find people that remember something like a stellar moment in 
their lives, in which they felt the main characters, doing the things, fighting. (…) But the result was 
very good, because the figure I read some time ago was that 11 % of Montevideo‘s population is on 
occupied land.    
 
The centrality of Zabalza in the wave of land invasions around the 1990 peak and during that 
decade appears in multiple other voices. He is remembered by politicians and squatters as one 
                                                 
38
 This urban guerrilla movement, active in Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s, was also known as MLN (Movimiento 
de Liberación Nacional or National Liberation Movement). When, after the dictatorship, they entered into Frente 
Amplio as an electoral force, they formed a coalition with other groups and changed their name to MPP 
(Movimiento de Participación Popular or Popular Participation Movement). 
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who ―organized land invasions.‖ During my fieldwork, he was one of the most mentioned 
persons. 
A very active militant from the Socialist Party I interviewed remembered with a smile the 
90s decade, in which he helped organize some settlements. He told me that despite the political 
differences he had with Zabalza, they worked together organizing squatter settlements. ―We 
divided Montevideo in two‖ –he tells me remembering that while Zabalza worked more with 
squatters in the West of Montevideo, he worked more in the Eastern periphery of the city. 
Squatters also remembered Zabalza. He helped directly at least five of the 25 squatter 
settlements in which I conducted ethnographic fieldwork. When I asked Beatriz, the 
astonishingly articulate leader of a squatter settlement about why they settled in 1991 rather than 
before or later, she told me:  
Well, we have to acknowledge that Zabalza had started to organize squatter settlements. He would 
come and have talks with me. He used to come to my house or we would meet somewhere. He had a 
comité de base (local party committee) nearby around 1988-89 and well, I was involved with them 
[she voted for the MPP in the last few elections]. And he always gave us guidelines about how to 
organize ourselves, how to organize people, how processes were going and we had information about 
which pieces of land where city owned and which ones were not.  
  According to Garcé (2006) this support for squatters was part of broader tensions 
between the official Frente Amplio position and that of the tupamaros at the beginning of the 
leftist administration.  It was part of the tupamaros’ ―insurrectional view,‖ their attempts to 
radicalize the popular classes, and their contempt for ―bourgeois institutions‖ such as the private 
property. 
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 Yet Zabalza and other tupamaros were not the only ones criticizing the official 
government position against land invasions as too technocratic and far from people‘s needs.39 I 
also found some other individual politicians who were city councilors or local councilors in the 
first Frente Amplio city government who held this vision. 
 With time, this ideological defense of squatters disappeared within the Frente Amplio. 
The experience of more than 15 years of city government seems to have taught everybody that 
land invasions bring a lot of problems to the administration. This may be related to the decline of 
land invasions in the last years, the final striking feature of the cycle analyzed here.  
4.1.4 Decline 
Since about 2000 land invasions in Montevideo became rare events almost as rare as before the 
1990s.
40
 Of course, since my data stops in 2004, it is too soon to draw any definite conclusion, 
but the fact that land invasions did not explode with the 2002 Uruguayan economic crisis is 
something remarkable.
41
 It is in fact one of the main reasons behind my hypothesis that 
something more than economic hardship has been behind land invasions. If poverty skyrocketed 
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 As evident from the previous quote from Sebastián, from Youth 14, in which the squatter leader mentions the great 
help of then mayor Tabaré Vazquez, the official position was sometimes violated.  This might have been for 
strategic reasons, that is to say, to avoid the political cost of evictions or because reality was just overwhelming and 
the only thing politicians in office could do was to help them build decent neighborhoods.    
40
 To add to the graphical representations of the cycle, the average yearly number of land invasions per decade is 
perhaps illuminating: 0.4 land invasions per year for the period 1950-59; 0.9 for 1960-69; 2.8 for 1970-79; 5 for 
1980-89; 14.6 for 1990-99; and 3.4 for 2000-2004. 
41
 As mentioned before, already existing squatter settlements, however, seem to keep growing in population because 
of newcomers but mainly because of internal growth (i.e. births, formation of new households).  Still, comparative 
figures are not available. It was not only until the last 2004 population count (it was not a complete census) that the 
National Institute of Statistics included an item identifying if houses were located in a squatter settlement or not, and 
made sure informal city areas were covered.  According to this population count, in 2004 there were 144,707 people 
living in Montevideo‘s squatter settlements, that is 10.9% of the city‘s population, in 39,116 houses.  
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in 2003 and 2004 reaching 40.9% of Uruguayan households, almost doubling the percentages for 
the 1990s decade (Arim and Vigorito 2007), why did land invasions decay rather than increase?  
 One could imagine many factors that could plausibly explain this decline. Perhaps the 
most obvious one is the simple fact that most mobilization cycles tend to have an inverted U 
shape. Mobilization does not last forever. Yet that does not explain why decline happens at 
specific times. Another simple hypothesis is that vacant land is scarcer now, and it is in 
comparison to the past. Yet according to some of the experts I interviewed, there are still many 
free spaces in the city, especially in the periphery. Something related to the management of that 
vacant land is perhaps closer to reality. Two hypotheses about land management may help 
explain the recent decline in land invasions: legal changes and increasing government and 
citizens´ responsibility.  
4.1.4.1 Legal changes 
The first hypothesis is a recent harshening of property laws that makes evictions more 
likely and therefore increases the costs of invading.
42
 The wave of land invasions that started 
with the peak of 1989-90 encountered legislation that made it difficult for land owners to evict 
squatters as well as a weak policing of vacant land. This slowly changed first in practice and 
more recently formally.  
First of all, even though property is a constitutional right, the Uruguayan Constitution 
includes ―decent housing‖ as a right as well (article 45). Squatters are located in the legal limbo 
between these two rights. They might have violated property rights but they are exercising their 
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 The literature on Land Economics emphasizes the importance of the costs of squatting for the likelihood of people 
doing so. The probability of eviction increases those costs. For an economic analysis of land invasions for the 
Uruguayan case, see:  (Amarante and Caffera 2003) Unfortunately, the authors did not have the data to test their 
model, but they suggest interesting avenues for analysis.  
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housing rights. More practically, until recently once an invasion occurred, it was legally and 
bureaucratically difficult to evict settlers. Unless the owner – either the state or a private one - 
filed a report in the first 48 hours of the land invasion, the police could not evict settlers. After 
that time, and especially after settlers had started to build, it became difficult to evict them. After 
the first 48 hours, the owner needed to start a legal eviction trial procedure, which could take its 
time. If a year passed and settlers never used violence, they acquired ―possession rights.‖ The 
Uruguayan Civil Code legislates over ―possession‖ by saying that ―that one that has possessed a 
good [including land] quietly and publicly without interruption acquires the right of possession.‖ 
Since squatters do not tend to use violence to get into a plot,
43
 if a year passes because the owner 
did not realize her plot had been invaded or because after realizing she spent too much time in 
legal paperwork, then squatters have the right of possessing the plot. Besides, in an eviction trial 
squatters could argue a ―state of necessity,‖ one of the excuses for breaking the law and being 
exempt of responsibility in the Uruguayan Criminal Code. Defined as a situation in which the 
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  Since squatters take over empty plots they do not need violence. During my fieldwork, some squatters 
emphasized that they had not even broken the wire fence, which can be legally considered as violent usurpation of 
another‘s property. None of my informants in the 25 cases I studied more in depth recalled deaths or injuries in the 
process of squatting nor did I find any reports of deaths or injuries in the Uruguayan press. The most hostile 
situations were those in which the police appeared at the invasion site. In 8 out of the 25 cases I found a police 
presence at the invasion. These were all planned invasions.  In five of these cases, the police came and held a group 
for some hours and then freed them, leaving the issue to a judge.  Sometimes a police officer stayed at the invasion 
site for weeks or months to prevent more squatters from joining. But squatters tend to remember a police presence as 
threatening (―they came with their clubs‖), but only two of the stories were traumatic. In one case, a squatter 
remembers resisting the police officers trying to destroy their tents. In another case, squatters remember officers and 
municipal staff besieging the group of early settlers to prevent their building or leaving until authorities came up 
with a solution to the situation. One of these squatters remembers that if you dared to leave the seized plot, the 
police would beat you. She was pregnant and with two children at the time, and her friends would come and bring 
her milk and diapers. When another organized group invaded a plot owned by the navy, thinking it was an 
abandoned private plot, the military reacted immediately. As one leader remembers, ―It was a very harsh eviction. It 
was a military owned plot so the codes there where militar codes. People were shocked but in reality the procedure 
was not something unexpected if you consider we were invading that plot, you know? But yes, they besieged the 
area with navy trucks in the main roads, and marines entered with dogs and clubs. There was no chance of dialog.‖ 
Even so, no one spoke of injury. The group left the plot without resisting, but got together at a nearby bus station 
and planned the invasion of another plot the following morning 
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person is acting ―to defend her life, physical integrity, freedom, honor or patrimony,‖ the ―state 
of necessity‖ was argued by lawyers and judges who defended squatters in eviction cases.  
During my fieldwork I found these legal interstices reflected on squatters‘ practices. To 
mention just some examples, when asked if they thought they were breaking the law when they 
squatted, most residents answered ―no.‖ Some referred to their right to housing, such as a woman 
who argued they were not breaking anything ―because housing is a right by law,‖ or another 
resident who was conscious of his going against other people‘s property but justified it by saying 
―you feel you are breaking a rule, but you also feel that the rule is wrong‖ – and he adds - 
―there‘s also the use value of the plot…before we invaded it, it was a garbage dump.‖ There 
were also some that did not even understand the question, because they did not perceive the 
practice of squatting as something outside the ordinary.  
Many of the planned land invasions occurred on weekends or holidays. Far from random, 
the choice of date responded to the intention of letting 48 hours pass without a report, and start 
building so it became difficult for the owner to evict them. Even if the police came and wanted to 
evict them, bureaucratic paperwork made it difficult. As one leader of an invasion in municipal 
land remembers:  
The municipality came several times with trucks and the police and we entrenched ourselves and 
often three or four ended up at the police station. I was always among them. (..). They came and 
wanted to destroy the tents and some of us fought so they didn‘t take down our houses and some of us 
went to the police station. They put us in the waiting room, because someone had to go and sign a 
report saying that we were intruders. Since sometimes nobody went and 12, 24 and even 48 hours had 
passed, the captain started asking himself what to do with us. Without somebody filing a report they 
could not send us to a judge. And we fought because… what was the solution?  
Politicians, in turn, remember being constrained by the legal procedures. As an example, 
when I asked the current Housing Ministry, Mariano Arana, and former Montevideo major for 
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two periods (1995-2004), about what they used to do when they knew of a new land invasion, he 
said:  
We tried to avoid it, but it wasn‘t easy. If they were organized, it wasn‘t easy. 
Besides…legislation….You had to be previously informed to be able to proceed in the first 24-48 
hours. After that, eviction was difficult.   
Some lawyers and judges helped squatters by judging squatting under the realm of civil 
rights rather than for the crime of usurpation, and arguing the mentioned state of necessity. Yet 
this favorable situation for squatters has changed. According to Helios Sarthou –a lawyer that 
has helped many squatters with legal advice, who is also a former senator and representative for 
the Frente Amplio, and that I interviewed because his name kept appearing in my fieldwork- 
since about the year 2000 it is more difficult to defend occupations of land, buildings or 
individual houses. He pointed at two different moments in the legality of squatting.  
What makes the difference? I remember it perfectly. It was an instruction they gave to all attorneys. 
And it coincides with the government of Jorge Battle [president from 1999 to 2004, from the 
Colorado party]. Attorneys started to prosecute squatters with an absolute insensitivity to their social 
condition.  They give them 48 hours [to evict] (…) Until this decision, which was taken in the 
political sphere and reflected itself in the attorneys‘ decisions, we had room for judicial debate, for 
invoking the ―state of necessity‖ which is true…What more ―state of necessity‖ you can find that a 
person that is left on the street from night to morning and has to occupy somewhere? There‘s such 
insensitivity. 
44
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 Besides Dr. Sarthou I interviewed other two lawyers that have helped squatters with legal advice. Dr. Sarthou was 
the most mentioned among residents, however. In two neighborhoods, squatters told me he helped them directly. In 
one case, he gave advice to one of the leaders when she got notified that she and her family were going to be 
evicted. She was from his same political party and fraction and he was a representative at the time. In a different 
case, one of the leaders told me they had invited all political parties to an assembly when they settled and that 
Sarthou had come and advised them to divide the plots and leave ample streets so they could get an early state 
regularization since, even though they were on private land, the owner owed too much money to the state. ―He gave 
us the strength –this leader remembers- to build houses with solid materials and so people started building.‖ Sarthou 
was a senator then. In two other oral histories, he appeared as someone who helped squatters in general but not them 
in particular. Finally, the day I interviewed him, while waiting in the very old law office in the center of 
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This perceived harshening of the legal procedures against squatters, crystallized recently 
with a 2007 reform to the Criminal Code. A new law not only makes it easier to denounce cases 
of property usurpation but also broadens what is considered usurpation. While before only a 
judge could denounce usurpation in the first 48 hours of its happening, now any witness can, 
anytime. Besides, while before only clandestine or violent invasions were considered usurpation 
cases, now any invasion of property, even if it occurs during the day and without any use of 
force, is considered usurpation of someone else‘s property and therefore a crime. This new law, 
originally intended for invasions of houses in the prestigious Punta del Este seaside resort, has in 
practice also affected the land invasions studied here. 
45
 
In sum, the legal interstices on which squatters could rely to invade a plot without being 
evicted have shrunk significantly. Yet besides changes in the legal management of land, I believe 
political management of the land has also changed. This constitutes the second and last 
hypothesis for the recent decline in the number of land invasions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Montevideo, I noticed something curious. Hanging from the faded walls of the tiny waiting room there were lots of 
brass plaques from different unions or groups of workers thanking him. There was one little plaque thanking Dr. 
Sarthou ―for his selfless work for the neighbors of the neighborhood 19 de Abril,‖ a squatter settlement that started 
in 1990, the year of the greatest peak.   
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 Law Nº 18116, which substitutes article 354 of the Criminal Code, approved unanimously by all legislators on 
April 10
th
, 2007. It was a change triggered by some occupations of houses in the luxurious seaside resort Punta del 
Este. Since these houses tend to be used only over the summer and remain alone the rest of the year, they are 
difficult for owners to police. (The old and new texts as well as the justification of the project and the discussions in 
both chambers are available at www.parlamento.gub.uy). Although the law states the usurpation happening in a 
seaside resort as an aggravating factor, it technically applies to the entire country. Thus, it applies to invasions such 
as those for squatting, for cooperative housing building or for production by rural workers. Because of this, the law 
has received criticism from social movements and some sectors of the left. In an article published by FUCVAM, the 
movement for cooperative housing, titled ―Will there be land for the poor?‖ they severely criticize the law by 
pointing at the consequences it can have ―criminalizing land invasions of workers that are just using a survival 
strategy under conditions of gradual de-industrialization and recent cyclical crisis and had to choose between eating 
or paying rent.‖ They call for looking at the causes of land invasions rather than prosecuting them.  (Accesed May 
26, 2007 http://www.fucvam.org.uy). Apparently these dissident voices have been heard since legislators from the 
Frente Amplio have developed a project to modify this article again going back to considering it usurpation only if it 
is violent and clandestine and allowing only owners, or people that prove to be related to them, to report it. This in 
turn, has received criticism from the opposition, but the issue has not been formally treated in the legislature.  
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4.1.4.2 Increasing government responsibility for the land 
Another emergent hypothesis from my fieldwork is that what changed was the increasing 
responsibility by government and by ordinary citizens about vacant land. A new squatter 
settlement is a problem to the city government which has to spend money taking services to 
faraway places. Helping them now will probably bring problems later. Besides, when a vacant 
land is perceived as an important space by citizens, it becomes more likely that they denounce its 
invasion quickly and that eviction occurs. I will illustrate these two ideas with two examples.  
The case of the El Cambio land invasion illustrates the increasing awareness of the city 
government, and of the Frente Amplio government in particular, that helping squatters can be 
problematic. This invasion occurred in October 2004, right before the election that put the leftist 
coalition in the national government for the first time in Uruguayan history. In fact, the invasion 
was named after the Frente Amplio’s campaign that year: El Cambio (The Change). Located in 
one of the areas of the city with the largest number of  land invasions, El Cerro, with a tradition 
of working class organization and with a permissive local government, El Cambio was not 
evicted immediately. Yet contrary to what happened to most land invasions in this area, after a 
period of hesitation and after a change in local authorities, the local council this time decided to 
oppose this invasion. Moreover, it wrote a formal declaration opposing any new land invasion in 
the area.  
This case marks the beginning of a new stage in the Frente Amplio government of the 
city. Perhaps because of the responsibility or the learning gained in the 15 years in charge of the 
city government, or perhaps because of the leverage gained by winning also the national 
government for the first time, the leftist administration is working hard to avoid new land 
invasions, even if that disappoints part of its constituency.  As one of the former local authorities 
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of the Cerro local council told me when I asked him about this specific event: ―We made many 
mistakes. It‘s impossible to govern without experience. Governing means knowing, 
understanding, and we used to make many stupid mistakes.‖  
Finally, a ―no case‖ or a case of a failed land invasion illustrates the increasing 
responsibility of citizens for vacant land, especially when perceived as of having collective 
interest.  When a group of young neighbors from Brandi, another working class neighborhood, 
invaded the soccer field of the neighborhood and started dividing the plot and building tents, 
neighbors reacted quickly. They called the local authorities who despite the fact that it was a 
weekend, acted quickly enough to evict the people in less than 48 hours. As one of the neighbors 
told me: ―we were there at 8 am on a Saturday morning; we were with the local authorities, the 
neighborhood association and also municipal staff.‖ A former city councilor remembers this 
event with pride. She remembers the city council mediated in this conflict in order to avoid both 
the invasion and a violent eviction. 
46
 
In sum, I suggest that the responsibility for and the policing of vacant land has increased 
both from local governments and citizens and that this might explain at least part of the recent 
decline in the number of land invasions in Montevideo.  
4.2 TYPES: DISCOVERING HETEROGENEITY 
In this chapter, I have treated land invasions as if they were homogeneous. I have described the 
cycle of invasions and suggested explanations for its different periods and main features. In this 
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 109 
section, I will add yet another important layer of complexity: the different types of land 
invasions. Land invasions vary in many ways: in their landscape, their area, their location and so 
forth. Because of the main questions of this dissertation, I will emphasize one type of variation: 
settlement formation. I distinguish three types of settlement formation, based on my fieldwork in 
Montevideo. Accretion invasions are those that are formed gradually and without planning; 
planned invasions are those that involve some degree of organization before the invasion and at 
least during the first days or months of settlement; and finally subdivision and sale are those that 
start because an entrepreneur divides a piece of land and sells parcels in a transaction that has 
some level of illegality.    
As chapter 5 will develop, I believe the moment of settlement formation, when the first 
people invade a land, to be an important contentious moment. It is contentious because it goes 
against property rights. It is important because it tends to have a long lasting impact on such 
neighborhood characteristics as spatial design, community organization and services. To start 
with a visual image of this long-lasting effect, Figures 6 and 7 show two land invasions with very 
different origins.   
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Figure 6: Aerial Picture of the squatter settlement Acosta y Lara, formed by accretion (by Google 
Earth) 
 
 
Figure 7: Aerial picture of the squatter settlement COTRAVI, a planned land invasion (by Google 
Earth). 
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4.2.1 Land invasions by accretion 
Box 1: A story of an accretion invasion 
The name of the settlement, as the state and people around the neighborhood know it, is Acosta y Lara, 
like the street that forms one of the neighborhood boundaries. It is not a name that settlers have chosen but was 
chosen by others to identify a settlement without a name. The neighborhood is located in a thin stretch of land in 
between that street and a polluted stream (see figure 6). Crammed with houses, the only open space is the 
irregular narrow passages that go through it.  Unlike most accretion invasions in Montevideo, houses are poor but 
built with solid materials, thanks to the help of a local NGO. Yet their quality depends on their location. Walking 
towards the end of the neighborhood bordering the stream, the landscape becomes denser and poorer. Garbage is 
everywhere with dogs and horses eating from it, and a putrefactive smell becomes more penetrating.  
A group of 4 or 5 shacks were there by the end of the 1950s but most arrived slowly during the 60s 
decade. Many were migrants from other areas of Uruguay, coming to the capital. José, 48, current neighborhood 
president and a temporary construction worker, moved to this neighborhood with his parents when he was very 
little. They used to live in a formal working class peripheral neighborhood in Montevideo, but – he remembers - 
they could not pay the rent because they did not have regular jobs. His grandparents had been among the first 
comers, and they settled somewhere in 1956-57.  At the beginning people worked selling sand from the stream’s 
bank for construction, until the sand was over. There was no neighborhood association then. As José describes it:  
There was no organization, no structure. Nobody told you this is your plot. There was no limit. So people would come 
and fence in the parcel they wanted. Some took too much. Many people from the interior of the country started to come. A 
family would come and then that family told other families “come to Montevideo. At least here you don’t have to pay rent, you 
live in a shack, and there are some jobs” (…) My grandparents came with a plastic tent and then, I remember that they built a 
house with mud, reeds and cane, all from the swamp that used to be here. (…) People cooked with fire (…) They found their way 
to survive.  
Many years ago an NGO started working there and due to that external intervention a neighborhood 
association was generated, named La Esperanza (Hope), of which José is the president. José is a very articulate and 
empowered man but, he told me, most of his neighbors feel ashamed to speak in public. They always rely on him 
to talk to authorities. They feel they do not know how to speak.  
 Because it has been there for decades and because of its very poor landscape, many call it cantegril (see 
chapter 2 for the history of this term). Since the settlement is located close to one of the most affluent areas of the 
city, there had been pressures for relocation. During the dictatorship, some of the settlers were relocated and their 
houses bulldozed.  Outside neighbors accuse squatters of robbery. José recognizes that some people in the 
settlement do rob but he says that they also do it inside the settlement, and that it is only a small group. “They 
can’t put us all in the same bag” –he protests. He is angry at that stigma. Denouncing the thieves is difficult – he 
says - because people fear retaliation against their families. “It is difficult to work together” against this problem –
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José adds. In fact, it has been difficult to work together for many things, such as bringing light to the neighborhood.  
Although there have always been some neighbors willing to work for the neighborhood, in general associations 
have been very fragile.  
There might be changes in the future, however, since this settlement is entering into the state 
regularization program. The State will introduce sewage and other public services, and will propose a different 
map of the neighborhood that will involve relocation of many dwellers, perhaps to some place outside this plot, 
because there is no room for everybody. It is still to be seen how successful the state and the neighborhood 
association are in this process. It is still to be seen if this intervention can undo the legacy of an accretion land 
settlement.  
 
 
Figure 6 shows a typical Montevideo land invasion formed by accretion. In these invasions land 
was occupied gradually, without organization or planning. After the first family or group of 
families invaded a land, more residents started coming gradually. There was generally no 
political intervention at the beginning, no apparent government involvement, neither formal nor 
informal. There was no neighborhood association or local leader assigning plots, drawing blocks 
and streets, or selecting newcomers and this is reflected in the outline of the neighborhood. 
When I asked María, a resident of a very poor squatter settlement in the North East of 
Montevideo, whose family was among the first ones to invade the today packed neighborhood, if 
someone had told them where to build or how much land they could take, she explained:  
No, no, everyone took a piece of land. Now, there‘s no more land. I'll tell you. We are a big family. 
We must have about 40 square meters [about 400 square feet] and we have 3 houses there and we also 
have the sheds for the horses, because we have animals, you know? 
María‘s family knew about this abandoned plot because they used to live in front of it, in public 
housing. They had moved out public housing to a town outside Montevideo but things did not go 
well there economically and they moved back to their old neighborhood. As she remembers it, 
―we came back to the neighborhood. The only choice we had was to build a shack in the middle 
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of that lot. With time, more people started to come and a neighborhood started to grow. I think it 
has more tan 400 families now.‖  
Accretion settlements are generally crowded groups of small shacks, with no public space 
or streets. Services are scarce. Settlers tend to provide themselves with water and light by 
―hooking‖ themselves to the main lines. Typical houses are very poorly built, with materials 
owners find in the garbage such as metal sheets and wood Piles of smelling garbage, horses, 
carts, and other indications of scavenging are common in their landscape.  
  One of the main features of accretion invasions is their invisibility. As a resident of one 
of the settlements I visited told me, ―this neighborhood was never in the map, never. When we 
tried to get the phone line, they didn‘t find the address. The neighborhood did not exist.‖ 
Invisibility derives from a lack of contact with the state, which in turn reveals negligence both 
from a state that does not come and a generally nonexistent neighborhood association that does 
not demand.  
 There is generally no collective history of the neighborhood but a multiplicity of 
histories. When I asked Jacqueline, a resident of an accretion settlement who works at a scrap 
dealing family business, if there was any NGO working in the neighborhood she answered, ―I 
can tell you about this part of the neighborhood [the one visible from her location]. Maybe 
someone that lives there can tell you about that part, but I can't."  A telling indicator of this is 
that having applied the same oral history questionnaire – with adjustments - to first residents of 
planned and accretion invasions, while interviews in the first type of neighborhood lasted on 
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average one hour, they lasted only half an hour on average for accretion invasions, and this after 
probing as much as I could.
47
 
 In general, I did not find neighborhood associations or leaders. When there were, it was 
in those cases in which an external agent such as an NGO or the government regularization 
program (PIAI) had motivated the election of neighborhood representatives. Early residents are 
the ones that have some attributes of leadership, since they have been there for the longest time. 
When other people arrived the newcomers asked them if they could stay. Sometimes neighbors 
rely on them for help. But they do not tend to be bridges to the outside world, like leaders of 
other neighborhoods. Nor do they assume the task of guaranteeing the wellbeing of the 
neighbors.   
 Perhaps because of this lack of collective history and leadership, collective action 
problems are common. Residents often speak of lack of trust, fragile neighborhood organizations 
that last very briefly, neighbors stealing collective goods such as food from the soup kitchen, etc. 
This resident‘s appreciation of her neighborhood illustrates this:  
Everyone pulls towards his side, to find things for himself and not to help the neighborhood. My 
father was about to participate in a neighborhood association but everyone wanted a bite, and that's 
not it…If you are fighting for the neighborhood it shouldn‘t be because what you really want is to get 
a job in the municipal government. Everyone pulls towards his side. That's why it never worked. I 
have known at least 4 or 5 neighborhood associations, but they don't last. 
Politicians did not appear spontaneously in squatters‘ narratives when I asked about the 
history of the neighborhood. When I asked, residents saw politicians as very distant, not caring 
about them and trying to use them. José, from one of the accretion invasions I visited, told me 
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―nobody ever did anything for this neighborhood.‖ And another resident critically answered that 
politicians ―always came five or six months before the elections but they never came to say (…) 
They never give you anything! They build their fame with you. They come, they film you and 
then you are there [on TV] showing the poverty in Uruguay.‖ For him, ―those at the top are all a 
band of liars.‖  
When asked ―which are the three persons or institutions that helped the neighborhood the 
most,‖ people had trouble answering. The most common answers, after hesitating, were 
―nobody‖ or the name of some NGO working in their neighborhoods. In fact, even though some 
of these NGOs if not all of them have projects funded by the state, squatters do not perceive the 
state presence.   
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4.2.2 Planned invasions 
Box 2. A story of a planned invasion 
Villa Libre (Freedom Village) was founded in December 1995. A group of about 20 young and middle aged 
people had been meeting for about a month at a soup kitchen in El Cerro neighborhood to plan a land seizure. 
They did not all know each other from before but they all learned about the plot through friends, job colleagues or 
acquaintances. Some were from a group of young anarchist militants and those did know each other. But more 
than anything what connected them was their common need for housing. They started by exploring different 
possibilities of plots to invade. Since most of them were from El Cerro – an organized working class neighborhood 
in Montevideo, with a tradition of union participation and, more recently, leftist voting - they started to look for 
plots there. As one of the early settlers who was then renting at a rooming house in the city center told me:  
The majority, who were people from the soup kitchen, people from the FAU (Anarchist Federation of 
Uruguay), they wanted the plot to be in El Cerro. For people like me who were not from El Cerro, we didn’t care.   
They also wanted a place from where they could go to their jobs easily. When they felt ready, they 
invaded a private plot from the Frigorífico Nacional, once a huge meat processing plant that gave jobs to many but 
that is now closed like many other similar plants and industries in the area. Since that plot had been abandoned for 
many years, they thought it was a safe one. They invaded on a Friday night, trusting nobody would notice them 
over the weekend. But the police came that same evening and held some of the men overnight. They freed them 
the following morning with the ultimatum of leaving that plot immediately. Squatters decided to cross the street 
and invade a public park. The police came and this time took some of the women. They were the ones at the 
camping site while most men were asking for donations in street markets or searching for advice on what to do. 
Settlers asked a local lawyer for help and she put them in touch with some other lawyers. The group started to 
shrink because some people got scared with the eviction threats. 
After holding the group of settlers at the police station for a day, they released them the following 
morning telling them they needed to leave that public land. On January 6, a holiday in Uruguay, municipal staff 
came with an eviction order and starting charging settlers’ belongings and told them they needed to come with 
them. They took them to another plot. Residents remember this as a confusing event, because trucks were private 
and the eviction order was not signed by a judge. They feel the Mayor wanted to get them out of the park and 
since he could not do it legally, he hired private trucks on a holiday to be able to do it. They also remember this day 
with anger since the trucks were completely careless with their belongings and just threw them on this new plot. 
Since now they had been taken to a private plot, the owner – a neighborhood soccer club - also wanted to evict 
them. The group started to fight with the local government asking them for a solution. If the municipality had 
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evicted them from the park, now they had to find them a solution. The group became stronger, choosing some 
representatives in charge of talking to authorities but deciding everything in assemblies. Pedro, one of the 
representatives, was chosen because he had previous experience in a land invasion, “he had contacts, and he knew 
how to move himself and whom to talk to” – as another settler told me. They started to fight with the local 
government and in the end they gave them another plot in which they could stay. Residents remember different 
sectors of the leftist municipal government fighting for the decision to evict them or not. The fact that most of the 
invaders were leftist militants was an asset, according to Darío:  
When the local government came and saw some of us here, they said ‘Wow, you were here?’ It was as if 
they came with a position and when they saw there were people from their political sector, they changed. 
This picture shows the group in these early belligerent days, when they were starting to settle and build. 
The neighborhood flag on the background shows the symbolic ties to the broader neighborhood, El Cerro, by a 
drawing of the El Cerro hill, geographic feature that gives name and symbolic recognition to this working class 
neighborhood.   
 
 
 
After a period of confrontation with authorities, the local council assigned them another plot. It was next 
to two other land invasions, but rather than join either of them, the group wanted to form its own neighborhood. 
“We had different ways to see things and different ways to decide. We stayed apart” – one early resident 
remembers.  Some of those differences were political, since the other neighborhoods had connections with the 
traditional rightist parties.  
Early times were tough because they had to clean the plot, smooth it, and start building everything. They 
planned streets and blocks, with the hope that one day they would become regularized, that is, they would receive 
their property titles and urban services and, in the end, become an ordinary city neighborhood. They started 
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building their shacks. The group built a house for one of the residents who was a single mother. A group was in 
charge of cooking for everybody. They remember this as a time of solidarity. They discussed with local authorities 
the criteria for selecting new residents. Although authorities only wanted to accept families with children, since 
some of the group were single men, they fought to change that criterion. Newcomers could not have incomes 
superior to 3 minimum salaries. They had a deadline to build something with solid materials. This left out very poor 
people who could not build anything but a shack. They did not allow people with horses or other animals, which 
left scavengers out. In an assembly they decided they did not want anybody from the military, strike breakers, or 
thieves. They quickly got services such as water and light by directly asking the relevant state agencies, and often 
also asking the local council for help. They brought services for the whole area that the nearby settlements had 
never managed to get.  They were always distrustful of politicians. They did not want to feel used. But they were 
very pragmatic at the same time:  
We were always rebellious with that (…) We used to go to the City Council or wherever and we talked to 
everybody, blancos, colorados, frenteamplistas. If someone opened the doors to us and offered something, we were 
there (…) Here in the local government, many times we went and told them “ok, you are closing us the doors, we go 
somewhere else. 
After the first two years, participation started to decline. Some of the initial settlers had moved out. 
According to Pedro, “Divisions started when people began to sell parcels and leave.” And he adds –“That’s when 
respect was over (…) it’s hurtful…after all this sacrifice.” Pedro and Nelly, early founders who are still in the 
neighborhood association, say people do not want to participate. “Everybody complains because the 
neighborhood association doesn’t do this or that – Nelly explains, - but whenever we call a meeting to choose 
representatives, everybody votes for us because nobody wants to be responsible for this…and with the years you 
get tired.” But Darío, one of the early comers who is not participating in the neighborhood anymore, says that the 
neighborhood association is sold out, that they do not confront any more the local government but just does what 
they want them to do.  
The neighborhood association’s main goal remains as it was in 1995: getting regularized. Although they 
are included among the settlements to be regularized, it is still unclear when that will happen. The State runs on 
slow time. The first time they asked for a school was in 1998. In 2007, when I conducted fieldwork, it was under 
construction.  
 
Figure 7 shows a typical planned invasion from Montevideo, seen from the air. These 
invasions generally happened suddenly, and were thought out by either one person or a group. 
People may have kept arriving on the following days and months, but a first group came together 
and seized the plot, generally over night and on a weekend or holiday in order to avoid attention 
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from police and owners. They required some prior organization at least to find out about 
available plots and decide which one to seize and when to do it. Research about available and 
safe plots, that is state owned land or private land whose owners had died or had not paid taxes in 
a while, often included contacts with politicians or state officials who had that type of 
information. It was not uncommon for the group to confront authorities, the police or the owner 
in the first days of the invasion. Still, besides perhaps 24 hours of detention at the police station 
and, even less likely, relocation by the authorities after some fighting, eviction was very rare. 
From the start, an (often self proclaimed) leader or group started dividing the plot into smaller 
parcels, drawing streets and leaving some room for community buildings or public spaces. This 
planning imitated the urban planning and the norms of the outside formal city. This person or 
group often crafted some neighborhood rules, including rules for selecting newcomers.  
These rules often reflected the intention of not being like an accretion invasion or, in a 
resident‘s words ―we didn‘t want this to be a cantegril. (…) What we always tried, the idea, was 
to build a neighborhood.‖  Another resident spoke of planning the neighborhood as a collective 
project, a ―vision.‖  
You have to have a certain vision. That‘s the difference between asentamientos and cantegriles. And 
there are asentamientos that end up being cantegriles. And there are others that end up being a barrio 
(neighborhood). If you have the vision that you don‘t want to live in a cantegril and want to build a 
barrio, then you have to do what the state doesn‘t do. The state often plans the city. Since the state is 
not planning [your settlement] then you have to do some planning yourself so one day the state can 
bring you some services and you can develop. If you don‘t have that vision, then you turn into a 
cantegril.  
Some of the neighborhood rules had a class connotation, excluding the poorest of the 
poor by either prohibiting animals such as the horses used for scavenging, or establishing a 
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deadline to start building with brick or other (relatively expensive) solid materials.  Explaining 
these rules, residents of three different planned invasions told me:  
 
We were all people of work. If the person had a job, we gave them a parcel. If he didn‘t, then we 
didn‘t. Because if you don‘t work, what are you going to do, man? You can‘t even build one room 
with cement. 
 
We were not delinquents and here there were no carts, no horses. I mean, there were no people of very 
low resources. We were really hard working people, workers that needed a house and couldn‘t pay the 
rent (…) We are families of wor-kers [her emphasis] not people that beg or rob. We are people that 
like to live well but don‘t have the means, that‘s it. But with dignity, that‘s the thing. Because I‘m 
sure that if you now enter into any of these little houses, the humblest you can find, I‘m sure it doesn‘t 
stink of dirt, rotten things or animals. [And her husband added] If you bring a black with a cart and a 
horse….We didn‘t want that. We didn‘t want to live in the dirt, you know?  
 
We formed a group with people like me, workers, I mean not marginal people, for instance.  
 
The working class identity expressed in this quotes was present in most of my 
interviewees of planned invasions, that is leaders and non leaders that have lived in the 
settlements since the early days. It is probably not shared by all residents, but it was part of the 
project of the neighborhood, of the idea that the early settlers had about where and how they 
wanted to live, and with whom. Despite the fact that most of them were, at the moment I 
interviewed them, in low paid informal jobs they defended their identity as workers.  
The spatial outline of planned neighborhoods tends to look like the one in figure 7. From 
the air they look, like this one, like a regular neighborhood. Yet because of the population 
pressure, especially for internal growth and also because of newcomers, sometimes the original 
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design starts to fade. Shacks start to appear towards the fringes of the settlement, some families 
start dividing their parcels either because they sell part of it or because they give a piece to a 
family member to build a new house there.  Population pressure also makes it difficult to 
maintain public spaces or those plots originally designed for the future construction of a soup 
kitchen or a neighborhood plaza. The durability of the original design tends to depend on the 
capacity settlers have to enforce the original rules.  
If accretion invasions were characterized by invisibility, planned invasions are generally 
in the other extreme. They want visibility. They want the state to recognize them, bring services, 
put them an address so they can have phone and other services, pay the bills and get an 
ambulance if an emergency happens. They went to be regularized, that is to say, they want the 
titles of their property. They want to be owners. That was the common answer when I asked 
about the neighborhood goals, even if some were starting to recognize that they might not be 
able to afford taxes if regularization becomes true. This search for visibility is also a search for 
recognition, for belonging, and ultimately for citizenship. Elsewhere I have called it a search to 
―resist exclusion‖ (Álvarez-Rivadulla 2007 [2000]).  
Because at least early residents endured together the invasion and the construction of the 
neighborhood, there is a common narrative of origins among them. Of course there are dissident 
voices, even among founders, but there are memories of a shared past. This distinguishes the 
early comers from the late comers. The latter came at different moments in time, when the plot 
was already seized and the most pressing needs solved, so they did not have the same 
experiences as the founders. They did not share the experiences and hopes they did at the 
beginning. Often, this narrative includes epic accounts of how residents fought with the police, 
filled a swamp with their own hands, purged the neighborhood of a group of thugs by destroying 
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their shack and entrenching themselves for three days with provisions and arms in case they 
came for revenge, transformed a garbage dump into a clean and smooth plot, helped each other 
to build houses, cooked together in a soup kitchen, left their doors open, and displayed all kinds 
of group solidarity. As an already quoted politician that has helped many squatters put it planned 
invasions go through a ―stellar moment in which people feel they are the main actors of their 
own lives.‖ 
This real and idealized past is very difficult to transmit to the next generations of 
dwellers, especially because after a while an informal market tends to appear and people start 
buying and selling their plots with great rotation of settlers. As Celeste, a settler of a planned 
invasion nostalgically told me, 
When we came to live here, people cared if you needed money to pay the light, or if you needed some 
medicine. It was very nice, and it still is, but there are new people now that do not know the habits 
that we use to have at the beginning. Here, for instance, when the neighborhood started, we said, well 
if you start a produce store, I start a grocery store, but don't start the same business as me, you know? 
We respected each other to be able to work together, you know? 
This ―key theme of memory‖ as another resident put it, often translates into insecurity 
problems. Many told me they fear to leave their houses alone. Celeste, the same interviewee 
quoted above, has a little store in her house but she only dares to attend to customers through the 
window grille for fear of being robbed. The solution of collective action problems as well as 
more individual ones depends a lot on the persistence and legitimacy of a leader or neighborhood 
association. As an example, I got access to the minutes of the neighborhood association meetings 
of one planned invasion from 1998 to 2003. I was surprised to see, for example, how they 
controlled every land transaction in the neighborhood. People buying or selling had to be 
authorized by the neighborhood association. They also impeded the invasion of the 
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neighborhood soccer field. Yet this notebook takes us to another feature of planned invasion: 
their close relationship with the state, since in almost every meeting the group registers meeting 
with some authority or writing a letter to petition something, etc.  
Neighborhood associations involved in planned invasions want to reach out. Once in the 
plot, one of their main tasks is to reach out, especially to the state, to get the things the 
neighborhood needs. They do so using different strategies. Directly demanding something from 
the authorities bypassing regular bureaucratic procedures is a very common strategy among 
squatters of planned invasions. Sometimes they use political brokers to reach authorities or to 
accelerate the fulfillment of their demand. They know insisting is key. And when some pressure 
is needed they use the power of multitude, that is, they go all together to a public office and 
camp there until they get the water pipe or the electricity service they are looking for. Only rarely 
do they use more disruptive strategies such as street blockades.  The most successful strategy – 
described in depth on chapter 6 - is what I dub market clientelism, which consists of a very 
strategic use of clientelistic networks promising loyalty and votes to the best bidder. The 
common phrase ―we are apolitical in this neighborhood‖ often hides these market-like 
clientelistic networks in which leaders do not commit to any politician or party but flirt with 
many at the same time in order to get the services for their neighborhood.  
Some of the leaders I interviewed were experts in how the state works, where and who to 
ask, had the phone numbers of the secretaries of this or that authority and some even had very 
technical knowledge on issues such as water connection. Joking about their thorough knowledge 
of state institutions and the amount of time spent demanding, one leader told me: ―We were like 
City Council staff members; when we entered everyone knew us. We used to go 2 or 3 times a 
week. "Some brought this knowledge from before, from their participation in unions, housing 
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cooperatives or neighborhood associations, but many learned by doing once they invaded. For 
the latter, participating in the neighborhood association was their first politicizing experience.  
When asked who were the three institutions or persons who helped your neighborhood 
the most, early residents of planned invasions, both leaders and non leaders, contrary to accretion 
invasions, tended to mention a variety of state institutions as well as politicians and authorities. 
Those institutions varied depending on the needs of the settlement. As one resident put it:   
We went were we had to go. If you know that the Municipal Council has the competence to give you 
what you want, then you go to the Municipal Council. You are not going to go to the Health Ministry. 
The institutions they knocked at also depended on the plot‘s owner. If the plot was city owned, 
then the municipal government was the most visited by squatters. Yet those institutions also 
varied with time and with institutional changes. When in 1990, the Montevideo municipal 
government started a decentralization process squatters started making demands on their closest 
local government (CCZ or zonal community center).  
To conclude this characterization of planned invasion, I will discuss one very particular 
kind: utopian invasions. During my fieldwork I found a few planned invasions whose early 
residents wanted more than solving their housing needs. Their framing of the land invasion was 
different. They emphasized horizontal decision making and a great distrust for vertical 
neighborhood associations, for example. Decisions were to be made in assemblies and many 
declared themselves in a ―state of permanent assembly‖ during the first months of the invasion. 
Leaders were connected to the left, had participated in one of the Frente Amplio factions, in 
unions and/or in the cooperative housing movement. This is reflected in actions that make 
utopian invasions different, such as the distribution of plots in Nuevo Amanecer (New Sunrise) 
where instead of distributing land on a first come, they first divided the plot into equal parcels 
and then gave them out randomly among the first 36 families.  It is also reflected in critical 
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discourses such as the one from this neighborhood leader, who received me in a living room 
dominated by a huge picture of Raúl Sendic, one of the founders of the Tuparamo guerrilla 
movement, and a firm believer in the need for land reform in Uruguay:   
The theory was to build an invasion clearly denouncing existing housing policies. So in a way it was a 
protest. But at the same time, it tried to be effective for the people who were invading. I mean, we 
were not only interested in the symbolic act of invading. There was a real commitment to solving 
people‘s housing problem.  And the third element was to try to give some organization to the 
invasion, for example in the infrastructure, that could later be a bridge to other forms of organization 
(…) In one assembly we even had a discussion to try to arrive at a model of collective property (…), 
to offer an alternative to individual property somehow. We also thought that perhaps the collective 
part could come through self help construction (…). Once we thought of producing collectively in 
those plots [currently invaded by a second wave of squatters] because there were a lot of unemployed 
people that knew how to bake, make shoes, plant (…). But with time the neighborhood association 
started to decline. It disappeared, in fact. The most crucial needs were solved and you can have a lot 
of political willingness but people only move for the prod of necessity. Your ideas can be beautiful, 
but if you don‘t have people‘s needs, you are done. 
  
He nostalgically describes two or three months as a ―fulfilled utopia‖ because they all fought for 
the same thing, they all helped each other in a context of need.  Sometimes the fulfilled utopia 
lasted longer but in none of the cases I observed, was it currently alive. It was something early 
residents remembered, but the idealists‘ projects of the beginning tended to fade in the first year 
of settlement.  
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4.2.3 Subdivision and sale 
Box 3: A story of a land invasion by subdivision and sale 
When María and her husband saw an ad in one of the national newspapers of an affordable plot in Villa 
García, North East of Montevideo, they decided to visit. It was December 1988. She was quite puzzled because 
there was no light or water. It was just a plot in the middle of the countryside. Yet they decided to buy it. They had 
to pay a downpayment and then monthly installments. They never saw the owners. They paid everything to a 
notary in an office located in the city center. 
María, who had a history of social participation in different organizations and political participation in the 
Colorado party, become the president of the newly formed neighborhood association. Soon she began to be 
suspicious because plots were too small and she had the idea that the municipality required more area per parcel.  
One day, while waiting to pay taxes at the notary office, she overheard an argument between two men. One of 
them said “If the people of Villa García know this is a fraud, they kill us.” Her suspicion was confirmed. She went 
back to the neighborhood, called an assembly and told the 20 families already living there what she heard. She 
went to the municipality where she had some political friends from the Colorado party and she found out that the 
bigger plot had never been formally divided. Their property titles were false. She did not find much support in the 
municipality, however. One staff member told her to be careful, to not pursue the issue, because these people 
were mafia. But the fraud was even bigger, because they oversold parcels. So there were parcels with two or three 
owners that came to claim theirs and found it was already inhabited. With the help of a lawyer they sued the 
sellers, but nothing happened. They were in jail for 48 hours and after that they released them. According to 
Maria, they had political connections.  
When the neighbors realized they were on their own, and that they were formally squatters, they started 
to organize as such. Using her political contacts and her leadership skills, María got light and water for the 
neighborhood. She remembers how she got the water, after failing through the regular procedures:  
It was a time of electoral campaign, so we had to use it. You needed to negotiate. You need votes, I need 
80 water meters. (…) People here needed water and we didn’t have it because we had already demanded it but the 
paperwork was sleeping somewhere. (…) I talked to the water company’s president. He was colorado. I told him 
‘I’m a colorada’ (…) He said they were overwhelmed with work. And I said, ok, the campaign is coming and if you 
want votes, come down to earth, I need water for my people.  
Today the neighborhood is in good condition. Houses have basic services and are built with solid 
materials. There are streets, although not paved. Yet I was impressed by the high tension cables right next to the 
settlement. María talked about that too:  
The pollution from high tension cables is worrisome. Kids can have cancer in 10 years or so [due to 
radiation exposure]. That’s been proved. (…) We also have the pollution from the garbage containers. We’ve talked 
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to the local council several times, but they don’t care about the problems of Villa García, you know? 
Maria’s hope is that one day her neighborhood is no longer a squatter settlement. She wishes to get land 
titles in order to be able to sell legally and feel more secure.  
 
 
Besides accretion and planned invasions, Montevideo also has what we can call 
entrepreneurial invasions or invasions by subdivision and sale. From the air, that is spatially, 
they tend to look like the one in Figure 7, because they are also planned, but they differ in that 
their planning involves (often fraudulent) economic profit. (See figure 22 for an aerial and other 
pictures of an invasion that started through subdivision and sale). Informal housing markets tend 
to develop in all types of invasions. After a while, even in utopian invasions, some may sell their 
house and go to a formal neighborhood or to another squatter settlement, even the most 
committed leaders. But what distinguishes this third type of land invasion is that the market 
component is there from the moment of the invasion. No household settles without paying 
something.  
These are planned invasions, generally by one individual, in which land is subdivided and 
sold to residents. The individual may be the owner of the land or a designated seller, but they are 
sometimes bandits that claim to be the owners and cheaply sell plots they do not own. Therefore, 
sometimes squatters do not know they are squatters until they discover they have been victims of 
a fraud. Some owners of vacant and unproductive land have incited invasions to later ask the 
state for compensation. Land is often private and located in protected rural areas in the periphery 
of the city.  According to the Montevideo municipality, plots cannot be subdivided for urban use 
there, so these transactions are illegal. Besides, these areas do not have the necessary services for 
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a new neighborhood. As in planned invasions, settlers start making demands on the state for 
services.  
During my fieldwork I found several examples of this type of invasion. I develop one in 
depth in chapter 6. In yet another one, one of the residents started coming to the plot because 
they saw an ad on the newspaper. They bought a plot and later realized they had been victims of 
a fraud.  The sellers had divided the plot in smaller pieces than the zoning rules permit for that 
area, and the property titles they gave them were fake although signed by a notary. Neighbors 
started organizing after they realized they were not owners but squatters. They were able to get 
water and other services, mainly through the leadership and contacts of one of the neighbors who 
is from the Colorado party and has always worked for the party. Their current goal is that the 
Ministry of Housing regularizes their neighborhood, by giving them real property titles and 
bringing all the services.  
Imagination has not been absent in order to get around the law. As a former city 
councilor told me,  
[generating squatter settlements by selling private land in rural areas] got pretty technical. The last 
thing that happened to us at the City Council, and we reported it, (…) was that somebody that owned 
rural land as a corporation [sociedad anónima] would sell pieces of it as a share. [There was a case] in 
which after you bought a share, they calculated how much you needed to build your house. So people 
could go to the owner‘s son‘s construction materials store, purchase what they needed leaving the 
share as a guarantee. If you didn‘t pay for the materials, they would take your share and evict you. It 
was a cartel!  
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4.2.4 Prevalence 
Figure 8 shows how prevalent these types of invasion have been in the city of Montevideo, for 
those I have been able to classify (240 out of 427). 
48
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 8: Types of Settlement Formation, Montevideo 1947-2004 (N= 240) 
 
 
The most common type of land invasion in Montevideo has been accretion (57% of those 
I could find information about). Yet about 1 out of 3 invasions have been planned, and 11% have 
                                                 
48
 I was able to classify 56% of all Montevideo‘s settlements. At first I thought those unclassified were most likely 
accretion cases, but after checking with the data I realized they do not follow a pattern different from the whole. 
Unclassified invasions do not resemble one type more than the other. They tend to be in public land (67%) just like 
most invasions of any type (63%). They are not clustered in one area of the city but distributed throughout the city 
periphery although there is a slight tendency to be in the Eastern part of the city rather than in the West (56% of 
unclassified invasions are located in the East versus 51% of all invasions). Finally, although unclassified invasions 
started throughout the period of study, their peak is in 1990-94, just like for all invasions.   
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been a product of land subdivision and sale.  This variation challenges any generalization about 
land invasions. Although in the first part of this chapter I have treated all as the same in 
describing their evolution over time, it becomes important to open the box and explore the 
heterogeneity. In the following section I will explore the variation of these types over time and 
space, to see if there are patterns that my own previous generalizations might have hidden.  
4.3 TYPES OF LAND INVASIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 
Types of land invasions are not distributed randomly throughout the history of the cycle 
or throughout the city. Although in this study I emphasize more the time dimension, in this 
section I explore also the spatial clusters and suggest some hypotheses about them. Figure 9 
shows the cycle of land invasions by type, over time.  
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Figure 9: Cycle of land invasions by type of invasion. Montevideo 1947-2004 (N=256) 
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The first land invasions in Montevideo were of the accretion type. Families, probably 
immigrants from other areas of the country searching for an opportunity in the capital city would 
come and slowly form new informal neighborhoods (see chapter 2 for demographics). It was not 
only until the mid 1960s that the first planned land invasion appeared in the city. I have 1965 as 
the date when people started forming what today is Casabó (not visible in the graph because in 
1965 there was also another accretion invasion that hides this one). 
49
 Planned invasions did not 
become popular in the repertoire of land squatters until the 1989-1990. They remain popular 
during the 1990 decade, surpassing the number of accretion invasions every year from 1991 until 
1997.  Even today, judging by the characteristics of the cycle towards the end of the studied 
period (2004), if there is a land invasion, it is likely that it is a planned one rather than an 
accretion one. (Fraudulent) land subdivision and sale, in turn, appeared late in the repertoire of 
squatters. It probably took some time for promoters to perceive the profit of the business. 
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 The squatter settlement known as Casabó, located in the traditional working class neighborhood of El Cerro, is a 
big portion of land that in fact includes three different smaller squatter neighborhoods. It was one of the settlements 
I studied in depth. All the stories of early residents coincided on the role of the Colorado Party in this invasion. A 
local broker, who would later be a city councilor (1985-1990) and who at the time worked for a politician who 
would soon be presidential candidate (i.e., Vasconcellos would run for election in 1966) and senator, was the one 
who distributed the parcels, selected the first residents, and created the original neighborhood association, whose 
president was also a Colorado. This squatter settlement would show unusual signs of urban planning and 
mobilization that ended up with the treatment of this case in the Parliament and the approval of a law, designed by a 
Colorado Party politician, which gave settlers ownership of their plots and assured them services (Ley 14006).  
The discussion of this bill in the House of Representatives is very interesting for many reasons (Diaro de Sesiones 
de la Cámara de Respresentantes 605 (1593-1613), March-April-May 1971, Uruguay).  First, the great majority of 
representatives supported the law (41 of 47 voted affirmatively for the bill in general). All representatives from all 
parties agreed they wanted to guarantee the rights of the inhabitants of Casabó. In that discussion, one Colorado 
representative expressed what seemed to be a consensus in the chamber by saying: ―At the moment, about 200 
families or about 1000 people live there. They are hard-working and of good habits. They have not only built their 
own houses, which are very different from those in cantegriles, but they have also built a clinic, a sports plaza, a 
soup kitchen, things that speak of a great spirit of solidarity. These people deserve the support of the State‖. The 
second interesting thing derives from this quote. The opposition is clear. While inhabitants of Casabó are―deserving 
poor‖ those that live in cantegriles are not. A third interesting aspect of the discussion is that representatives enter 
into a discussion on the concept of marginality that I will not analyze here but that deserves its own treatment. 
Fourth, a delegation of neighbors from Casabó was present at the discussion. The transcription includes some 
moments in which neighbors applaud and the chamber‘s president threatens to remove the spectators. Finally, 
although the bill dated from 1967, this discussion and the final approval occurred in August 1971, right before the 
November elections. Although the state has provided Casabó many services, property titles were never given out. 
Yet, squatters in Casabó were never evicted and feel somehow backed by this law, even if many would like the titles 
to be real. Neighborhood associations still fight for the implementation of the law.  
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Besides, given that they are mostly in private land while the others are mostly in public land, it 
might be the case that an exhaustion of vacant and neglected public land is playing a role in 
changing the repertoire.  Figure 10 introduces the analysis of land property into the picture.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of invasions settled in private land (vs. public land) by type of settlement 
formation. Montevideo 1947-2004 (N=217) 
 
Most land invasions have taken place on public land (61%). Occupying public land is 
safer because the state does not enforce its rights as private owners do. Yet this varies by type. 
While planned and accretion invasions are overwhelmingly located in state-owned land (68% 
and 63 % respectively, which is not a significant difference as the error bars illustrate), those 
invasions that started by subdivision and sale are mostly located in private land. The state, 
especially Montevideo‘s municipal government, has been strongly opposed to subdivision and 
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sales.  Such invasions often involve defrauding poor people and building up in far away areas 
that the government considers not proper for it either because they are reserved for productive or 
ecological purposes or because it is too costly to bring services to them. Entrepreneurs are 
therefore more attracted to private land, where policing is lower.  They have been owners of 
unproductive land or opportunistic intermediaries the ones who have promoted subdivision and 
sale invasions in private land.
50
  
Finally, and in order to also have an idea of how this varied throughout time, figure 11 
presents the evolution of type of property for accretion and planned invasions. I have omitted 
subdivision and sale invasions from the analysis because there are not enough cases per period to 
be able to calculate percentages. Figure 11 shows something that that the averages hide. 
Although the majority of accretion and planned invasions tend to be located on public land, by 
looking over time, a changing pattern emerges. Somewhere in the mid 1990s, squatters started to 
choose private plots rather than public ones. This is likely to be in part due to the obvious 
exhaustion of public plots suitable for invasion, that is, vacant, not too far away, without 
surveillance, etc. Yet if we consider that there are still some good – i.e., well located, smooth - 
public plots available and that some land invasions are in the roughest and less habitable places 
such as polluted river banks where there is still room, we should think of other factors rather than 
availability affecting this change.  The shift towards private plots may be related to the already 
mentioned greatest surveillance of public plots both by the municipality and citizens.  
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 I found a small group of squatter neighborhoods that were settled on pieces of land from different owners. For the 
cases in which the owners were two different but public institutions, I simply considered the settlement to be on 
public land. Yet, I have excluded from this analysis those settlements located on public and private land at the same 
time. Those were mostly accretion invasions (9 out of 10) that probably started in one plot and slowly expanded 
towards a neighboring plot from a different owner.  
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Figure 11: Percentage of invasions settled in private land (vs. public) by type of settlement formation 
and time period. Montevideo 1947-2004 (N=190) 
 
Besides the temporal description of the cycle of land invasions, it is telling to look at the 
geographic or spatial distribution of these land invasions. Far from being randomly located, land 
invasions are clustered in certain places of the city. Contrary to what happens in a city like Rio, 
whose peculiar topography generates favelas in the middle of the city, on the hills, in 
Montevideo squatter settlements are on the periphery, circling the urban city center. Figure 12 
shows a map of Montevideo superposing the about 400 squatter settlements to the 18 
administrative units in which the city is divided.  
Those areas of the city with more squatter settlements are the traditionally most deprived 
ones. There are very few land invasions in the coastal south east of the city, a very urbanized 
area and the most affluent of the city. A combination of higher population density, high land 
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values of the relatively scarce vacant land, and pressure from affluent neighbors who would not 
like to see their properties depreciated have provoked on the one hand fewer land invasions to 
begin with and on the other hand relocation of those squatter settlements that were there. As an 
example, the few squatter settlements that in the 1990s were still in the old city, the commercial 
and historical center, were relocated to the periphery.  The north eastern and north western parts 
of the city are the ones with most squatter settlements. These were areas already deprived before 
the peak in land squatting, with available land and, importantly, not far away from avenues or 
streets that could get people to their jobs. More recently, however, even more distant areas have 
been occupied (e.g., see the more isolated spots in the east and west of the city). Some of those 
are the land subdivisions and sales in what the city government considers non-urbanizable rural 
land. In fact, figure 12 shows them with a different color.  
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Figure 12 Location of land invasions by type of settlement. Montevideo Map. 
 
I have marked with circles two clear clusters: on the West part of the city (left) there is a 
group of planned invasions, in the post-industrial, working class, leftist Cerro area; on the East 
side, in turn, there is a smaller cluster of settlements that started by subdivision and sale, located 
in what the city considers rural land. There is no clear pattern for accretion invasions, other than 
what they share with all invasions: they tend to be in the periphery of Montevideo.  
Putting all these characteristics together in a nutshell, we can see three main 
constellations of settlement formation. (Because of the main line of inquiry of this dissertation, 
that is, the role of politics in squatting, I will impose a categorization by political period on the 
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time dimension). Table 2 organizes information by political period and shows the distribution of 
land invasions according to land property, type of invasions and region of the city. Prevalent 
types per political period are highlighted in grey.  
Table 2 Distribution of squatter settlements by land property, type of invasion and location, per 
political period (percentages) 
                                
  Land Property Type of Land Invasion Region of the City 
  Private 
State 
City  
State 
Other 
Total N Planned  Accretion  
Subdivision 
& Sale 
Total N Center East West Total N 
Before 1974 29.7 51.4 18.9 100 37 12.1 81.8 6.1 100 33 4.0 60.0 36.0 100 50 
Dictatorship  31.4 43.1 25.5 100 51 2.8 86.1 11.1 100 36  66.1 33.9 100 59 
1985-1989 18.6 55.8 25.6 100 43 34.3 57.1 8.6 100 35 2.1 29.2 68.8 100 48 
1990-1994 36.0 37.1 27.0 100 89 53.4 39.7 6.9 100 58  42.3 57.7 100 97 
1995-1999 52.5 23.7 23.7 100 59 39.5 39.5 20.9 100 43  54.8 45.2 100 62 
2000-2004 83.3 11.1 5.6 100 18 50.0 18.8 31.3 100 16   77.8 22.2 100 18 
                
 
The first wave of land invasions in Montevideo occurred between about 1950 and the 
first years of democracy in the late 1980s. These land invasions were formed by accretion and 
settled in public land, especially city owned land, located in the Eastern periphery of the city. 
The second configuration is formed by a boom of planned invasions throughout the 1990s 
decade in the Western periphery of the city, although with time they diffused to the Eastern 
periphery. Although the first planned invasions were in public land, they increasingly started 
considering private land as well. Towards the end of the considered period, planned invasions 
tended to be on private plots. Utopian invasions are a particular subgroup of this configuration. 
The ones I identified dated all from the 1990s and they were located in El Cerro or in the nearby 
working class neighborhoods in the Western periphery of Montevideo. Residents agree that they 
are more organized because they are from El Cerro or the nearby area. As one of them told me, 
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―El Cerro is different. We are the Republic of El Cerro.‖ A municipal official agreed with this 
perception but was more specific:  
El Cerro is a place, like La Teja [nearby neighborhood] with a working class fighting tradition. They 
have been fighting since the beginning of the 20th century, so they have that tradition. (…) If you 
walk around El Cerro you will not find many metal sheet shacks, even though there are about 60 
squatter settlements there. That happens because people still have that fighting spirit. It is something 
that gets transmitted from generation to generation. And the person who squatted with some metal 
sheets and wood, you visit him two months later and he has started to build something with bricks. 
You go again, and he has started to make something bigger and already has a septic tank. I mean, 
there is an organizing tradition. And there is a tradition of improving your house.   
 
Finally, the last configuration that can be identified is an emergent one of very few land 
invasions that are either planned or land subdivisions and sales, overwhelmingly in private land 
and in the Eastern part of the city.   
 
4.4   CONCLUSION  
This chapter has emphasized that time – especially if divided by political periods - seems 
to be related not only to the number of land invasions but also to the types of land invasions in 
Montevideo. The peculiar context of the 1990s decade with great political competition and the 
Frente Amplio in the municipal government appears to be connected with the emergence of a 
wave of planned invasions. Geography has some explanatory power as well. Most of these 
planned invasions are located in the west part of the city, especially in the traditional working 
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class neighborhood of El Cerro and its surroundings. A tradition of working class organization 
and leftist militancy may have plaid part in this story. Diffusion processes or imitation may have 
as well, since the first planned invasion, Casabó, happened in this area.  
This heterogeneity defies most generalizations about squatting. In a very interesting 
comparative analysis of land squatting Nezar Alsayyad (1993) suggests that while in Latin 
America most common types of squatting are of the generated (i.e., planned and incited by some 
person or group) and mobilized type, in the Middle East gradual and spontaneous processes of 
squatting are more typical. Although probably true in general terms, there is great variation 
between cities in Latin America, and as I explore here, great variation even within the same city, 
depending on the location and timing, and, fundamentally, on the relationship of squatters and 
authorities. When squatting started in Montevideo, neighborhoods were more similar to what 
Alsayyad and other authors like Asef Bayat (1997; 2004) describe for the Middle East: a ―quiet 
encroachment of the ordinary‖ to use Bayat´s term. There were however counted exceptions. The 
exceptions depended on the availability of political networks.  
While accretion invasions did not established early relationships with the authorities, 
planned invasions are fundamentally built on those relationships. It is through them that squatters 
sometimes get the plots, that they always get the services and so on. Land subdivision and sales 
are different in that they are born in the informal land market. But they are very similar to 
planned invasions otherwise, both in spatial outline and in relation to authorities (see chapter 6 
for a description of one invasion that started as a hybrid between subdivision and sale and 
planned).   
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5.0  INTERACTIVE MODELS FOR AN INTERACTIVE THEORY: EVENT 
ANALYSIS OF LAND INVASIONS 
In the previous chapter, I have described the cycle of land invasions based on contextual 
historical evidence. Here, drawing on the literature on political opportunities, protest events and 
contentious politics more generally, I explore a more parsimonious explanation by examining the 
influence on that cycle of a few theoretically driven predictors. In so doing, I propose testing the 
effect of political opportunities in a new context and with an elusive form of contentious 
collective action about which we do not have the usual newspaper or historical archives that we 
have about other forms of mobilization.  
5.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AS A DETERMINANT OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: AN IMPORTED FRAMEWORK 
 That political context matters for the emergence, development, and impact of social movements 
is, as Meyer (2004) points out, at the core of the political opportunity perspective. More 
specifically, political opportunities are dimensions of the political system that suggest that 
effective action is possible and thereby encourage people to engage in contentious politics 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). The theory appeared initially to counter the 
idea that people rebel or mobilize because of their perceived hardships (Gurr 1974). Having 
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inspired a great deal of research (McAdam 1982; Skocpol 1987; Snyder, Tilly, and 1972; Tarrow 
1989), this perspective has also received criticisms. In this chapter I will address two of those 
criticisms: one related to its ―ad-hocness‖ and the other related to the scope of the theory in terms 
of context and types of mobilization it may explain. I will not address here, although I do it at 
several other points in this dissertation, a much more fundamental criticism to this approach, that 
of its structural bias or its neglect of human agency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999).  
 Many have criticized political opportunities explanations for explaining everything, and 
therefore running the risk of not explaining anything (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and 
Jasper 1999; Meyer 2004). What constitutes an opportunity is so loose and often so ad hoc that 
all features of a political structure can be an opportunity, and therefore one can always find some 
opportunity to account for a movement happening. Addressing this criticism, a group of scholars 
has made an effort to first specify beforehand what they meant by political opportunities and 
second take the study of protest events from descriptive time series of cycles of protest to 
multivariate analysis. In so doing, they have found specific political opportunities to be more or 
less relevant depending on the type of mobilization and the time and place in which it happened. 
(For examples see: Jenkins, Jacobs, and Angone (2003); Minkoff (1995; 1997); Soule and Van 
Dyke (1999). For reviews or states of the art of this work see Rucht and Neidhart (1999); Olzak 
(1989); Meyer and Minkoff (2004)).  
A less heard but very accurate criticism is that the majority of the work on the effects of 
political opportunities on mobilization takes place in what today are wealthy western 
democracies, basically in the US and Western Europe. This is slowly changing, but still the case 
(Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003), especially regarding multivariate studies of protest 
events. Although studies of social movements in Latin America proliferated in the 1980s, 
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stimulated by widespread mobilization throughout recently democratizing societies, the reigning 
paradigm of those studies focused on identities and autonomous capacities of the movements, not 
on their relationships with formal politics (Caldeira 1990; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Evers 
1985; Holston 1991; Oxhorn 1995; Touraine 1987). But more recently, the political opportunities 
framework has, however, become increasingly popular among scholars studying collective action 
in Latin America (Almeida 2003; Auyero 2000; Auyero 2007; Hipsher 1997; Hipsher 1998; 
Schneider 1995; Strawn 2005).
 51
   
Some of these latter studies have explicitly used the empirical cases of Latin America to 
expand the political opportunities ideas to authoritarian (Almeida 2003) or democratizing 
contexts (Hipsher 1997), generating new theoretical ideas and scope conditions for the political 
opportunities theory. Others have distanced themselves from the framework as it is because they 
found it inappropriate to explain reality in Latin America. According to authors such as Davis 
(1999) and Auyero (2007) the idea of having politics on one side and mobilization on the other 
does not accurately describe a region where politicians and activists intertwine.  Yet very few 
have conducted multivariate studies of events testing political opportunities vis-à-vis other 
theories of collective action. And, as I argue here, those that did it have not really considered the 
interactive nature of the political opportunities framework. As a consequence they have jumped 
too quickly to the conclusion of Latin American exceptionality. 
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 For insightful commentaries on this paradigmatic shift in the study of social moments in Latin America see Davis 
(1999) and Roberts (1997).  
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5.2 PREVIOUS MULTIVARIATE STUDIES OF PROTEST EVENTS IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
Walton and Ragin‘s (1990) work on austerity protests throughout Latin America and other third 
world countries in response to the 1980s debt crisis is one of the very few multivariate studies of 
protest in the region. Another one is Strawn‘s (2005) work on various types of protests during 
1999-2000 in 31 Mexican states.  These two works have many things in common. Besides being 
multivariate protest studies, they use newspapers as sources, as is common in the field (Earl, 
Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004). More substantively, they both find political opportunities to 
be irrelevant or at least less important than economic factors in explaining protest.  
 Walton and Ragin (1990), using a Tobit model, find that the most consistent predictor of 
austerity protest severity across countries is IMF pressure. From this finding and from a 
significant coefficient for overurbanization (a measure of how distant the level of urbanization of 
a country is from the one expected according to its GNP per capita) they conclude that World 
Systems or Dependency theories are the best predictors of protest. The most dependent countries 
are the ones who experienced the most severe austerity protests.  Their measure of political 
opportunities, a civil rights index, is insignificant in their models. 
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 Strawn (2005) uses pooled time series (he has longitudinal data on states) to regress 
protest (measured as monthly averages of daily events of different types of protests) on different 
predictors. Among these predictors he includes measures of political opportunities – e.g., 
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 Because of the moment in which they write, before the Political Opportunities framework became distinct from 
the Resource Mobilization approach, the authors talk about Resource Mobilization Theory, in opposition to the 
relative deprivation or hardships theory.  They include three predictors of this theory: the civil rights index, the 
percent employed in manufacturing and the past protest events. None of them turns out significant in their models. 
While in current studies the former would normally be classified as a political opportunity indicator, the second two 
would be classified as resources.  
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dummies for months before and after elections since election times are often considered 
moments of opportunities for mobilization - and measures of economic hardship – e.g., consumer 
price index, open unemployment, wages, and direct foreign investment. He is particularly 
interested in the latter because, he thinks, ―structural adjustment states‖ such as Mexico pose a 
challenge to political opportunities theory. There, Strawn argues, economic conditions are so 
harsh that people tend to protest because of them, regardless of the opening or closing of the 
political opportunity structure. His models‘ results support this idea. His political opportunities 
measures turn out to be non significant whereas his economic hardship measures turn out to be 
statistically significant predictors of the number of protest events in a certain month and state.  
 These studies leave us with the idea that Latin America – or the third world - is different, 
that mobilization there is perhaps more driven by grievances than in wealthier western 
democracies. This might be true, but I believe it is too early to rush into that conclusion. 
Furthermore, I believe the opposition of grievances or hardships versus opportunities is a flawed 
one. Grievances and opportunities tend to interact with each other to make people mobilize. In a 
nutshell, grievances are a necessary but not sufficient condition for protest to happen. This type 
of theoretical argument has a natural multivariate analysis companion: interaction effects. Yet 
the use of interaction effects is not common in multivariate studies of protest events. I wonder if 
the conclusions of both Walton and Ragin and Strawn would have changed somewhat had they 
included political and economic factors as interactive terms rather than only as additive effects. 
Perhaps, for example, Walton and Ragin would have still found that austerity protests were more 
severe in those countries where overurbanization and the IMF pressure were higher but that the 
impact of those factors was much higher among those countries with more freedom (e.g., where 
the index of civil liberties was higher).  
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Interaction effects are appealing because they capture in a model something that is 
conceptually very intuitive, common, and relevant in social sciences in general and in the study 
of protest in particular: conditional effects. Conditional effects occur when one predictor has an 
effect on the dependent variable only under certain conditions. In other words, the effect occurs 
only in certain categories or values of a second independent variable. Thus, interaction effects 
allow us to contextualize equations, without having to specify two different equations for two 
different contexts.  We model that context through the use of a second, interactive variable that 
funnels, moderates or otherwise shapes the effect of the main independent variable of interest on 
the outcome we are looking at (Kam and Franzese Jr 2007). 
Without interaction terms, we assume that the same specification of the estimated 
equation is valid for all the data points in the sample (and the population from which the sample 
is drawn).  Without interaction terms, we assume that the effects of the independent variable or 
variables over the dependent variable are additive, this is that they are the same regardless of the 
level of other variables. Assumptions that simplify reality are desirable for parsimony. The 
problem is when we oversimplify to the point of distorting reality. Given the complexity of many 
social phenomena, it often makes sense to admit the possibility of nonadditivity or interaction 
(Friedrich 1982). 
In this chapter I will test this interactive argument for political opportunities and 
grievances, with the occurrence of land invasions in Montevideo Uruguay. As explained in 
previous chapters, land squatting is a survival strategy of many urban poor of the third world that 
involves various degrees of planning, neighborhood organization and relation to the state. For 
many urban poor is the closest they get to state policies, party politics, and 
organization/mobilization. (At least in Latin America, although this might not be true for other 
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parts of the world as explained by Alsayyad (1993),  Alsayyad and Roy (2003) and Bayat (1997; 
2004)).  Many studies have explored the relationship of squatters and formal and informal 
politics (Burgwal 1995; Castells 1983; Collier 1976; Dietz 1998; Dosh forthcoming, 2009.; 
Eckstein 2001; Gay 1994; Handelman 1975; Hipsher 1998; Özler 2003a; Özler 2003b; Portes and 
Walton 1976; Schneider 1995; Stokes 1991). Yet there is no previous study of squatting as 
protest events. Most studies are case studies, narrative histories of mobilization, or comparative 
studies of different types of informal and formal political participation. The clearest antecedent 
of the analysis presented here is Collier‘s (Collier 1976)(1976) study of settlement formation in 
Lima. There, Collier analyzes variation in settlements‘ foundation in different political contexts. 
He provides great historical explanations, with details on squatter policy. He does not, however, 
model his data statistically. 
 The statistical analysis of the role of political opportunities poses several challenges. As 
explained in the methods chapter, land invasions are elusive forms of contention, among other 
things, because they do not leave traces in the usual sources used for this type of research: 
archives or newspapers. Still, the fact that some historical sociologists have been able to 
imaginatively assemble event catalogs about ancient times and use them in multivariate analysis 
made the endeavor seem feasible.  Markoff‘s (1985; 1986; 1996; 1997) analysis of French 
peasant protests around 1789 was, in this sense, incredibly inspiring.  Data collection for my 
project was long and required the use of many sources. It resembled more the type of data 
collection of a historian or even a detective than that of a sociologist. Yet the challenge was 
worth taking, and I think it is worth taking for other elusive forms of contention as well.  
In their Dynamics of Contention, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), express their 
dissatisfaction with the compartmentalization of studies of mobilization. For them, strikes, wars, 
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revolutions, social movements and other forms of political struggle or, as they put it, contentious 
politics share causal mechanisms and processes. To find those patterns, they argue, it is 
necessary to break large complex series of events such as revolutions or social movements into 
smaller episodes and then identify recurrent mechanisms and processes within them. Following 
this guidance, I will focus here on the moment of settlement formation as a contentious event.  
5.3 STUDYING EVENTS OF LAND SQUATTING IN MONTEVIDEO 
Chapter four has already described the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo since its beginnings 
in the 1940s until the early 2000s. Chapter three has explained the data collection process that 
enabled the study of that cycle. I will not repeat this here, but go directly into trying to explain 
that cycle. Because, as Figures 3 and 4 in chapter four showed, land squatting peaked around 
1990, which was the year that the leftist party (Frente Amplio) assumed the government of the 
city for the first time in history, we could leave with the impression that squatting was caused by 
something related to the left in the city government. Perhaps that fact raised the expectations and 
hope of the urban poor. Perhaps politicians, from the winning party or from the opposition, 
actively promoted squatting.  We could alternatively think that some underlying cause led to 
both the left‘s triumph and the increase in land squatting. There is also the possibility that the 
two events coincide in time but are completely unrelated. Yet the analysis proposed here is 
somewhat more ambitious since it does not aim at understanding a peak retroactively but at 
comprehending variation in the count of land invasions per year throughout the period.  
The main hypothesis behind the study is that moments of political opportunities mediated 
and intensified the effect of hardship on the likelihood of new land invasions.   
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5.3.1 Definition of contentious event  
Social movements and other forms of collective action are composed of different kinds of events. 
The study of just some of those events of mobilization is therefore a gross simplification. Still, it 
enables sophisticated and parsimonious explanatory analysis. There is no single definition of 
what a contentious or a protest event is. Sampson et al. (2005), for example, consider ―collective 
action events,‖ two or more individuals engaging in some sort of non-profit, political, public act 
that is not part of routine political activity (initiated by the state or political parties) or part of 
regularly scheduled gatherings such as meetings of self-help groups. For Koopmans and Statham 
(1999) any instance of claim making of migrants and ethnic minorities appearing in daily 
newspapers of Germany or Britain was considered an event. Here, I consider an event to be the 
invasion of a plot of land by a group of people with the purpose of building their houses there. It 
is a contentious moment because it involves going against one of the most sacred principles of 
capitalist societies: property rights.    
5.3.2 Data  
To review, Montevideo has currently about 400 squatter settlements, defined as residential 
communities of 10 or more houses located in a plot of (public or private) land residents do not 
own (INE 2006). In general, squatter settlements tend to be inhabited by poor residents who self 
built their houses. Land invasions do not leave traces in newspapers or any other systematic 
archival material. As explained in length in chapter three, I had to use various sources – oral 
histories, interviews, and various documents - to find out the dates (year) of land invasions. I was 
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able to assemble a data set of 257 out of a total of 427 land occupations53 covering 58 years, from 
1947 to 2004. Figures 3, 4, 5 and 9 in chapter four has already presented the cycle of land invasions 
based on these data.  
This information was used to build my dependent variable, number of land invasions per 
year. The data set was completed with a series of variables that I thought would be good 
predictors, based on the interactive theory of hardships and political opportunities already 
explained, and some controls.  
As an indicator of hardship I have used average yearly real wages of workers.  Thanks to 
the work of economic historians, a  time series of real wages, or wages adjusted for inflation to 
make them comparable across time, is available for Uruguay from 1870 until 2002 (Historia 
Económica 2008). Historically, real wages are a better measure of quality of life, especially for 
the lower classes, than the more artifactual GDP per capita (Aghion and Williamson 1999). 
Other series of relevant indicators of hardship such as poverty rates, number of evictions or 
housing prices are only available since the late 1980s and this is why they are not appropriate for 
longer term historic analysis. However, real wages correlates strongly with other possible 
measures of grievances such as yearly number of renters‘ evictions (r = -.87).  
Figure 13 shows the bivariate relationship between real wages and the number of yearly 
land occupations.  
                                                 
53
 The total is more than the figured of 412 used in official sources (INE 2006). There are 412 that currently exist but 
I included also a few ―dead events‖, meaning settlements that changed into cooperative housing or that were 
relocated by the government to a different place.  
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Figure 13: Scatterplot of real wages and number of land invasions by year, Montevideo 1947-2002
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The widespread of number of land invasions at low values of real wages and the low 
occurrence of invasions at higher values of real wages suggest that real wages might be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of land invasions, which usually 
suggests an interactive relationship between one or more pair of variables. The scatterplot also 
shows an outlier year, with low average real wages and the highest yearly number of land 
invasions (40). That point corresponds to 1990, and it is the year that figure 4 (chapter four) 
showed as a peak. As stated before, my interest here is to explain variation throughout the 
period, and not only understand the peak. Yet it is important to control for this in order to avoid 
having one data point influencing the results inordinately. It is also important to run the models 
without that data point to check if results hold without the outlier.  
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 Real wages are measured in an index with base 100 (which corresponds to the year 1913).   
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Rather than including a dummy variable to account for a single outlier, which would be 
an a-theoretical ad hoc solution, since land invasions increased after 1989, I preferred to include 
a dummy variable to account for the whole period after 1989, coded 1 if the year was 1990 or 
afterwards and 0 otherwise. Therefore, if there is something special about that period we should 
see a positive effect of the 1990-and-beyond dummy on the number of land invasions, controlling 
for the other factors.   
 This dummy variable has a more substantive meaning, however. 1989 is the year that the 
leftist party Frente Amplio won the Montevideo municipal elections for the first time in history.  
It has been in office since then, winning all the consecutive elections. Many argue that the city 
administration was a launching pad for winning national elections in 2004 (Lanzaro 2004; Luna 
2007). In previous chapters I suggest that the Frente Amplio’s city government had a more 
invisible and unexpected effect by provoking an increase in land invasions at the very beginning 
of the period.  This rise in squatting seems to have been activated by several mechanisms. These 
mechanisms included hope on the part of squatters that a leftist government would be benevolent 
towards the homeless poor, the promotion of land invasions by a minority of radical leftist 
politicians and local leaders guided by the idea of land redistribution, and a divided government 
with a traditional party in national office and the leftist party in the city‘s office. I have also 
hypothesized that the drop in land invasions after 1996-97 might be related to the increasing 
responsibility taken by the leftist city administration and the citizens for the vacant land of the 
city. Yet, in order not to over-fit the data based on ad hoc hypotheses I have just included one 
predictor, the 1990-and-beyond dummy to account for the period that the Frente Amplio is in the 
city government from 1990 until 2004, the year in which the study period ends. In practice, the 
analysis actually finishes in 2002 because the historical real wages series finishes then.   
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This dummy accounts for a contingent political opportunity. Yet my goal was to account 
also for more systematic ones. As indicators of political opportunities I have therefore used two 
dummy variables: electoral year and post electoral year, both coded one if that year was 
electoral or post-electoral respectively and 0 otherwise. The use of election times as a political 
opportunities indicator is pretty conventional. Other studies have suggested a relationship 
between electoral competition and squatters‘ mobilization (Özler 2003b; Schneider 1995). The 
first dummy, electoral year is supposed to capture the campaign effect.  Since elections are held 
in November in Uruguay, parties and individual politicians have that entire year to campaign, 
and therefore this dummy captures what happens before elections. The second dummy, post 
electoral year, captures a different type of political opening or opportunity: the one that happens 
once the winner party is in power (e.g., incoming government paying favors, perhaps the 
perception of more tolerance or more overlooking by the authorities due to the confusion and 
adjustment of the first months in power, or some other mechanisms). I expect one or both of 
these dummies to be positively related to the number of land invasions. 
It becomes important to note here that the election year variable introduces some noise 
into the analysis given because it includes December data, and therefore, it might include some 
post-election cases. This is one of the disadvantages of having the year as the unit of analysis 
rather than more detailed information on timing. Yet, I could not reconstruct invasions‘ exact 
date of settlement.  
I have also included a one year lagged number of invasions in the models for two 
connected reasons. On the one hand, this is a customary practice in time series analysis because 
data points are not independent as regression models assume: what happened the year before 
probably influences what happens on a certain year. If, at an extreme, the dependent variable 
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were entirely predicted from last year‘s values, one would have no evidence that the exogenous 
variables were causing anything to happen the current year. The other reason is more theoretical. 
This lag captures a diffusion process. Once a group of people invade land, they open the 
possibility for others to do it as well. Thus, I expect this lag to the positively related to the 
number of land invasions.   
Finally, to test the type of interactive or conditional effect of grievances and political 
opportunities suggested before, I have included two interactive terms in the model. They are 
interactions (multiplications) of real wages with the electoral year dummy and with the post 
electoral year dummy. The signs and significance of the coefficients of these interactive effects 
do not mean much in themselves (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005; Braumoeler 2004). As 
explained below, their interpretation requires a more nuanced analysis.
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5.3.3 Methods 
I estimated the yearly number of land invasions using Poisson regression, which is appropriate 
for use with count data, where the use of the linear regression model usually results in inefficient, 
inconsistent and biased estimates (Barron 1992; King 1988; Long and Freese 2006; Minkoff 
1995; Minkoff 1997).
56
   Since the unit of analysis is the year, there are 55 observations (1947-
2002). I ran all the models using STATA.   
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 In general, predictors are not correlated among each other. The only problematic correlation is that of the lagged 
dependent variable and the 1990 and beyond dummy (r=.72). Yet, when I run the models without the lagged 
variable, the effect of the 1990 and beyond dummy remains, which indicates that multicolinearity is not taking away 
the effect of any variable vis-à- vis another one.    
56
 The choice of Poisson over negative binomial comes after running negative binomial models, and comparing 
them. The negative binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson model that corrects for overdispersion. When 
data is overdispersed, the Poisson model gives spuriously small standard errors. In none of the cases was the 
additional ―alpha‖ parameter (the one that accounts for overdispersion) in the negative binomial models significant.  
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After estimating the models, I predicted the count of yearly land invasions using the 
predictnl command in STATA which is used for postestimation of nonlinear predictions. The 
estimation of parameters in non linear regression models such as Poisson can be used to predict 
and plot probabilities. Probabilities of the dependent variable are more intuitively meaningful to 
interpret than the coefficients, especially when we have interactive terms.  
5.3.4 Results 
Table 3 shows the Poisson regression results, both for the simpler model and for the model with 
interaction terms.  In both models, most variables are significant and with their signs in the 
expected direction. However, with the presence of interaction effects, we cannot interpret 
coefficients as if we were in the simpler linear additive regression world. (Remember that in 
models with interaction effects the main effects‘ coefficients represent the effect of one the 
variables when the other is zero. In this case, for example, the coefficient of electoral year 
represents the effect of an electoral year when real wages equals zero, which is an inexistent 
situation.) The exception is the lag variable which surprisingly turns out not significant. 
Apparently, the number of invasions at t-1 does not affect the number of invasions the following 
year. Yet, this does not rule out all possibilities of diffusion. There is no evidence of diffusion of 
squatting experiences year to year, but perhaps our yearly measures do not account for shorter 
term diffusion processes occurring say, month to month.  The coefficient for the 1990-and-
beyond dummy is significant and positive which means that after controlling for hardships and 
other political opportunities, invasions were more likely to happen after 1989, that is, after the 
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Frente Amplio won the city government. It is important to note that the outlier of 1990 with 40 
land invasions is not drawing the data to this result. I have run the analysis without that year and 
results hold.  
Both models give significant results for theoretically relevant predictors. Both political 
opportunities (election year and the year after) and hardship (low salaries) have increased the 
number of land invasions per year during the period from 1947 until 2002. There are several 
criteria for choosing one model over the other. Parsimony is one common criterion. Predicting 
power is another one. Combining these two, the option would be the simpler model because it is 
more parsimonious without losing goodness of fit (log ratios are not very different between the 
two models).  Yet in this case, I choose to analyze the interactive model because it is the one that 
derives from my theoretical model. Both grievances and opportunities are needed for 
mobilization and mobilization depends on their interaction. Following this logic, the model 
without interaction terms is underspecified. 
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 An autocorrelogram (using the acplot routine in STATA) does not show serious autocorrelation problems in the 
time series model. In any case, as explained in the text, I include the lagged dependent variable as a control.   
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Table 3:  Poisson Regression Estimates of the Influence of selected predictors on the Number of Land 
Occupations per year, Montevideo 1947-2002 
N invasions total 
   Real wages -0.022*** -0.011** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Election year dummy 0.508** 1.970** 
 
(0.174) (0.728) 
Year after election year dummy 0.546*** 2.976*** 
 
(0.150) (0.677) 
Real Wages*Election Year 
 
-0.013* 
  
(0.006) 
Real Wages*Year after election year 
 
-0.022*** 
  
(0.006) 
1990 and beyond dummy 1.488*** 1.409*** 
 
(0.176) (0.178) 
Lag (N total invasions t-1) 0.003 0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
Constant 3.298*** 2.056*** 
 
(0.321) (0.492) 
   N 55 55 
LR Chi2 281.000 294.78 
P > Chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.546 0.573 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
As stated before, the interpretation of our theoretically more relevant predictors, given the 
fact that we have included interaction terms, is not intuitive. The coefficient for, say real wages 
does not represent the average effect of yearly real wages on the number of land invasions. It 
only indicates the effect of real wages when both the post electoral dummy and the electoral 
dummy are 0 that is to say in between election years. As Kam and Franzese (2007) remind us, 
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each variable involved in the interaction terms of interactive models has multiple effects, 
depending on the values of the other interactive variables, not a single, constant effect. 
Figure 14 offers a more intuitive understanding of the effect of real wages on the number 
of land invasions. It shows the predicted count of land invasions for different types of years 
(electoral, post-electoral and other) for the different levels of real wages. The first thing that is 
clear from the figure is that there are more land invasions when real wages are low and that there 
are almost none when real wages are high. Clearly hardship does have an effect on the 
probability of land invasions happening. Yet that effect is conditional on the year. Post electoral 
years tend to have a greater number of land invasions, followed by electoral years. Years in 
between elections, however, even if average salaries for people are low, do not see many land 
invasions.
58
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  To predict the number of land invasions for different types of years I used the predictnl command in STATA, 
with three different equations. I let real wages vary freely and held all other variables constant using a central 
measure (median for dummy90andbeyond and median also for the lag dependent variable). Given the Poisson 
equation 
 μi = exp (xiβ), I used the following equation to predict the count of land invasions in electoral years:  
 
predictnl p_invtot_electoralyears =  
                          exp(β0 [cons] +  
                           β1 [real wages]* real wages +  
                           β2 [electoral year]*1 + 
                           β3 [post electoral year] * 0 + 
                           β4 [interaction realwages_electoral year] * real wages * 1 + 
                           β5 [interection real wages_postelectoral year]* real wages * 0 + 
                           β6 [dummy90andbeyond]* median value of dummy90andbeyond + 
                           β7 [lagged n invasions]* median value of lagged n invasions') 
 
In this equation, the value for the dummy electoral year is set to 1(both in the main effect (β2) and in the interaction 
term (β4)), whereas the value for the dummy postelectoral year is set to 0.  The equations for postelectoral years and 
for other years, were similar but with the values changed in the dummies and the interaction terms.  
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Figure 14: Predicted total number of land occupations per year by real wages 
Figure 15 illustrates the magnitude of the differential effects of real wages on the number 
of land invasions, depending on the type of year, with the corresponding confidence intervals. 
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  As stated before, the effect of real wages on the number of land invasions is not just the coefficient for real wages 
(β1). To calculate that effect we need to take the first derivative of y (number of land invasions) with respect to x 
(real wages), as suggested by Kam and Franzese Jr (2007) and Friedrich (1982) . When we have two-way 
interactions as it is the case here (real wages interacts with the two type of year dummies), and the outcome is 
categorical or count data, the marginal effect of xi on y (p in the equation) is:  
 
 
 
 In the Poisson model, this translates into:  
 
exp (xiβ) * βi + βij xj+ βik xk 
 
Thus, to calculate the effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions I used the following equation, 
using the predictnl command in STATA:   
 
predictnl derivate of n land invasions for low real wages =  
exp(β0 [cons] +  
β1 [real wages]* low real wages + 
β2 [electoral year]* electoral year + 
β3 [post electoral year] * postelectoral year + 
β4 [interaction realwages_electoral year] * low real wages* electoral year + 
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The effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions is a negative one. When real 
salaries are low the number of land invasions increases. But that effect depends on the type of 
year. The greatest effect occurs in post-electoral years, followed by electoral years. In other 
years, that is years in between elections, the negative effect is still negative but almost 
insignificant. The upper limit of the 95 % confidence interval is almost 0.  
 
Figure 15:  Marginal effect of low real wages on total number of occupations per year by year type 
 
These results, supporting the hypothesis of a conditional effect of real wages on the 
number of land invasions per year, refer to the whole population of land invasions. As stated 
                                                                                                                                                             
               β5 [interection real wages_postelectoral year]* low real wages * postelectoral year + 
               β6 [dummy90andbeyond]* median value of dummy90andbeyond + 
               β7 [lagged n invasions]* median value of lagged n invasions) 
   * 
(β1 [real wages] + 
β4 [interaction realwages_electoral year] * electoral year + 
               β5 [interection real wages_postelectoral year]* postelectoral year) 
 
I also calculated confidence intervals for the effect. Since the ultimate goal was to show this graphically and there is 
one marginal effect for each value of real wages, I had to hold that variable fixed at a certain value. Because 
substantively I was interested in hardships, I held real wages constant at a low value (its mean minus 1 standard 
deviation). I let the types of years dummies vary, and held the dummy90andbeyond and the lag n of invasions 
constant at their medians. 
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before, however, land invasions are far from homogeneous in Montevideo. While some are 
planned before the invasion, some start by accretion and yet others start because somebody 
subdivides the land and starts selling it to people often fraudulently (see chapter 2). In the 
following section I explore the possibility that these three types of settlement formation are 
different kinds of collective actions, triggered by different factors.  
5.3.5 Comparative results 
Table 3 shows the results of running the same interactive model as in Table 2, but this time also 
for the three different types of land invasions separately.  
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Table 4: Poisson Regression Estimates of the Influence of selected predictors on the Number of Land 
Occupations per year for three types of occupasions, Montevideo 1947-2002 
 
  Total Organized Accretion 
Land 
subdivision and 
Sale 
     Real wages -0.011** 0.003 -0.011* 0.007 
 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.031) 
Election year dummy 1.970** 6.329** 0.719 9.326 
 
(0.728) (2.191) (1.104) (5.699) 
Year after election year dummy 2.976*** 5.178** 3.472** 3.446 
 
(0.677) (1.790) (1.043) (3.990) 
Real Wages*Election Year -0.013* -0.046* -0.003 -0.074 
 
(0.006) (0.018) (0.009) (0.047) 
Real Wages*Year after election year -0.022*** -0.039* -0.027** -0.020 
 
(0.006) (0.016) (0.010) (0.033) 
1990 and beyond dummy 1.409*** 2.346*** 0.800* 3.875** 
 
(0.178) ( 0.458  ) (0.315) (1.167) 
Lag (N total invasions t-1) 0.007 0.029 -0.001 -0.018 
 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.047) 
Constant 2.056*** -2.221 1.451* -4.667 
 
(0.492) ( 1.637) (0.700) (4.273) 
     N 55 55 55 55 
LR Chi2 294.78 132.03 67.75 45.21 
P > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.573 0.6023 0.309 0.482 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
The 1990 and beyond dummy and the lagged number of land invasions behave similarly 
across the four models. For all types of land invasions, their expected count was greater after 
1989. Yet looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, and comparing the models for each type 
with the model for the total, we can see some interesting difference. The entrepreneur invasions 
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seem to be the ones more likely to occur after 1989, followed by the organized invasions. In turn, 
none of the three types seems to be triggered by temporal diffusion processes since the lagged 
number of invasions is not significant for any of the models. Again, it becomes important to note 
that this only rules out diffusion year to year, but not week to week or month to month.  
To interpret the conditional effect of real wages on the expected count of land invasions 
per year for each of the three types of invasions, I have calculated predicted counts and marginal 
effects for the three models (following the same logic explained in footnotes 53 and 54). Figures 
16 to 21 show these calculations graphically.  
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Figure 16:  Predicted Number of ACCRETION occupations per year by real wages and year type 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of ACCRETION occupations by year type 
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Figure 18: Predicted Number of PLANNED occupations per year by real wages and year type 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of PLANNED occupations by year type 
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Figure 20: Predicted Number of LAND SUBDIVIDSION AND SALE occupations per year by real 
wages and year type 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Marginal effect of low real wages on number of LAND SUBDIVISION AND SALE 
occupations by year type 
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The comparative analysis of the models for the three different types of land invasions 
shows variation that remained hidden in the overall analysis. Accretion invasions are the closest 
to the general pattern (e.g., it makes sense because accretion invasions are the majority, so they 
influence the overall results). The expected number of invasions is greater as the yearly real 
wages go down (Figure 16). Yet the effect of real wages is much greater in post electoral years. 
In fact, if we look at Figure 17, we see that low real wages are only significant for post electoral 
years. This is quite different from planned invasions, which are more likely to occur also when 
the salaries are low but when elections are coming, that is, in election years (Figures 18 and 19). 
Post electoral years also positively affect the expected count of planned land invasions but to a 
lesser extent (e.g., the effect of low real wages in post electoral years is close to being 
insignificant).    
Although entrepreneur invasions seem to behave similarly to planned invasions in the 
estimated counts (Figure 20), when we look at the marginal effect of low real wages on the 
expected count of land invasions (Figure 21) we see that it is not significant for any of the year 
types. Thus, entrepreneur invasions seem to be yet a different type, unrelated to grievances and 
political opportunities, at least as measured here.  
5.3.6 Discussion 
As expected, as real wages diminished, land invasions grew. Land invasions are generally a 
strategy of the urban poor which are the ones mostly affected by overall indicators of hardship 
such as low real wages. Still, this is just part of the story. It does not take only hardship to squat. 
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The effect of low real wages is enhanced if an election happened the year before. Electoral years 
also increase the effect of real wages on the number of land invasions.  
As it seems, land invasions cannot be explained only by looking at attributes of 
individuals or families. Another level or mechanism is needed. Based on my broader fieldwork I 
hypothesize that isolated individuals or families may feel ready to squat when their salaries are 
low or other hardships high but often brokers, leaders or entrepreneurs, are needed for those 
families to take action. This is especially true for planned invasions, which takes us to another 
discussion point.  
More interestingly, the interactive effect of grievances and politics varies for different 
types of land invasions. This is especially clear for accretion and planned invasions. Accretion 
invasions tend to happen in post electoral years while planned invasions tend to happen in 
election years. This finding can be understood in the broader context of the fieldwork I 
conducted in the city of Montevideo, visiting squatter settlements across the city and 
interviewing more than 80 residents (leaders and non leaders), politicians, state employees, and 
other key informants.  
To give just one sharp indicator, while interviews with residents of accretion invasions 
lasted less than half an hour, interviews with residents of organized invasions never lasted less 
than two hours, and they could take several visits. In accretion invasions there is not much of a 
collective story to tell, which was what the interview schedule was about. Of course, there are 
lots of stories, and lots of examples of solidarity among neighbors. But when asked about how 
they got to the occupied land, and what they did when they first arrived and had to build their 
houses and face the lack of any services, there are mostly individual stories, not stories of 
neighborhood organizations. With residents of planned invasions, after listening to epic stories 
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about the old days (e.g., organizing beforehand, finding a safe plot to squat, resisting the police, 
building houses together, sharing a soup kitchen, discussing everything in assemblies with direct 
democracy and so on) I was the one who sometimes had to cut the interview short because 
information was getting redundant after the third hour or so and I had to run to the other extreme 
of the city to my next interview. Planned invasions, especially at the beginning, were more 
proactive. Interestingly, they frame their squatting in terms of rights. They demand a place in the 
city. This might be the reason explaining why they tended to squat in electoral years, during the 
campaign, just like more organized social movements and pressure groups.  
The reasons why accretion invasions tended to happen in post-election years can be 
several. Using the framework of all my data, I hypothesize two mechanisms as important. On the 
one hand, politicians and new state officials, once in the government, might have repaid their 
constitutents‘ votes by letting them squat. In addition, most politicians and state officials 
squatters are connected to are those in office, the ones that have resources to give away. On the 
other hand, individual families or small groups might have decided to invade a plot after 
elections under the safety of the confusion of an authority change.  
Finally, entrepreneurial invasions are a new type and they do not seem to be related to 
hardship or elections as political opportunities. Since they start with subdivisions and the sale of 
plots by the owner or by a fraudulent broker, they might follow more of a market logic that is not 
captured in the models presented here. Yet also from my interviews and ethnographic 
observations, I can say they are very much connected to politics. Elections might not determine 
when they start, but to get what they need (e.g., streets, information, tolerance, water, and so on), 
owners or fraudulent brokers need to be in contact with state officials and politicians.  It is a 
 170 
puzzle that they have been more likely since 1990 given that the Frente Amplio in government 
has been harsh with this type of often fraudulent sales.   
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Drawing from this case but going beyond it, this study contributes to the literature on contentious 
politics in at least three ways. First, it suggests an interactive relationship between political 
opportunities and hardships or grievances, rather than an additive or competitive one. The idea is 
that political opportunities constrain and enhance/moderate hardships but do not tend to be the 
sole cause of mobilization outcomes.  
Because they wanted to quarrel with the engrained idea that relative deprivation was the 
cause of (irrational) mobilization, exponents of resource mobilization first and political 
opportunities later downplayed the role of hardships or grievances completely. In a beautifully 
provocative statement in 1974, Tilly wrote:  
Grievances are fundamental to rebellion as oxygen is fundamental to combustion. But just as 
fluctuations in the oxygen content of the air account for little of the distribution of fire in the 
workaday world, fluctuations in grievances are not a major cause of the presence or absence of 
rebellion. For that, the political means of acting on grievances which people have at their disposal 
matter a good deal more (Tilly 1974). 
 
 The argument was that hardships and grievances, more or less constant, could not be the 
cause of episodic mobilization. Just as they led the pendulum too much into the rationality 
direction, overlooking the role of emotions in mobilization (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001), 
they led it to the political opportunities direction as well, perhaps going too far from hardships 
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and grievances. The idea of specific political factors such as electoral times interacting, 
channeling, magnifying or ameliorating the effect of grievances or hardships is perhaps closer to 
reality for many cases.  
Second, these findings suggest that political opportunities do matter for Latin American 
mobilization, in particular for poor people‘s mobilization in the region, as well as they matter for 
wealthier contexts. Even for the most aggrieved, politics do matter in their participation in 
collective action.  Findings do not support claims of regional exceptionality, in terms of greater 
relevance of hardship there. Yet proving such broad statements would require much more 
research on contentious events in the region and in other places. Among other things, indicators 
of hardship and opportunity should be the same if the goal is really replication, something I did 
not do here (my measures of hardship and opportunity are not the same as in the studies I started 
the discussion with). We are still very short of being able to generalize about broader theories of 
mobilization on the basis of empirical findings about specific movements in certain times and 
places, using narrow and very heterogeneous indicators of political opportunities. We need more 
research that uses similar methodologies and similar variables across a wide range of contentious 
events to be able to make such generalizations.  
Finally, these findings show that an elusive form of collective action, especially the less 
planned invasions, that many would not even call contentious and most not a social movement 
can be modeled in similar ways as more structured forms of mobilization. Through intensive data 
collection it is possible to get at event data even without the availability of convenient sources 
such as newspapers. Oral histories and institutional histories can also be used to reconstruct 
mobilization events. Of course these reconstructions will be imperfect, and certainly mine has 
imperfections, missing data and perhaps some mistakes in the dates. But even so, some effects 
 172 
are clear. And of course studying just the beginning of land occupations is not everything. But 
history does matter. And the type of land settlement, and the moment of land settlement do have 
a long lasting effect on the landscape of neighborhoods in the trajectories of mobilization and on 
the wellbeing of the people that live in those neighborhoods.  
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6.0  MARKET CLIENTELISM: “IF YOU DON’T FLIRT, YOU DON’T GET 
ANYTHING.” 
Hanging from the white walls, surrounding the table where I interviewed Manuel Gómez, there were 
all sorts of trophies he proudly showed me one by one. Just as we tend to have in our living rooms the 
pictures of people we love, places we like, and maybe some ornaments or paintings that denote a 
taste, a life style and that constitute part of how we present ourselves to the visitor, this squatter 
neighborhood leader owned a very peculiar gallery. Manuel had his walls decorated with a picture of 
him hugging Tabaré Vazquez, former Montevideo mayor and later Uruguayan president for the leftist 
coalition Frente Amplio; a big paper clip with many articles about the neighborhood including words 
and a picture of Mario Carminatti, once candidate for City Mayor from the traditional center-right 
Colorado Party; another picture of Manuel, this time with Jorge Zabalza, a former city councilor, who 
lives in a squatter settlement, politically located to the left of the left, once a member of the 
Tupamaros guerrilla movement, and who has helped and promoted the creation of many settlements 
in the city. Perhaps the most surprising of all, was a letter in a golden frame that Manuel took down 
with the help of a chair to show me. Signed by the then president Julio María Sanguinetti, from the 
Colorado Party, it congratulated Manuel for the ―thriving human group that moves this neighborhood 
ahead.‖ Besides the celebrity of the sender, I was puzzled by the paradox of Manuel being 
congratulated for building a neighborhood considered irregular in a rural area where the Montevideo 
Municipal Government forbids construction.
60
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 Neighborhoods and people‘s names are fictitious to comply with confidentiality. Only public figures‘ names are 
real.      
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Beyond the meaning of each particular letter, article or picture described in these 
fieldnotes, the most curious thing was the combination of them in the same place. It was not 
mere chance. Just as Manuel saved each of these objects, I saved this vignette from my fieldwork 
because I remember it as one of those moments in ethnographic fieldwork when suddenly 
everything makes sense, micro windows through which you can see the broader picture, seconds 
that reveal what months of research had hidden not because they are anecdotal but because they 
synthesize what you have already seen but in a confused or fragmented manner.  
This living-room materializes what I call market clientelism, which has been the most 
successful strategy of brokerage used by Montevideo squatters‘ leaders to get the goods they 
need from the state –the squatters‘ main interlocutor. In this chapter, I use the story of Manuel 
and his neighborhood to walk the reader through my fieldwork and then fly with him or her to 
the concept of market clientelism. I finish referring to some important points in the literature on 
clientelism and mobilization that I believe this case speaks to.  
6.1 METHODS 
As mentioned elsewhere, the goals of this dissertation are twofold. First, I want to identify when 
and the conditions under which squatter settlements have been more likely to emerge in 
Montevideo. And second, I want to understand how squatters have interacted with those 
conditions, especially with politics, to produce (different types of) squatter settlements. This 
chapter aims at contributing (primarily) to the second of these goals.  
 As part of a broader city and time wide ethnographic fieldwork I describe in the methods 
section of the dissertation I conducted a ―mini-ethnography‖ of the squatter settlement New 
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Rock. Through zooming in on the story of this particular neighborhood I learned in depth about 
one particular way in which squatters have interacted with politics (and through them with the 
state): market clientelism. 
 Fieldwork included a multiplicity of data. Because my approach to contention aimed at 
being ―relational‖ or ―interactive‖ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2008) exploring the 
squatters‘ points of view was not enough. I also needed to explore other viewpoints such as those 
of politicians and state bureaucrats. Because my approach was historical, the people I needed to 
interview were not necessarily currently in office but were people who could tell me about the 
moment in which New Rock settled and asked for services.   
To get started, I walked through the neighborhood, took pictures, and conducted oral 
histories with two of the founders and leaders of the neighborhood as well as with ordinary early 
residents. I had previously identified one of the leaders, Manuel, through other interviews.  His 
name turned up in some of the interviews with politicians and officials. So did the neighborhood 
he founded, which some people mentioned as a fraudulent sale and some as an example of 
planning and organization. So I decided to look for him.  
To find Manuel I randomly called people in the phone book with his name and asked if 
they lived in New Rock until I eventually found him and arranged an interview. The day of the 
interview another founder, Miriam, was also there so I had the chance to ask both of them about 
the story of the neighborhood. It was Manuel who introduced me to a family of early residents I 
also interviewed on that long afternoon.  
   Those oral histories were guides for me to find new interviewees and crosscheck the 
stories or see the same information from another point of view. Thus, I interviewed former city 
councilors from different political parties, social workers and local authorities at the Local 
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Community Center (CCZ), one of the main directors of the Ministry of Housing, two other local 
brokers that knew the main leader of New Rock, and asked all of them about New Rock and its 
main leader, Manuel. I also looked at newspaper articles. Finally, I got access to the minutes of 
the City Council‘s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements for the day in which they 
received a group of neighbors from New Rock.  
 I have used the rich information obtained from these sources in several ways (e.g., the 
date of settlement for the statistical modeling). But for this chapter I have focused on the 
strategies used to build the neighborhood, and in particular to contact the state. By carefully 
reconstructing the genealogy of the settlement and the main leader‘s political network I try to get 
at the most common patterns or mechanisms involved in the construction of the neighborhood.  
 Finally, and in order to put the case of New Rock into context, throughout the chapter I 
also use information about other settlements and about the political context of Montevideo 
collected in the broader fieldwork for this dissertation. 
6.2 THE GENEALOGY OF NEW ROCK  
As mentioned in the methods section, it is unusual to find articles on land invasions and this is 
the reason I dub squatting elusive collective action. It is also rare to find articles on squatters‘ 
neighborhood organizations. It is perhaps easier to find references to squatters in the newspapers 
in poverty, or crime, related articles. Thus, finding this article in El País’ – one of the main 
national newspapers - online archive struck me as puzzling.  
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New Rock is now 8 years old and it celebrated its birthday by inaugurating a fountain and a bus 
terminal. The latter enables this area of the city, inhabited by about 1400 families, to have better 
access to several areas of the city (…) For the inauguration ceremony (…) about fifty neighbors were 
present, the Housing Minister, Lucio Cáceres,  José Bello from the bus company, the vice-president of 
OSE [the state owned water company] Hugo Granucci and other authorities. The ceremony included 
the neighborhood association giving acknowledgement plaques to the officials of the bus company 
and the water company (…)  
After about 800 families occupied the area, they all acquired the 25 hectares plot, paying a sum of 
about 140,000 dollars, according to Manuel Gómez, president of the neighborhood association. (…) In 
eight years of existence, they were able to get water, light and roads and stand out from the rest of the 
squatter settlements according to neighbors who add that ―safety is greater than in many other places.‖ 
The Minister of Housing agrees and says ―compared to other zones with similar characteristics, New 
Rock is one of the most ordered that I know of. It has an adequate social cohesion and better urban 
conditions.‖ 61 
 
I found other published news about New Rock in El País and other mainstream media, all 
reporting the successes and exceptional character of this squatter settlement. In one of them, the 
Interior Minister, after visiting what the reporter considers a ―model‖ neighborhood for its low 
crime rate, said that in New Rock ―neighbors take care of the neighborhood and cooperate with 
the police.‖62 The reason why New Rock, unlike other settlements, appears on the news is 
because its leaders are well connected. In particular, the president of the neighborhood 
association, Manuel Gómez – a very outspoken short man in his fifties, - is a very important 
node. It was because his name and the name of the settlement kept appearing in other interviews 
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 El País. 2003. ―New Rock cumplió 8 años y festeja con obras.‖ November 20.  
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 El Espectador. 2003. ―Stirling destacó el trabajo de los vecinos en el barrio New Rock.‖ Panorama informativo a 
las 12.30 (online transcription). July 16. See also: La República. 2002. ―Unas 400 familias del asentamiento New 
Rock volverán a tener agua.‖ Comunidad. December 27; and Trinidad, Gustavo. 2003. "Barrio New Rock: un 
refugio de paz en tiempos de violencia.‖ El País, July 16.  
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I was conducting, either with key informants, politicians, or other local leaders, that I decided to 
include New Rock among the group of 25 squatter neighborhoods that I researched in more 
depth. This well connectedness is reflected in the visits made by very important political figures 
to this settlement.  
From the very beginning, New Rock and its main leader were embedded in political 
networks. They became a squatter settlement and a neighborhood leader through political 
networks. Manuel had always lived in the area next to the settlement called Rock. There, a few 
clustered poor houses were the only urban sign in the middle of an enormous green area of small 
family farms, in the Northeast of Montevideo. They did not have good light, piped water or any 
other services. They were in the middle of nowhere. According to Manuel, he had ―always 
thought that the way to progress was to bring people in.‖  
The opportunity came –Manuel and another neighborhood representative, Miriam, 
remember in an interview- when in November 1995, ―we occupied because FUCVAM [the 
cooperative housing movement] had a group of people evicted from a cooperative and did not 
know where to put them.‖ They were interested in the plot next to where Manuel and Miriam 
lived, a plot that had been empty for 30 years, and nobody knew who its owners were. Manuel – 
who in his words had always been ―just one more neighbor‖ - started becoming the leader of 
what would be New Rock.  
Unlike the slow reaction that some settlements in public land had experienced, since the 
land invasion was on a private land, the police came immediately and took everybody to the 
police station. As Manuel recalls it, ―The owners appeared immediately (…) But we agreed that 
they would sell and we would buy.‖ The invaders did not have any money to pay for the land, 
but Manuel had an idea. He opened a bank account, divided the plot in about 250 small parcels, 
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and started receiving people who would pay 2,500 Uruguayan pesos each – at the time about 
200-250 dollars. People did not need to pay all up front. Most people paid in small installments, 
depositing directly at the bank and giving the receipt to the neighborhood association.  
As was true for many other owners of private land in what is considered a rural area by 
the municipality, this was probably a good deal for the owners of the unproductive land in which 
New Rock is currently located. Since protected rural areas cannot be subdivided, owners could 
have only sold the whole plot, for much less than the amount they received from New Rock 
neighborhood association.  How much money was exactly involved in the transaction between 
the New Rock‘s neighborhood association and the owners remains confused. Different sources 
have different numbers, and some accuse Manuel and the others of having kept some money for 
themselves.
63
 Manuel and Miriam deny any gain from the transaction.  
The early days of the neighborhood were busy ones. A lot of knowledge from the 
cooperative housing movement was transmitted into the planning of this neighborhood, through 
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 Not only did other interviewees (such as a neighborhood leader of another area of the city) suggest Manuel had 
kept some money, but some of the neighbors of New Rock, accused him at the City Council. Checking the minutes 
of the City Council‘s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements, I found that on October 3, 2003 (that is about the 
same time newspapers were publishing about this model neighborhood and politicians were visiting it), a group of 
neighbors came to ask the City Council for help in finding the property titles of the neighborhood. They were 
worried about their legal situation, and they accused Manuel of not giving them the information they wanted and of 
having kept money from the transaction for himself. In the words of one of the speakers: ―We put together in a bank 
account about 300,000 dollars and the two plots of the neighborhood were bought for 160,000 (…) Apparently there 
is a difference that this man kept and that money is ours.‖ The councilors gave them information on property titles 
and promised to get in touch with the local municipal authorities in order to help promote a more democratic 
neighborhood association. They also promised to visit the neighborhood soon. I do not have information on what 
happened after this session but things did not seem to have changed much since. When I conducted fieldwork, about 
four years later, Manuel was still president of the neighborhood association. Interestingly, neither this possible fraud 
case nor the problems with the neighborhood association appeared on the minutes of the regular sessions of the City 
Council. The issue remained in the special commission. Whenever the minutes of the whole City Council referred to 
New Rock it was always to mention the neighborhood exceptionality, the ―decency‖ of its houses or how 
―sometimes civil society goes ahead the state‖ (e.g., minute N° 1012, 11/04/2002; minute 1177, 17/03/2005). The 
last mention I found was in 2008 in reference to a letter that the neighborhood association sent the city council 
asking them to sponsor the celebration of the neighborhood‘s 13th birthday. The councilors unanimously agreed. 
There was no discussion. Nobody questioned the legitimacy of the neighborhood association or reminded the others 
of the visit of a group of worried neighbors five years before (minute N° 1418, 23/10/2008). (See minutes at 
http://www.juntamvd.gub.uy). 
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the alliance of Manuel with the FUCVAM leaders. In an interview with one of those leaders, he 
explained to me that they tried to organize them ―in a communitarian way.‖ 
Now they have streets, they have electricity; everybody‘s plot has the same area. People had a 
deadline to build their homes, and they had to build them with solid materials. So we tried to export 
the organizational experience [from cooperatives] to squatter settlements. (…) I can name you a 
bunch of settlements in which I participated and other fellows as well, and we gave them the 
organizational inclination. New Rock also has a community center, and actually tomorrow I need to go 
because they have created a production cooperative. So I think conceptually FUCVAM has irradiated 
this organization. 
It becomes important to note that these leaders, one of them also a city councilor for the 
Socialist Party (a faction of the broader leftist coalition Frente Amplio), and the other one an 
advisor at the city council, did this on their own, not formally under a movement or a political 
party. It is also important to remember here, as an important contextual feature, that Uruguayan 
parties have defined factions with their own identities, programs and candidates (Buquet 2001). 
No party or movement have ever programmatically promoted land squatting. Manuel also 
remembers this knowledge transmission and support. ―We will always be grateful – he said - to 
the Socialists,
64
 even if later we had political differences with them, because they gave the first 
step in this neighborhood. Without them, this neighborhood wouldn‘t exist. Afterwards, it was 
all our work.‖ He speaks of his relationship to FUCVAM as a friendship, ―and what a 
friendship!‖ – he emphasizes.  
Manuel also remembers the president of the City Council at the time, Jorge Zabalza – one 
of the characters in the pictures from the opening vignette - helping them, defending them at the 
City Council. Speaking about this, Zabalza told me that at the time the left was divided about this 
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 FUCVAM has always been connected with the Socialist Party.  
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settlement. Some thought they should not help because it was built in a forbidden place, there 
was money involved, and besides Manuel was building his political career within the Colorado 
Party with this. ―And what we thought was – Zabalza speaks for himself and other councilors 
from the left - that there were more than 400 families solving their housing needs.‖  
This story accounts for deeper divisions within the left. One of the frictions had to do 
with the position towards land squatting. On one side there was a radical minority thinking that 
land squatting was a sort of spontaneous land reform, and on the other the major maintaining that 
squatting should be avoided in a city that had not grown in population and that they should find 
other more sustainable ways to accommodate the lower income groups. The idea was that 
bringing services to squatter settlements is more expensive, and that the expansion of the city 
should be avoided. The other friction had to do with the relationship of the Frente Amplio, 
traditionally a middle class party, with the lower classes. As Luna (2007) explains in detail, the 
triumph of the Frente Amplio in the 2004 national elections for the first time in history, required 
a process of constituency diversification and expansion. One of the toughest tasks in that process 
was the ―penetration of traditional party strongholds in Montevideo‘s periphery‖ (p. 2) which 
was facilitated through the decentralization process that the leftist coalition put in action once it 
won the municipal government in 1990.  
On the ground, winning those strongholds was not easy. Among other things it meant 
winning local leaders and, perhaps more difficult, it meant breaking with prejudices. As one of 
the leftist politicians involved in the foundation of New Rock told me:  
 
-I used to work with these people. They are very peculiar comrades…they have many codes that I 
think were never really understood by the left. It takes a lot to understand these codes. But these 
leaders have served the people in an unconditional manner, being bandits at the same time of course. 
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MJ- I‘ve heard Manuel switched parties… 
-Yes, they were all from the right. This has to do with another debate we had in the left.  
I always thought being a leftist militant was sectarian. And even more in my generation. You had to 
smoke a particular brand of cigarettes, wear boots, long hair, jeans, listen to folk music….The Beatles 
were bourgeois. (…)  
[bringing these leaders to the left] was a great job. They were all from the right, but from the right 
right, anticommunists. And now, they are all leftist militants. This is a great achievement. And it‘s a 
product of not just giving them a book to read but of really going and getting into the mud with the 
people. We were in the land seizure, we worked, we saw, we learned.  
When New Rock was founded, Manuel belonged to the Colorado Party, which held 
national office at the moment. He had been a Colorado since young, although he had switched 
factions within the party because once ―they came and got me a job at the municipality.‖ After 
invading and squatting, he started using his political contacts in the Colorado Party to get things 
for the neighborhood such as money to fund a children‘s soccer team and the roads of the 
neighborhood. He is very grateful, for example, to one politician who worked at the state water 
company. He remembers him as someone who helped many squatter settlements bringing them 
water and, essentially, as a very modest man, who would come and ―eat chorizos with us.‖ 
During fieldwork I repeatedly found this idea of the good politician being the one that comes to 
the neighborhood, is unpretentious, speaks people‘s language, walks around the neighborhood 
and ―steps into the sheet,‖ listens, shares food or mates with the neighbors. In a nutshell, the 
good politician is the one who shows understanding and closeness.  
In 2004, two years before my fieldwork year, the national government switched from 
being held by the Colorado Party to being run by a leftist one. Manuel also switched sides and 
became a Frente Amplio voter, with a huge sign of one of the factions of the leftist coalition in 
his front door. He was actually on that faction‘s ballot ―as filler in the 30th place‖ –he clarifies. 
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According to Manuel, ―all types of politicians came here‖ and he mentions several from the 
whole political spectrum. He became a Frente Amplio supporter for the 1999 elections, but then 
he chose another faction, the socialist one, since in the end they had been the ones helping in the 
neighborhood. However, he had fundamental discrepancies with the socialists. He considered 
them too sectarian for his needs:  
What happened? If you said to the socialists that someone from the Colorado party was coming to 
bring water [to the neighborhood], they said no, no, no. If you told them someone from the Blanco 
Party was coming to solve the electricity problem, they said no, no, no. That‘s how it started. We can 
be your friends but we need to do the public works. If we don‘t do them, people are going to start 
revolutionizing and we need to get the things. If we don‘t… 
 
High loyalty to just one party was especially inadequate during the years in which New 
Rock emerged. Not only were the municipal and national authorities from different political 
parties, but the ministries were divided. From 1990 until 2004, the municipal government was 
leftist and the national government rotated between the Colorados and the Blancos, the two 
traditional parties. In addition, these two were bound by political pacts to give some ministries to 
each other. Among those ministries were some relevant to squatters such as the Housing 
Ministry, which, as an example, was held by the Blanco Party, during the 1995-1999 Colorado 
national government.  
Manuel was not the only one switching from the Colorado Party to the Frente Amplio in 
the neighborhood. At least people from his inner circle also did. In a long interview with Luis 
and Betty, a middle aged couple who have been in the neighborhood almost since its foundation, 
and used to be Colorado voters, they told me that they also voted for that Frente Amplio faction 
in the last election, following Manuel. They are both skeptic about politics. As Luis puts it ―I 
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don‘t identify with any party because politicians are all the same.‖ They have had a life of 
hardship and they do not feel politicians have helped them a lot.  Yet the one who has helped 
them – even more than their own families - is Manuel. He was the one who took their disabled 
child to the hospital the day a car knocked him down. He did so using a truck from the water 
company for which he was doing some work –again, through his political contacts.  Manuel also 
lent them money to pay for Luis‘ mother funeral, since her death found them broken. Once in 
Easter, when they could not buy any chocolates for their kids, Manuel came and brought some. 
He also gave Luis a job in a cooperative of workers he founded. They feel indebted to him. As 
Betty puts it, ―he is always there when you are not ok (…) We matter as people to someone. He 
cares that something happens to us. That‘s enough. So in appreciation we … if he asks me for 
help in a soup kitchen, even if he cannot pay me, I‘m there.‖  
Manuel founded the workers‘ cooperative where Luis, himself, and other men from New 
Rock work. Their first contract was with the Colorado administration. They worked for the water 
company bringing piped water to squatter settlements. Now, they have a contract with the 
Minister of Public Works who, not by chance, belongs to the same Frente Amplio faction as 
Manuel. At the moment I conducted fieldwork, they were building bus stops along some main 
roads around Montevideo‘s periphery and nearby areas. Manuel recalls the story of this contract 
as part of a negotiation to promote his new faction in the neighborhood. In his words, ―we work 
politically with a sector, with the vice-president‘s. So I went and told him ‗if you want me to 
work for you politically, there are two things: first the neighborhood and second, jobs. I can give 
you credit, but I am not going to work for free‘.‖ 
As the empowered and proactive leader he ended up becoming in the process of building 
the neighborhood, Manuel also organized a meeting with President Tabaré Vazquez. According 
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to him, they had sent Vazquez a letter before the election to talk about his policies on squatter 
settlements, but he never answered. Once he was elected, they sent another letter scolding him 
for not having answered. He gave them an appointment immediately. Manuel went together with 
some people he knew from squatter settlements in his area. As Manuel recalls it:  
What we said to the president was that we disagreed with the Emergency Plan (basic income).
65
 
Instead of it we want to solve our job problems. One of the arguments was that the people who work 
for state agencies as builders, maintenance stuff, cleaners, and so on are people from squatter 
settlements. But the ones who get the contracts are big companies that pay low salaries. So it‘s better 
that they teach people from squatter settlements, who are the ones that need the most, how to organize 
themselves, create their own small company, their own cooperative, NGO, whatever.  
This story shows some particular and some general things about Manuel as a squatters‘ 
leader. On the one hand, it shows a very unusual proactive leader who wants to meet with 
politicians before elections and that has a proposal different from the government‘s. On the other 
hand, it shows something I saw repeatedly, at least among those squatter settlements that have 
some degree of neighborhood organization: a direct relationship with authorities. Squatters prefer 
to meet with the director, the councilor and even the country‘s president. Through their own 
history or through what they heard, they have learned that those meetings are feasible. They 
know, besides, that through those direct meetings they will get what they want more easily and 
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 One of the Frente Amplio’s main campaign plans, and one of the first measures the administration implemented 
once in office, was a new social welfare program for poor families, in response to the big economic crisis that had 
hit the country in 2002-2003. The plan, popularly known as Plan de Emergencia (Emergency Plan) had two main 
objectives: immediate assistance (e.g., basic income of about 50 dollars per month, health care) and support to get 
out of poverty (e.g., educational programs, labor programs). I conducted fieldwork exactly in the middle of the 
implementation of the plan. Although not the focus of my research the plan, especially its basic income component, 
recurrently appeared in my interviews and observations. Some of my interviewees were beneficiaries of the basic 
income. A neighborhood leader, for instance, was anxiously waiting for her monthly check to be able to bring her 
daughter and granddaughter home from a different city since they could not pay for it. For another, the basic income 
meant a lot for his capacity to care for his kids and wife, because his work as a scavenger never brings them much. 
Some complained because they had been excluded, others because someone they knew lied about her income and 
got it unfairly or more fundamentally because it promotes people‘s laziness. As one woman put it, ―Uruguayans are 
lazy; they don‘t want to work. They want to earn a lot and do little, and the government…We are against the 
Emergency Plan because it‘s promoting more laziness…don‘t give people money or food. No. Give them a job‖.   
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quickly than following the regular bureaucratic channels. The state is perceived as something 
stretchable. And the best mechanism to extend its limits is to meet directly with the right person. 
  
  
Clockwise from upper left: a) View of New Rock from the air, January 13 2008, by Google Earth. The 
settlement appears as a dense urban island in rural surroundings. The block and street design are 
typical of planned neighborhoods or of those, like this one, that started by subdivision and sale. b) 
Neighborhood kindergarten, product of an association between the Municipal Government and the 
neighborhood association. c) Two of the best neighborhood houses. All houses are made of solid 
materials (condition to stay in the neighborhood) but there is great variation in the quality and 
completion of constructions. d) Very typical image of a squatter settlement street: houses in 
construction with a pile of bricks or other construction materials outside. For many squatters houses 
are always slow, ongoing projects they go back to every time they can save some money or when 
there is a family need, such as the marriage of a child who will stay there. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: New Rock squatter settlement. Montevideo, 2007-8 
 187 
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
Beyond the quite folkloric character of Manuel and the specific details of New Rock’s yet 
unwritten history, this case is an open window to dialog with many interesting theoretical issues 
related to clientelism and mobilization. I will focus on developing the concept of market 
clientelism but I will also refer to other aspects of the literature that I think this case speaks to.  
The construction of New Rock relied heavily on Manuel’s political networks. Those 
networks, at the same time, were created and recreated through the building of the new 
neighborhood.  Of course, there were also other networks at play in its construction, for each 
household probably used family, church, friends and other ties to come to live there, build their 
homes and solve their everyday needs. Yet I will focus just on a small part of the universe, on 
those networks used to contact the state and bring it to the neighborhood, specifically on the 
clientelistic ones. 
 The story of this squatter neighborhood shows that face-to-face contacts keep being 
important for modern or post-modern politics. They were not just something tied to traditional 
politics and destined to disappear with the modernization of political parties and the use of the 
media to spread political messages and attract voters. People still like politicians who come to 
them. At least the squatters I interviewed did. Politicians, in turn, need to get more votes and in 
so doing face-to-face interactions and exchanges seem to still be effective. As Auyero (1997) 
points out, ―the personalized distribution of goods and favors keeps being crucial to obtain 
support, loyalty and – ultimately - votes‖ (p.  20). 
 But clientelistic networks manifest differently in different contexts. In the context I refer 
to in this chapter, of a) people with housing and other needs, b) in a society with a tradition of 
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statism and clientelism (Panizza and Piera 1988)
66
 that recently underwent structural adjustment 
policies and with c) high electoral competition (especially for the poor), fragile and mobile 
clientelistic networks were likely to emerge. And, when these networks were present for 
squatters, they were the most efficient way to reach the state.  
6.3.1 Squatters and clientelism 
The use of clientelistic networks by squatters has a long tradition in Latin America. So does the 
study of them by the social sciences. In his study of colonias in the periphery of Mexico City 
Cornelius‘ (1977) saw a suitable environment for old type rural caciques to emerge and 
reproduce. According to him, ―the lack of a governmental ‗presence‘ combines with the severity 
of problems confronting such settlements to create a situation in which people may feel a greater 
need to enter into a dependency relationship with a local cacique" (p.348). Like most mainstream 
social science at the time, Cornelius was embedded in Modernization Theory, so he thought 
caciquismo would disappear with the integration of squatters to the city. Collier (1976) has also 
addressed the often hidden and particularistic relationships between squatters and politicians for 
the Lima case. According to him this relationships have served, among other things, as a means 
to gain political support for politicians.  
These early studies provoked a reaction in younger generations of scholars. Some wanted 
to prove Modernization Theory wrong and show that clientelism was alive and well in the more 
developed democracies and economies of twenty years later. Some others wanted to show 
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 It is likely that without this statist tradition squatters would not expect so much from the state and that they would 
not speak of their rights to housing –as many did in my interviews.  According to Alsayyad (1993)1993) making 
claims to the state and being politicized is part of the ―squatting culture‖ in Latin America, not only of Uruguay. By 
contrast, in the Middle East squatters tend to resort to strategies outside politics such as, depending on the particular 
context, complete political invisibility, tribal networks, or religious law to legalize land.  
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variation in the political behavior of squatters, by saying that not all of them were clientelistic. 
This is precisely the argument of the early work of Stokes (1991) in Peru. She found two ideal 
types of squatters: clientelists and radicals. Clientelists accept social hierarchy and perceive their 
work in the neighborhood as approximating that of professionals or managers. Their strategy is 
to cultivate friendly relationships with officials and others, they see the state as representative of 
universal interests and friendly to the demands of the poor, they respect the state-established 
rules of the game understanding that this may win some rewards. Radicals, in turn, are more 
egalitarian, identify strongly as workers, and see themselves in conflict with owners. They 
pursue coordinating efforts with other poor to exert maximum pressure on the state, they see the 
state as a representative of capitalists. They see themselves as part of broader social movements.  
Stokes‘ perspective, which definitely returns agency to the poor by saying that not all of 
them buy into the clientelistic game and that some have a very critical perspective, is similar to 
the one Gay (1994) takes in his very interesting comparison of two favelas in Rio. As he puts it  
Latin America's urban poor are often portrayed as the innocent victims of repressive, and exclusionary 
regimes [in a footnote Gay includes David Collier's book on Peruvian squatters as one of the 
examples of this perspective]. Victims they undoubtedly are; innocent however, they are not. Indeed, 
there's increasing evidence from a variety of contexts that the urban poor have been active, organized, 
and aggressive participants in the political process and that the popular organizations, in particular, 
have had a significant impact on the relationship between the urban poor and political elites. 
 
What I found in Montevideo was quite different than this perspective in the sense that I 
did not find a divorce between clientelism and agency. On the one hand, Manuel‘s brokerage 
shows the possibility of using clientelistic networks with great agency if that means being able to 
decide and propose. On the other hand, even those few squatters who were more radicalized 
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tended to behave according to the rules of the game, negotiating, flirting with politicians, and so 
on.  
6.3.2 Market clientelism 
I call market clientelism to those fragile clientelistic networks, based on competition among 
patrons, which give more power to clients and brokers and are based more on short term 
exchanges than on long lasting loyalties. Clients and brokers are able to switch patrons or 
combine them in unprecedented manners.  
I draw this concept from scholars of Colombian politics. They developed the concept of 
―market clientelism‖ to understand the changes that the 1991 constitutional reform brought by 
introducing decentralization. According to them, decentralization has increased political options 
and political competitors. This, in turn, has developed into what they dub ―market clientelism‖ 
which is characterized by unstable networks that are less asymmetric than in the past because the 
client acquires more weight in the relationship (García 2003). Early scholars of clientelism 
already thought of the changes electoral competition may cause to clientelistic relationships. In 
his study of Southeast Asia, Scott (1977) argues that electoral competition had improved clients‘ 
bargaining power.  
Like other forms of clientelism, market clientelism is a form of citizen-politician linkage 
that, unlike programmatic ones, is particular, based on direct tangible goods targeted to 
individuals and small groups of citizens in exchange for (the promise of) electoral support  
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The peculiarity of market clientelism is that it defies the 
common ideas of a passive client because it shows a very strategic one, willing to change bands 
and flirt with many at the same time to get concrete goods.  
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Manuel‘s self representation, his practices, and the stories that others in his network and 
outside of it told me about him strongly contrast with other experiences of clientelistic 
relationships that are highly unequal and in which the lower class leader assumes ―an attitude of 
submission or even servility vis-à-vis the powerful‖ (Stokes 1991).  Way beyond passiveness or 
submission, and also beyond hidden resistance in Scott‘s (1990) terms, Manuel‘s strategy is 
explicit and active. Using Merklen‘s (2003; 2005) metaphor to illustrate the behavior of squatters 
in Argentina, Manuel‘s logic and practices resemble those of a hunter more than those of a 
farmer. He is always attentive, ready to grab any opportunity.  
As he puts it: ―we had to flirt a lot with politicians. If you don‘t flirt, you don‘t get 
anything.‖ As stated before, besides flirting, he has actually switched parties and factions several 
times. Besides, as he explained, he left one particular faction of the Frente Amplio because they 
demanded too much loyalty or exclusivity.  Others‘ descriptions do not situate him in a 
submissive attitude either.  ―A popular urbanist,‖  ―a rogue (pícaro) from a Cervantes‘ novel,‖ ―a 
person who only defends his pocket,‖ ―an intelligent man that always goes towards where there 
is [political] strength,‖ are some of the phrases both fans and detractors used to describe him. 
Although poor and in a position apparently subordinate to any politician, Manuel has power and 
has used it strategically to his and his neighborhood benefit.  
Those squatters who, like Manuel, learned how to use these networks in a market-like 
way were the most successful in reaching the state. Yet there were ways to behave like a market 
client other than Manuel‘s. The leaders of New Blossom, one of the most upgraded squatter 
settlements in Montevideo, practiced a different strategy: division of political labor. The two 
main neighborhood leaders belonged to two different political parties and they both used their 
political networks to get services. The colorado leader got easy access to roads because the 
 192 
Ministry of Public Works was in his party‘s hands. The leftist leader, in turn, got a lot of support 
from the Frente Amplio municipal administration.  But New Blossom also used another strategy, 
this one much more common among other squatter settlements I visited: apolitical performance, 
that is, pretending no interest in political affairs. One of the early founders explained to me that 
even though invaders were from the left, after they squatted ―there were no political parties.‖ 
During the early times, they did not let people put political signs in their houses. 
―We are apolitical here‖ was a common phrase among leaders of squatter settlements, 
especially the most organized ones. Given the many stories of contacts with politicians to get this 
or that, this latter phrase sounds a bit paradoxical. In fact one could substitute apolitical by 
hyper-political and it would make perfect sense. But what squatters really mean when they say 
they are apolitical is not that they are politically neutral since most of them have their clear 
preferences, but that they behave or perform as if they were apolitical. Part of that performance is 
―open[ing] doors to everybody‖ as they claim they do. If they show preference for one party 
publicly they would probably not get many things they want that are not under the control of that 
single party. They might even get less from that party too. It becomes important to remember, for 
example, that in the period 1995-2004, the national government of Uruguay was controlled by 
the Colorado party – and so was the Ministry of Public Works, -  the Frente Amplio had 
Montevideo‘s municipal government, and the Blanco Party  controlled the Ministry of Housing. 
In that context, showing no preference was the cleverest thing to do if you wanted to get 
something from each. 
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6.3.3 The “other” clientelism 
No doubt market clientelism was the most successful strategy for squatters‘ organizations and 
leaders that wanted to get the state‘s attention. Yet in the varied universe of squatter settlements I 
did find, although less frequently, other less strategic uses of political networks, based on long 
term loyalties and strong affective ties.  
―The Distributor‖, a local Colorado party broker that earned his nickname because he has 
organized many squatter settlements in one of the most deprived areas of the city and distributed 
land in them to many people, is an example of a more traditional type of broker than Manuel. He 
has always been very much involved in political networks but he has never left his party. As he 
put it looking at me with wet and fixed eyes:  
 If the Colorado Party has a vote, that‘s my vote. I have had offers by the blancos, the frenteamplistas 
(…). They offered a blank check to switch…but how can I do that? With myself….I can‘t do that as 
easily as others change colors. What would I say to my children?    
The squatter settlements organized by “The Distributor” were, however, visibly less 
developed or upgraded than New Rock. He only has a single patron, someone twice 
representative and once a candidate for mayor but who has not been in office since 2000. The 
Distributor, therefore, does not have access to much for his constitutency.  Once in a while the 
patron comes and distributes mattresses and blankets and invites people to a barbecue. But 
although in the past ―The Distributor‖ once got a job through the party, today he is unemployed. 
―I am one of the living dead – he says - (…) I live from my wife.‖ He gets sporadic personalized 
help from his patron. Once in a while, he gives him some money, but he does not feel that is 
really dignifying; and he also got medical attention through him. But the relationship appears to 
survive for reasons other than the goods exchanged. Loyalty and belonging seem crucial.  
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The contrast of Manuel and ―The Distributor‖ shows different ways of reaching state 
resources through political contacts with different degrees of effectiveness. In the 24 different 
cases of land invasions I visited,
67
 three patterns were clear. First, a leader or neighborhood 
association with political ties helped the neighborhood acquire services. Those neighborhoods 
whose initial leaders had some political ties, with any party, and no matter which brokerage 
modality they used, today have better services and better urban quality in general. Second, 
accretion invasions did not have this type of leader. Politically well connected leaders are often 
present in planned invasions and sometimes in subdivisions and sales (see table 5). Finally, 
among the connected leaders or neighborhood associations, those that had ties with different 
political parties were more successful in obtaining a greater variety of state resources, 
(something that gives them the best urban quality).   
 
Table 5. Presence of political ties at the moment of settlement by land invasion type (study sample). 
Invasion type 
Presence of leader or 
neighborhood 
association at the 
beginning of the 
invasion with political 
ties 
Total number of invasions 
in the sample 
Accretion 0 6 
Planned 
14 15 
1 unknown   
Subdivision and 
Sale 
1 3 
Total 15 24 
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 I studied 25 different invasion cases, but one of them was a case of an eviction. For that case, my informants were 
a local leader of the broader neighborhood and the local authorities that avoided the occupation of a public plot. This 
is why the n of invasion leaders equals 24.   
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I hypothesize that the effectiveness of Manuel‘s market clientelism is a product of the 
increasing electoral competition between parties, and even between factions, for the urban poor. 
In the past, being loyal to one party could be effective. In fact, the squatter settlement that has 
achieved the greatest recognition from the state in the history of the informal city in Uruguay has 
been Casabó, whose leaders were very loyal to the Colorado party for many years. They are the 
only ones whose case, after being discussed by the parliament, is backed by a law that recognizes 
their property over the land and promises upgrading the neighborhood. Yet more recently, 
flirting with many parties became more effective.  
6.3.4 Some other theoretical reflections on clientelism and mobilization 
 Besides being an example of market clientelism, the story of New Rock also speaks to some of 
the core issues in the literature on clientelism. The first of those matters is the false dichotomy 
between rational and normative action. As Auyero  (1997) explains, arguing against those who 
thought that clientelistic practices were pre-modern, irrational and characteristic of traditional 
societies, some authors have emphasized the rationality of clientelism for both sides. This has 
illuminated many aspects of clientelistic networks and practices, yet it has forgotten the 
important non-instrumental aspects of it. By invading a plot and organizing the settlement of 
people in New Rock, Manuel reinvented himself.  He is important for many people both inside 
and outside the neighborhood, both clients and patrons. As he puts it, ―everybody comes here. If 
there‘s a police problem, they come here. If there‘s a divorce problem, they come here.‖ During 
the interview he mentioned he was friends or had a good friendship with this senator or that 
bureaucrat, or the vice-president and so forth. As one politician from Manuel‘s same current 
political faction told me, ―[He] feels important if he is next to someone important.‖  
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 Another important matter in  this case can speaks to the literature‘s lack of attention to 
the emergence of actors, ties and networks (Auyero 1997). Studies often take the existence of 
networks as granted and do not explain how clients, patrons and brokers become so. Manuel‘s 
turning into the central position he is at today happened in an interactive manner. There was a 
turning point when two activist-politicians came and contacted him. But this did not happen in a 
vacuum. Although Manuel is right in saying he was ―just a neighbor‖ in the sense that he was not 
the president of a neighborhood association as he is today, he was a neighbor with political ties 
in the Colorado party. In fact, when I requested specific details, I learned that it was through 
another broker from the Colorado party who lived close to the evicted people the two activists-
politicians wanted to find a place for, that they reached Manuel. Curiously, about 12 years later I 
also interviewed that other broker and he mentioned Manuel and New Rock as well. He was “The 
Distributor.”  
 Another relevant subject in the literature on clientelism that this case tackles is the role of 
brokers. In addition to the dyad patron-client, the role of brokers has been studied by many 
because of their relevance in clientelistic relationships (Auyero 2000; Burgwal 1995; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Scott 1977). As Burgwal (1995:26) puts it,  
In contrast to patrons, brokers do not control resources, such as land, jobs, knowledge, protection, 
directly. They are intermediaries who manipulate their contacts to bring about communication 
between their clients and patrons who can dispense the first order resources. A broker bridges gaps in 
communication for profit, his main (second order) resource therefore is his network of crucial 
contacts. Patrons, brokers and clients are thus distinct roles, which can be fulfilled by the same 
person. 
As I see it, the story of New Rock, and possible the story of Montevideo‘s squatting, is mainly a 
story of brokerage. Manuel is a broker in the sense that he links previously ―unconnected social 
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sites‖ and ―mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site‖ (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Manuel connected the owner of the plot with the buyers. In this sense 
he was an economic broker. But there were more actors involved in the invasion and settlement 
of people in New Rock. He also put people in his neighborhood in touch with state agencies 
through politicians. Without those connections it would have been impossible for people like the 
couple I talked about before, Betty and Luis, to live where they currently do or at least in the way 
they currently do. Had they squatted on their own, without being embedded in Manuel‘s 
network, they would have been evicted by the owner or the police or, alternatively, joined a very 
different type of settlement, one by accretion with little services and probably no planning would 
have emerged. 
 Finally, another subject in the literature on clientelism I address here is the opposition 
between clientelism and mobilization. Clientelistic networks are often mentioned as a catch-all 
explanation for poor people‘s demobilization. (For nuanced exceptions see Auyero (1999; 2000); 
Burgwal (1995); Gay (1994)). Yet clientelism varies. We have here analyzed a network very 
centralized on one person, Manuel. This type of network does tend to demobilize, and yet this is 
not always the case.  
 One example of this is that a group of neighbors from New Rock mobilized against 
Manuel. Having paid for their plots by depositing in the bank account that Manuel opened to pay 
the land owner, not having received a property title yet and after receiving elusive answers from 
Manuel, they went to the City Council and said ―we want you to help us defend our rights.‖ 68 
This group of neighbors resorted to the channels of the Municipal Government which has been, 
at least formally, an enemy of land invasions in rural areas and of those suspicious of fraudulent 
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 Minutes of the City Council’s Special Commission on Squatter Settlements, October 3, 2003. 
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transactions. Moreover, they explicitly denounced the centralized clientelistic network, as these 
meeting minutes illustrate:  
There is no interest in neighbors‘ organization because they work with the old caudillo to whom 
neighbors are hostages. There are a lot of accusations to make but since we don‘t have solid 
arguments to found them we can‘t mention them…because that can cause us a law suit (…) What we 
want is that  New Rock organizes more democratically. We want to have the support of the City 
Council, of the Municipal Government and the Local Councils – people who are neutral here - and 
promote the creation of a good neighborhood association that is truly representative. 
69
 
 A different example involves Luis and Betty, members of Manuel‘s network‘s inner 
circle. Before coming to live in New Rock they had never participated in any organization. In 
Luis‘ words, ―the only thing we used to do was to vote.‖ When they started building their current 
house, the neighborhood was just starting and there were a lot of people in need. Betty started 
participating in a soup kitchen. She remembers that the colorados donated them things such as 
pots, glasses, clothing. ―We used to give milk, rice with milk, bread with jam that INDA (the 
National Institute for Nutrition) gave us to the children here. In the winter, it was cold, it was 
raining and they were barefoot.‖ Interestingly, Betty did this with Manuel‘s wife and daughter. 
In addition, Betty and Luis became members of the neighborhood association. And as members, 
it was their first time talking face to face to politicians, going to the City Council, and so on. In 
general, however, they worked in the neighborhood – dividing the plots, building streets, filling 
some irregular parts of the plot, organizing celebrations, building their own house, and helping 
others with theirs -  letting Manuel and a few others do the public relations work.  
In sum, clientelism and mobilization can coexist. Moreover, clientelism may under 
certain conditions enhance mobilization. Rather than a theoretical opposition the relationship 
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between these two concepts invites to ask empirical questions such as how and under what 
conditions does clientelism enhance or inhibit mobilization?  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The story of New Rock is not representative of the more than 400 squatter settlements in 
Montevideo. Yet many of the things I found in scattered form in my visits to 25 of those 
neighborhoods, in my interviews with bureaucrats and politicians, and in my statistical analysis 
of the land invasion cycle more generally, I found all together in New Rock. Many separate 
features appeared condensed and exaggerated in this social universe, as in a ―weberian‖ ideal 
type. I have focused on the neighborhood leader‘s crucial brokerage role in connecting squatters 
with the state. In particular, I have pointed at what I dub market use of political networks to get 
things for himself and his neighborhood.  
Through the use of multiple political ties at the same time, switching patrons, performing 
or behaving as if they were apolitical and in the meantime opening the doors to different parties, 
some squatters were able to transform the political opportunity of electoral competition for their 
promise of loyalty and votes into new land invasions and new services for their neighborhoods.  
Some scholars of contentious politics are switching from the study of big causes to the 
study of mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). This study is 
part of that current. In this sense, market clientelism was one of the possible mechanisms through 
which electoral politics – as one example of concrete political opportunity - sometimes 
transforms into (different types of) squatters‘ mobilization. In particular, the role of brokers 
appears as crucial.  
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Scholars of mobilization point at brokerage as one of the most important relational 
mechanisms that make some contentious events happen (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Yet 
it becomes important to remember that brokerage is not a univocal concept. Brokers vary 
significantly and this can have important consequences for mobilization. So we should be careful 
not to mingle things that are not identical and therefore fall into the same problem we attempted 
to solve by specifying the originally sponge concepts of politics or political opportunities 
(Markoff 2003). ―Brokers vary significantly in social location and modus operandi‖ –some keep 
their clients segregated from each other, others merge them; some are conscious of their 
brokerage activity while others call their activities favor-giving, gossiping and so on (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
Manuel showed us one type of brokerage, one that has a central location in the network, 
one that controls his inner circle but that at the same time can generate strong oppositional 
networks, and fundamentally one that is able to adapt to change and switch or combine the sites 
it connects to. This type of brokerage seems to generate either oppositional mobilization or 
directed mobilization, that is, mobilization that the leader needs or is willing to accept.  
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I have described the cycle of land squatting in Montevideo. This work is a 
history of the informal city of the capital of Uruguay, whose growth has been responsible for the 
biggest spatial transformations of this city in the last half of the twentieth century.  I have also 
tried to explain and understand this cycle. I did so by looking at patterns of variation over time 
and space as well as zooming in on the actors involved in invading land and, often, requesting 
services from the state.  
This work merges urban sociology and sociology of poverty with the literature on 
contentious politics and regular politics. It also combines methods by trying to count what 
seemed uncountable given the scarcity of data, such as the number of land invasions per year, as 
well as to understand occurrences and experiences by collecting as many points of view as I 
could as I tried to reconstruct events that happened in the past. During a year of fieldwork I 
collected several types of data, including 80 interviews, 41 of them oral histories with the 
founders of squatter settlements – both leaders and non leaders - and the rest with politicians, 
experts and government employees. I traveled back and forth from West to East getting to know 
24 different squatter settlements and one experience of a failed invasion. I walked around, took 
pictures, and observed the physical appearance of the areas, inside and outside the settlements. I 
talked informally with squatters I run into. I collected newspaper clippings, notebooks with 
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meeting minutes and every piece of written document I could find in places such as a leaders‘ 
house, a local government office or the archive of the City Council.  
I organized data collection and analysis in two ways. On the one hand, I focused on the 
25 invasion experiences and tried to get different points of view on each. These ―mini- 
ethnographies‖ threw light on the process of squatting, helped me differentiate types of land 
invasions, taught me about squatters‘ strategies to survive through conditions of scarcity 
(especially during the first times on their plots when they had no shelter), and threw light on the 
responses they got from the state as well as on the perceptions of politicians about squatters. I 
also built an event catalog of land invasions, noting their geographical location, type of invasion, 
type of land owner and date or period of settlement. This event catalog was useful for finding 
patterns over time and space. When converted into a time series, it allowed me to statistically test 
a model of the count of invasions per year as predicted by variables measuring grievances or 
needs and political opportunities.  
Over the last few decades squatter settlements have increased dramatically in 
Montevideo, a city that unlike other Latin American metropoles of the region did not suffer a 
barrage of rural to urban migration in the 1940s and 50s. By the time Uruguay entered into 
government-led industrialization and the import substitution economic model in the 1930s – 
usually held responsible for attracting rural migrants and generating squatter settlements in the 
periphery of Latin American cities - the country was already primarily urban and most of the 
urban population was concentrated in Montevideo. This urban population for the most part had 
been incorporated into the urban fabric formally and did not need to squat. Even so, a few 
squatter settlements started to appear in the 1950s, primarily populated by rural migrants. But 
they were an exception. The explosion of land invasions in Montevideo did not occur until the 
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1990s. By 2006, about 11 % of the city‘s population was living in a squatter settlement (INE 
2006). Settlements mushroomed without mediating natural disasters and without population 
growth. Other forces were in action. 
The main causal factor behind the growth of the informal city in Montevideo is need, 
need for housing, need for a job, need. It is a peculiar need, however, because it is not the need 
of rural urban migrants as in other cities but the need of already urban dwellers that, as if 
expelled by a centrifugal force, have populated previously rural or semirural areas on the 
periphery of the city, expanding the previously relatively compact urban core. This need is 
related to the big economic and policy changes in the country and the region operating in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century: a shrinking state, a more export oriented and less regulated 
economy, the closing of many national industries and the consequential reduction of the pool of 
stable jobs for the less educated.  
As powerful these changes have been, need cannot explain the specific moments in which 
people invade land and mobilize for services or the different types of land invasions. Only by 
considering the organizational and political dimensions of the concrete groups of people that 
invade land at specific moments and in particular places of the city can we understand the 
genealogy of the informal city in Montevideo. It is my contention throughout this dissertation 
that it is through the interaction between need and politics that squatter settlements can be 
understood. In sum, a need that can be satisfied by the state tends to get activated into a 
grievance and into collective action when people perceive political opportunities.  
I have explored this interaction in several ways. In chapter four, when describing the 
different types of land invasion through space and time, the moment of the land invasion appears 
as a turning point or critical juncture. Land invasions in Montevideo were of three types: 
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accretion, planned, and subdivisions and sales. Accretion invasions did not have a leader or 
organization at the beginning who was in charge of planning the seizure and connecting the 
settlement with the state. These unplanned seizures were typical of earlier times of the cycle, 
from 1947 until 1985. They were the typical type of invasion during the dictatorship, from 1973 
to 1984, when political parties were forbidden as were other forms of political organization. 
Planned invasions need a leader or organization and tend to have more political connections. 
They became popular during the 1990s, a time of political opportunity for organized groups. This 
was because there was first an increase in electoral competition for the urban poor and second 
there was a new leftist Frente Amplio administration in the city. The novel needs of a 
downwardly mobile working class combined with these opportunities to produce planned 
invasions. Finally, subdivisions and sales appear to be a product of need in a still newer political 
context. They start with a person, the owner or an intermediary, subdividing a rural plot into 
much smaller parcels than the law allows and usually fraudulently selling them to people. 
Forbidden by a municipality increasingly concerned with the growth of squatter settlements, 
these settlements are led by people with political and other contacts that allow them to conduct 
the fraudulent transactions. Many times, buyers do not know they are squatters because they are 
not conscious of the illegality of the business.   
In chapter five I explore the interaction between needs or grievances and politics in a 
different, more parsimonious, and therefore more restricted way. I test a model of the count of 
land invasions per year predicted by several variables accounting for grievances, politics and 
their interaction. I use real wages as a measure of grievances, dichotomous variables for electoral 
year and post-election year, and I also use interaction terms for grievances and opportunities 
(controlling for diffusion effects using the lagged dependent variable as a predictor as well). The 
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results are convincing in showing that the effect of low real wages on the probability of more 
land invasions that year is enhanced if that year is post-electoral. But if instead of running the 
model for all invasions we do it separately for each type of invasion, things become even more 
interesting. While the general model is valid for accretion invasions which seem to grow 
reactively in post-electoral years, it is electoral years which become significant in determining 
growth in planned invasions. They resemble more a proactive social movement that appears 
when contention is higher rather than when contention is over. The few cases of subdivision and 
sale do not allow me to draw conclusions from the statistical model, but they appear to behave a 
lot like planned invasions regarding the moments at which they tend to settle.  
Finally, in chapter six I explore this interaction through a more intimate lens by looking 
closely at one story of a squatter settlement and its leader. That settlement illustrates how some 
leaders and neighborhood organization have been successful in fulfilling their needs by reaching 
the state through political contacts. This is an instance of what I call market clientelism, which 
consists of flirting with many patrons from different parties and factions to get services for their 
neighborhood. By looking at the actors, both from the politicians and from the squatters‘ 
perspective, this chapter offers a dynamic perspective that illustrates how political opportunities 
are in part created. There is room for agency and strategy in this framework.  
With the increasing growth in research and theory on social movements in recent years, 
there has been considerable criticism of the political opportunities framework. One of the most 
illuminating criticisms has been directed towards the malleability  and stretching of the concept, 
which can transform it into a catch-all explanation that can never be contested (Gamson and 
Meyer 1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). I have tried to address this by defining 
political opportunities beforehand as electoral politics, especially in chapter five but also in a less 
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narrow way throughout the dissertation. In addition, I have always tried to emphasize an 
alternative explanation, in this case grievances.  
Another important set of criticisms has to do with the ―structural bias‖ of the stress on 
political opportunities, that is, the lack of attention to agency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). But 
the fact that not all research shows actors with flesh and bones does not mean agency is 
incompatible with the theory. Of course losing track of strategizing, emotions and meanings is a 
risk of all structural work. And this certainly has happened in some structural research in social 
movements, such as perhaps Skocpol‘s study of revolutions (Skocpol 1987). But for the most 
part I see it as a matter of emphasis and what the researcher wants to explain. In my case, to 
explain variation over time in types of settlements as well as to predict the number of invasions 
per year, opportunities seem to matter a great deal. And contrary to the belief that the concept of 
political opportunities takes agency away from the real actors and treats them like puppets, I am 
convinced in this case this framework gives actors agency.  
Conceiving squatters merely as the victims of structural adjustment takes away their 
agency. Seeing them through the lenses of political opportunities, on the contrary, enables us to 
see people that use different strategies, among them family strategies and market clientelism, to 
survive and get the things they believe are their rights. Squatting needs agency. And the degree 
of agency varies. One of the factors determining variation is precisely political opportunities, not 
in the abstract but generated by other actors strategizing and feeling as well. Politicians 
competing for squatters‘ votes, for instance are actors with agency. Politicians and local brokers 
promoting land invasions to reach ―the people‘s‖ self government and other utopias are as well. 
Throughout this dissertation I have mentioned emotions such as hope and I have shown the 
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frustration and suffering caused by poverty. All this does not eclipse the role of political 
opportunities.   
Thinking about the possible contributions of this study, I believe it is important to keep 
testing and modifying the political opportunities theory outside the wealthy democracies where it 
was created. In this sense, what if anything does the study of this particular case say to the theory 
of political opportunities?  Or, in other words, is it useful to test this theory outside its original 
context to attempt to broaden its scope or should we just use it for what it was originally for?  
One important contribution of this case to the theory can be a blurring of the boundaries 
between collective actors and the political. Rather than a sharp division between two sides, as the 
theory assumes – the movement and the state or other authority – in studying squatters in 
Montevideo we learn that reality is more complex. We find former politicians or politicians in 
office living in squatter settlements or helping squatters with information on available plots to 
invade. We find squatters that work for the state as military staff or as contractors building bus 
stops. Moreover, we find political parties that permeate both the state and the squatter 
settlements. This more complex reality invites us to use already made theories with caution. 
70
 
Still, being the devil‘s advocate here, if the results of modeling the count of invasions 
hold, this work also shows that the plain theory as created in the context of the wealthy 
democracies also works for this case even though squatters do not fit definitions of social 
movements and the scene takes place in a totally different setting from where the theory was 
born. Land invasions have been more likely in post-electoral years and electoral years. True, I 
add the interaction dimension, but overall the theory works. Thus, how can the case show the 
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 Also studying a context outside the wealthy democracies, the turbulent Argentina of the 2001 economic and 
political crisis, Auyero (2007) suggests that rather than looking at opponents and state, we should pay attention to 
their interpenetration and confusion.  
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strengths and the weaknesses of the theory at the same time? I believe this has to do with another 
important issue this study speaks to, namely methods and methodologies.  
Developments in the philosophy of science have made it customary to believe, at least in 
the social sciences, that theories are lenses through which we see reality. If we change lenses we 
may see different things. Methods or methodological approaches are also lenses through which 
we see reality. By combining what are traditionally called quantitative and qualitative methods 
this research faces the problem of finding contradictory realities. Qualitative inquiry is often 
illuminating in telling us things were not as simple as they seemed and in illustrating how, if we 
look in depth, there is much more heterogeneity than we originally thought. Quantitative inquiry, 
in turn, often tells us there are patterns or trends. Both types of inquiry have risks such as 
encountering complexity where parsimony is reigning, or claiming parsimony where complexity 
is evident.  
This particular study, in attempting to mix both types of methodological lenses, runs the 
risk of getting at contradictory results.  And it does. When looking at land invasions as events it 
finds some parsimony in terms of an outside political opportunity (election timing) being 
relevant for collective action (occurrence of a land invasion). Yet, when looking at land 
invasions more closely, as processes with actors, it finds the interpenetration of politicians and 
the state with squatters and other sources of complexity. I do not think choosing is a great idea. 
In many ways this work has, from its conception, advocated for that no-choice, for the fun and 
richness of mastering and using different lenses. 
71
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 I have use the expression ―traditionally called quantitative and quantitative methods‖ because I believe part of the 
division has to do with the social construction of Sociology and other social sciences such as Political Science as 
disciplines rather than with intrinsic characteristics of the data any method deals with. I have here shown how stories 
are essential to understand coefficients and how ethnography can be used to find data points and to create categories 
we later use to count. Because of this, I distrust the essentializing perspectives such as King, Keohane, and Verba‘s 
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Another important question for this study is, beyond methodological choices and beyond 
the particular political opportunities theory, what if anything has this case to say to the literature 
on contentious politics more broadly? Perhaps the most important contribution in this front is 
attesting that this literature is useful beyond the most common forms of contention such as 
violent riots, revolutions or well defined social movements.  Squatters in Montevideo do not see 
themselves as social movements or any type of defiant actor. It has been difficult for them to 
coordinate efforts and form umbrella organizations. They do not use collective violence either. 
Still there are many smaller processes and events involved in squatting that require collective 
action, coordination, petitioning, selecting leaders and so on. The literature on contentious 
politics is extremely useful to understand such processes. This work, therefore, sides with the 
idea that it is much more useful to focus on causal mechanisms that are common to different 
types of contentious politics, or even more broadly different types of collective action, than on 
questions such as what causes revolutions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The role of 
political brokers in finding safe plots to invade, planning invasions and getting resources from 
the state illustrates this.  Brokerage is a mechanism present in many different forms of 
contentious politics.  
In addition, also in relation to contentious politics, this work illustrates the connections 
between contention and routine or ordinary politics. It is an old claim of the modern literature on 
contention that social movements and other forms of organized collective action are not different 
from institutional politics but, on the contrary, very much alike. Besides, there are connections 
between them. Some activists may participate in both. Contention may cause changes in 
institutions. Institutions often channel and structure movements‘ claims.  Movements may end up 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1994) when they leave the realm of explanation to quantitative inquiry and the realm of description to qualitative 
methods.  
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as political parties. And, as the case of squatters illustrates, electoral politics have a lot to do with 
the moments in which people may mobilize or request services from the state. Moreover, we can 
risk a counterfactual and say that squatting in Uruguay would have been very different if 
political parties were not as omnipresent in state institutions as they have traditionally been.   
To finish these concluding remarks, I would like to think of two new directions I imagine 
this work could take. One of them is comparative and the other has to do with the analysis of 
space. Regarding comparison, the delicate question concerns the relevant comparative categories 
or cases. This work has already been comparative in two ways. It compares time periods and 
types of land invasions. The challenge would therefore be to go beyond Montevideo or beyond 
squatters. Taking the first option, I have suggested throughout this dissertation that the timing of 
Montevideo‘s peak in squatting was delayed in comparison to other metropoles of the region. 
The interesting question here is of course why. The case I believe is most interesting to compare 
Montevideo with is Santiago de Chile, among other things because they are both capital cities of 
countries with similar welfare state traditions, early industrialization and urbanization, and 
considerable experience of uninterrupted democracy until their militaries took over. The 
interesting difference between these two cases is that while in Santiago the greatest peak in 
squatting occurred before the military regime, in Montevideo, as we saw, squatting peaked 
afterwards. Nonetheless, the coincidence is that both peaks occurred at times of great electoral 
competition for the urban poor followed by leftist governments: Allende‘s presidency and 
Vázquez‘ city administration.  
In going beyond squatters to compare, options are multiple. One could be comparing 
squatters with other more traditional forms of mobilization within Uruguay, such as the 
cooperative housing movement (FUCVAM) or the labor movement. Do they follow similar 
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trends of mobilization? Are they countercyclical? Are they connected in any way? I have been 
already collecting information and speculating about this type of comparison, especially with the 
cooperative housing movement. Given its main issue, housing, the cooperative housing 
movement belongs to the same family as squatting. But it is a much more structured movement 
and, as we saw in this dissertation, it was thought for a working class with stable jobs and with 
organizational abilities transferred from unions. Besides, while FUCVAM thinks of itself as a 
social movement and is perceived by the general public and politicians as such, squatters are not. 
In two occasions, in 1989 and in 2006, FUCVAM decided to invade land in order to request 
more land for their cooperatives from the state. Both times their violation of property rights was 
considered as defiant behavior. Moreover, FUCVAM‘s land invasions had positive outcomes for 
the movement. The occupations of 1989 ended with the municipal policy called Cartera de 
Tierras (pool of vacant land) which promoted the use of public vacant land by organized groups, 
including cooperatives. The occupations of 2006 had great publicity as well and ended with the 
municipality offering 12 plots for cooperatives. 
72
  
What makes the comparison between FUCVAM and squatters interesting, among other 
things, is how the same fact, invading land, has different connotations and consequences both for 
the collective actors and for their political environment. Squatters‘ land invasions keep the urban 
poor in invisibility. They do not appear in the news and they solve by themselves housing 
problems the state and the market are not solving. Land invasions by the cooperative housing 
movement, on the contrary, make the movement visible. This takes us to another interesting 
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 As developed in chapter four, after these last land invasions by FUCVAM, a change in legislation increased 
penalties for property violations of all sorts. The movement reacted furiously against this law, especially because all 
Frente Amplio legislators voted in favor.   
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possibility for comparison with other groups that have also reached visibility by invading land. 
The most famous one is perhaps the MST from Brazil.  
Finally, the second dimension I could use to expand this work is the spatial one. 
Mobilization, like all other social phenomena, does not occur in a vacuum. Space can have a 
crucial positive or negative impact on mobilization and can influence the shape and 
characteristics of mobilization. Contentious groups like squatters, in turn, mold, create, reinvent, 
or overcome the constraints of space as well. Although unfortunately social analysis many times 
forgets about space or takes it as a simple container of social phenomena, there has been some 
renewal in interest  on spatial issues among sociologists (Gans 2002; Gieryn 2000). There is also 
very interesting work on spatial issues and mobilization in sociology and other social sciences 
(Auyero 2006; Gonçalves 2001; Gould 1991; Hedstrom 1994; Holston 1999; Markoff 1996; 
Martin and Miller 2003; Tilly 2000; Tilly 2003).  
I have already analyzed some spatial aspects in this dissertation, by mapping squatters 
and by finding patterns of clustering of types of invasions. Yet, much more could be done. On 
the one hand, statistically, there are very interesting paths one could take. With the idea that 
neighbors do matter, we could test if the probability of a geographic unit having squatter 
settlements is determined in part for neighboring areas having land invasions as well. Even 
though the clustering found in this work suggests this is the case, much more refined work could 
be done controlling for other variables. The challenge is to find available relevant political and 
socio-demographic variables to control for that vary across the chosen geographical units.  
More substantially, space is a constitutive dimension of squatting. Squatters‘ main 
contention has to do with land, with urban space. They are socio-territorial actors that transform 
vacant space into meaningful territory, into their neighborhood. Their existence depends on the 
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availability of land. After seizing the land, mobilization shapes the space of the neighborhood. 
Without knowing anything about the people who live in a settlement, we can speculate about the 
degree of current neighborhood organization and type of land invasion just by looking at the 
neighborhood layout. Planned invasions and subdivisions and sales distinguish themselves from 
accretion invasions because their neighborhood layout resembles a grid in the formal city, their 
houses tend to be built with cement, there is often a space for public use and so forth. Still, 
maintaining the original layout is not always easy, because norms are difficult to keep over time 
especially when more people keep coming every day. This expresses itself in the space if we 
observe the fringes of a settlement. Sometimes a very neat street layout starts to diffuse into 
crowded houses, perhaps closer to a river bank or in what originally was considered an 
uninhabitable area, with piles of garbage, and clearly poorer shacks.   
As individuals, by moving to an illegally occupied plot, squatters may transform their 
identities as well. Before they were poor or workers and now they are squatters, a status that is 
defined by where they live and not by their unsatisfied needs or what they do for a living. Before, 
they had to solve problems using family networks or friends. Now, they have collective problems 
to solve, such as getting water for their settlement, which they should try to solve with their 
neighbors. The idea of vicinity acquires a different meaning. By moving they also become 
subjects of state attention, which they were not when they lived in the formal city. In addition, it 
becomes interesting to study the processes that occur between a squatter settlement and its 
environment. In my fieldwork I was able to see a range from sharp spatial and social barriers 
between a settlement and a much wealthier environment to very blurry boundaries that made it 
difficult to distinguish where the informal settlement ends and the formal city begins. The 
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experiences of living in one situation or the other are likely to differ from one situation to the 
other, both for squatters and their neighbors.   
All these are new directions this work could take from now on. I would greatly enjoy 
being able to pursue one of them or, if not, I would love to think this work may inspire others‘ 
curiosity to do so.  
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APPENDIX A 
ORAL HISTORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
I am María José Álvarez, and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology at the University of 
Pittsburgh in the US. I am conducting a study of squatter settlements in Montevideo, and I am interested 
in the story of your neighborhood. The interview will take approximately 90 to 120 minutes. Dr. John 
Markoff, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, is supervising my progress on this 
project. 
 
Record on Template. 
Do not Tape 
 Date:  
 Location of Interview:  
 Neighborhood:  
 Role of interviewee in the neighborhood (type of activities performed and 
since when):   
 Demographic information:  (age, gender, race, class identification, 
occupation, education, household composition, and residential trajectory –
previous neighborhood, childhood neighborhood, date the person moved to 
the squatter settlement and plans to move out if any):   
 
Neighborhood data:  
Open question about 
neighborhood origin 
first. It’s important to 
let the interviewees 
speak freely to later 
analyze their 
narrative 
construction.  
After that, ask 
specific questions if 
the information does 
not come up as 
specifically as 
needed.  
Focus on how they 
solved problems (do 
1. How did this neighborhood start? What do you know about its history?  
 
Make sure the following issues are covered. If not, probe or ask directly. 
 When did it happen? 
 Name (who named the settlement and why?) 
 Who were the first settlers? 
 Number of initial settlers. 
 Did settlers know each other from before (e.g., coworkers, neighbors, 
members of the same political group, etc)? 
 What were the previous neighborhoods of initial settlers? 
 Why did people decide to move to a squatter settlement? 
 Who were the initial leaders and how did you chose them? 
 Who owned the land? 
 Very specific description of the first day or days of settlement (was there a 
planned invasion? If planned, how planned? By whom? Where did they/you 
meet to plan? How did they/you choose the land?  How did they/you choose 
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not ask directly about 
clientelism).  
the date? Did you have government authorization? 
 Role of external actors: Did they/you receive any help from non-settlers (e.g., 
lawyers, politicians, other settlements, NGO, government official, judge, land 
owner, etc).? Particularly important is getting information on the role of 
political groups (formal/informal, before/after the occupation, party, type of 
help and timing).  
 Did they/you receive any threat of eviction (e.g., police, politician, 
government, court, land owner, etc.? When and in what way? With what 
consequences? (reaction of neighborhood, follow-up by police, politician, 
etc). 
 How many and what types of groups did you have at the beginning?  
 How often did they meet? 
 Who participated of those organizations? (number and characteristics).  
 Did women and men participate in similar or different ways? (Older and 
younger? Employed versus unemployed? People from the city versus people 
coming from elsewhere?) 
 Did you have any relationship with other settlements or with social 
movements such as the labor movement or the cooperative housing 
movement?  
 (specifically about space) Who planned the neighborhood layout and why? 
And what has happened with the original plan?  
 Did you ever feel you were breaking the law or defying the authorities? 
 When the settlement was first established did it identify itself with any 
political party ? 
 
After the origins, ask 
about the evolution. 
2. What happened after the initial days? How did you solve the neighborhood 
problems? 
 
Focus on one or two issues (housing, water, light, food) and explore in detail 
how they obtained those goods. Probe for specific answers (including names and 
dates) in order to reconstruct the process and the social networks involved. Remember 
that you want to know if there are family, neighborhood, political or other networks 
that play a significant role and what is the role of the interviewee in these networks.  
You want to understand if clientelism plays a role, and if so, how. Make sure you get 
data on:  
 
 Who initiated and was in charge of the actions (a politician, a neighborhood 
group, a leader, the government) 
 What type of strategy was used (e.g., writing a letter, a person contacting 
somebody, a group contacting somebody, etc).. 
 
3. If you had to choose the three people or institutions that were most helpful 
to this neighborhood, who would you mention?   
 
 
Current Mobilization 
4. How is the neighborhood currently organized?  
Make sure the following issues are covered. If not, probe or ask directly. 
 
 How many and what types of groups are functioning in the neighborhood 
right now?  
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 When were they created and why? 
 How often do they meet? 
 Who participates in these organizations? (number of people and 
characteristics).  
 Do women and men participate in similar or different ways? (Older and 
younger? Employed versus unemployed? People from the city versus people 
coming from elsewhere?) 
 Do you participate in inter-neighborhood associations? Have you ever gotten 
together with any other neighborhood organization? For what? Which 
neighborhoods (location, name). Do you have any relationship with other 
social movements such as the labor movement or the cooperative housing 
movement?  
 Who are the leaders and who chose them? 
 What are your goals as a neighborhood?  
 What are your main problems?  
 What have been the main successes?  
 Are there any political clubs in the neighborhood? Who participates and what 
do they do?  
 Does the neighborhood association identify with any political party? Why?  
 Does the neighborhood participate in the local government? How?   
 Compare the neighborhood of today with its initial state? What has changed? 
What is the same?  
 Are there any rules regarding who visits/lives/or works here? Which ones?  
 How would you characterize this settlement politically? Is there a primary 
political party? Is there a political club in the neighborhood or close by? 
Which party would you say got the most neighborhood votes in the last 
election? 
 What‘s the most famous politician in this neighborhood? 
 How would you characterize the relationship of the neighborhood with the 
administration?  (local and national)? 
 
Individual data.  
Personal motivation 
to move, personal 
history of activism 
and personal problem 
solving networks.  
5. Now I‘d like to ask you some questions about yourself in relation to your 
neighborhood. Why did you move here? And why at that particular moment?  
6. (for leaders) How did you become a neighborhood leader? (for non leaders) 
were you ever in a leadership position in the neighborhood? Why or why not?). Have 
you ever participated in other organizations outside the neighborhood?  
7. What were your steps (if any) in neighborhood or political militancy? Have 
you ever participated in organizations outside the neighborhood (parties, unions, 
neighborhood association, etc).? 
8. I have already asked you about the neighborhood, but  how have you 
solved your personal problems such as housing, labor, and so on? 
9 Which party do you identify with (if it did not come up during the 
interview)? Why? Which party did you vote for in the last elections of 2004? Why? 
 
Additional questions will be asked to clarify or expand on answers given by subjects. 
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